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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2343 ' 
CLARA J. NEELY, Plaintiff in Er:.:"or, 
versus 
GROVER L. WHITE, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR.-
To the Honorable Chief Justice and.Ji1,Stices of the Siipreme 
Court of Avpeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Clara J. Neely, respectfully represents that 
she is aggrieved by a final judgment entered by the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk on the 23rd day of May, 1940, 
in an action at law in which your said petitioner was plain-
tiff and Grover L. White was defendant, which judgment 
awarded to your petitioner a recovery against the said de-
fendant of Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00), with in-
terest thereon froin the 1st day of November, 1938, subject 
to a credit of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), with interest 
on said sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) from the 2nd 
day of February, 1928. Your petitioner claims that she was 
· entitled to a judgment for the said sum of Twenty-five Hun-
dred Dollars ($2,500.00) and interest without any credit what-
soever. 
A transcript of t];ie record accompanies this petition. 
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2• *STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
The issues presented in this case can be more readily un-
derstood if the statement of the facts sets out first the factual 
situation which preceded the litigatio~ and next the pro-
ceedings and pleadings in the case. For this reason the state-
ment of the facts will be divided in this. petition as indicated. 
Your petitioner occupied the position of plaintiff in the court 
below and will be referred to in this petition from time to time 
as plaintiff, and the defendant in error, Grover L. White, 
occupied the position of defendant in the court below and will 
be ref erred to from time to time herein as defendant. 
1'he Factital s,ituation Precedvn_q Litigation. 
On November 1, 1927, Clara J . .Neely lent the sum of Twen-
ty-five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) to Cape Henry Cottage 
Corporation, a Virginia corporation of Norfolk, which exe-
cuted and delivered to her its negotiable promissory note for 
the principal sum of Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) 
dated November 1, 1927, payable two years after date, with 
six per cent interest payable semi-annually. This debt was 
secured by a deed of trust on a lot in Norfolk, Site 2, on the 
Plat of Glencove Estates. 
On February 1, 1928,-before any installment of interest on 
said note fell due-Cape Henry Cottage Corporation con-
veyed said Lot to Grover L. White, defendant below, and de-
f P.ndant in error here. The deed was signed and sealed not 
only by the grantor, but by Grover L. White, and contained 
this provision: '' As a part of the consideration of this con-
veyance the said Grover L. White hereby assumes and prom-
ises to pay a debt of Twenty-fi.ve Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) 
and interest secured by a certain deed of trust from the said 
Cape Henry Cottag·e Corporation to Wm. G. Maupin, Trus-
tee, bearing date on the 1st day of November, 1927, and duly 
of record in the aforesaid Clerk's Office in Deed Book 302-B, 
page 135, according to the terms and conditions of said deed 
of trust.'' 
Thereafter White paid interest to your petitioner on the 
1st day of May, 1928, and on the 1st days of each succeeding 
November and May up to and including· the interest on No-
vember 1, 1938. He did not pay the installment of interest 
due on May 1, 1939; he made no reply to several letters 
3* which were- *written him requesting payment of said 
interest, and he paid no attention to telephone calls re-
questing payment thereof. An action of assimipsit was insti-
tuted in the Circuit Court of the City of -Norfolk by Clara ,J. 
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Neely against Grover L. White returnable to first September 
Rules, 19·39, seeking recovery of said sum of Twenty-five Hun-
dred Dollars ($2,500.00), with interest from the 1st day of 
November, 1938, by virtue of the promise under seal mad~ 
by White as aforesaid to pay the same, and by permission of 
§5143 of the Code of Virginia authorizing actions at law by 
persons for whose benefit, in whole or in part, a promise or 
covenant has been made. 
The P1·oceedings and Pleadings in, the Case. 
The declaration in assitmpsit consisted of two counts, the 
first being the common counts in indebi.tatus assittnpsit, and 
the second being a special count declaring. on the defendant's 
promise under seal to pay. Plaintiff filed with her de,c.lara-
tion the affidavit and account prescribed by §6133 of the Code 
of Virginia, a copy whereof was duly served on the def end-
ant. At first September Rules, 1939, the defendant neither ap-
pearing nor pleading, the common order was entered; and at 
second September Rules, the defendant still failing -to ap-
pear or plead, the common -order was confirmed and an office 
judgment entered. 
The first day of the next succeeding term of the Circuit 
.Court of the City of .Norfolk after second September Rules, 
1939, was the 9th day of October. On that date the defendant 
filed a general demurrer to plaintiff's declaration. Counsel 
for defendant notified counsel for the plaintiff in writing that 
he had filed a demurrer, stating· that he had asked, ex pa.rte, 
that argument on the same be heard on 'November 4, 1939. 
He said nothing to plaintiff's counsel then or thereafter as 
to whether he had filed or would file any other or further 
pleadings. No reply was made to this letter. 
The :fifteenth day of the October Term, 1939, of the .Circuit 
Court of the City of 'Norfolk fell on October 23rd. On the 
morning of October 24th counsel for plaintiff, upon inquiry 
at the Clerk's Office, ascertained that no pleadings other than 
said demurrer had been filed on behalf of the defendant. 
Plaintiff's counsel was informed that counsel for defend-
4fi< ant would be present that *morning in the Circuit Court 
of the ·City of Norfolk; and, in the presence of counsel 
for defendant, plaintiff's counsel moved said court for a j:udg-
ment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of Twenty-five Hundred 
Dollars ($2,500.00), with interest from November 1, 1938, 
upon the g-round that the office judgment, entered as afore-
said at second September R,ules, had become final at the close 
of the fifteenth day of the Term, to-wit: October 23, 1939, pur-
suant to §6134 of the Code of Virginia; and, since there had 
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been no plea to issue supported by affidavit as prescribed by 
.§6135 of the Code of Virginia, it could not now be set aside. 
The court took said motion under advisement. 
At a later date the court overruled the demurrer of the de-
fendant and, over plaintiff's exception, overruled plaintiff's 
motion for judgment, and permitted defendant to plead. 
Pursuant to this permission, the defendant filed three 
pleas : a plea of non est f actum, a plea of the statute of limi-
tations, and a plea which was entitled ''Plea of Failure of 
Consideration". A motion to reject all of these pleas was 
argued with the result that the court declined to reject the 
· plea of non est factwni; it did reject the plea of the statute 
of limitations as being bad on its face; and the plea entitled 
''Plea of Failure of ·Consideration'' was demonstrated upon 
the arg·ument as s·o obviously bad that defendant's counsel 
withdrew it. 
Defendant also filed a written motion to transfer this cause 
to the equity side of the court, which motion was overruled 
by the court. 
At this stage of the proceedings the pleadings consisted of 
the declaration and a plea of non est fact um. 
Thereafter the defendant asked leave of court to file an-
other plea which he entitled "1Special Plea of Set-Off", which 
was concededly an attempt to file a plea under the provisions 
of §6145 of the Code. Leave was granted, over the exception 
of the plaintiff, to .file this plea, and plaintiff filed in writing 
her motion to reject the same. The gist of this plea was as 
follows: That by a certain contract dated January 28, 1928, 
the defendant, Grover L. White, had agreed to sell to Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation an apartment house in Norfolk 
the consideration for which was stated at $15,000.00 "to be 
-paid in notes assumed, land, money, and notes to be given as 
follows'': 
· 5~ * (1) $10,000.00 in cash. 
(2) $2,500.00, evidenced by six per cent notes payable 
. _$100.00 at 90 days; $100.00 at 6 months; $100.00 at 9 months; 
$100.00 at 12 months; $100.00 at 15 months; $100.00 at 18 
months; and the balance at two years. 
(3) To execute and deliver to White a deed for the said 
Site 2 on the Plat of Glencove Estates, the lot to be taken by 
Wbite at a valuation of $5,000.00 and he to asstime the 
$2,500.00 debt owed to the plaintiff and secured by deed of 
trust thereon. · 
The µlea stated that the contract was executed and that 
Cape Henry Cottage Corporation had failed to pay certain of 
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the notes delivered to White pursuant to the coµtract men-
tioned under sub-head (2) above, aggregating the pdncipal 
sum of $1,000.00. 
The theory of the defendant was that pursuant to the prQ-
visions of §5143 of the Code of Virginia any defense- available 
to White as against Cape Henry Cottage Corporation was · 
equally avaiiable to him as against the plaintiff, Clara J. 
Neely, who had instituted her action under the permission 
afforded by that statute. The motion to reject this plea was 
based on several grounds, inter alia, that the said contract 
had been fully performed by Cape Henry Cottage Corporation 
as shown on the face of the plea; that the plea was bad be-
cause it sought rescission of the contract; and that it was 
bad because it sought speculative damages. After hearing 
argument the court overruled the motion to reject and the 
plaintiff duly excepted. 
At this stage of the proceedings, pursuant to a petition 
filed by the defendant, Cape Henry Cottage Corporation was 
made a formal party defendant under the provisions of §6150 
of the Code. It filed its plea of general issue and its plea of 
· the statute of limitations to the claim asserted against it in 
defendant's special plea of set-off. 
Thereafter the plaintiff filed a general replication-the 
only replication permitted here under §6146 of the Code-and 
the case went to trial. The pleadings at the trial were as fol-
lows: 
The decl~.ration of the plaintiff supported by affidavit and 
account. 
6* *Plea of non est f actum filed by defendant White. 
Special plea of set-off filed by defendant White pur-
.suant to §6145 of the Code. 
Plaintiff's general replication. 
· Pleas of general issue and statute of limitations filed by 
Cape Henry Cottage Corporation to the claim asserted against 
it by defendant ''s special plea of set-off. 
It should be borne in mind that throug·hout the whole course 
of the pleadings and at the trial the plaintiff did not waive 
her right to have final judgment entered in her favor as of 
the 24th day of October, 1939, but, on the contrary, renewed 
her motion for such judgment at every stage of the proceed-
in~;s (M. R., pp. 8, 15, 24, 38). 
White admitted his execution under seal of the deed of 
February 1, 1928, in which he assumed and promised to pay 
the Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) and interest evi-
denced by the note held by the plaintiff (M. R., p. 69), and 
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admitted that. he had paid interest thereon regularly to her 
at semi-annual intervals through the installment matming 
November 1, 1938. He further admitted that he had made 
no payment of interest since that time (M. R., pp. 66, 82. See 
also M. R., pp. 42-45). He testified that three of the notes 
which were cl,elivered to him by Cape Henry Cottage Corpora-
tion puts"Q.ant to the contract of January 28, 1928, of an ag-
gregate f(ce value of $1,000.00, had not been paid (M. R., p. 
64). Tke last of said notes 111,atured on -l?ebruary 2, 1930. 
The evidence shows that White made no effort to collect these 
notes from Cape Henry Cottage Corporation (M. R., pp. 66, 
89-90), and that. he never mentioned them to plaintiff or 
claimed them as off-set or defense until this action had been 
brought against him ( M. R., pp. 82-83). 
At the trial plaintiff offered two instructions, the gravamen 
whereof was that if the jury should believe that White's right 
of action on any unpaid notes of Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration held by him accrued more than five years prior to 
the f\ling uf his special plea of set-off, he was not entitled to 
recover anything by virtue of said notes, and that they consti-
tuted no ground of off-set or defense in favor of White as 
against Neely and no ground of recovery in favor of White 
as against Cape Henry Cottage Corporation. Both of these 
instructions were refused and plaintiff duly excepted. 
T'' *The verdict of the jury was in favor of the plaintiff 
Neely against the defendant White in the sum of Twenty-
five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) with interest thereon from 
November 1, 1938, subject to a credit of One Thousand Dol-
lars ($1,000.00) with interest from F'ebruary 2, 1928. 
There was no verdict or fudgment in favor of White against 
Cape Henry Cottage Corporation. 
Motions were made both by plaintiff N ecly and defendant 
White, by plaintiff for a judgment for Twenty-five Hundred 
Dollars ($2,500.00) with interest from November 1, 1938, and 
by defendant that judgment be entered for the defendant, 
and argued. The court overruled both motions and entered 
judgment on the verdict. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
First Assignment. 
The court erred in overruling plaintiff's motion to enter 
judgment in her favor as of October 24th, 1939, for Twenty-
five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) with interest from Novem-
ber 1st, 1938: because the office judgment became final at the 
close of the fifteenth day of the term, to-wit, October 23rd, 
Clara J. Neely v. Grover L. White. 7 
1939, and, since defendant did not sooner plead to issue and 
:file au affidavit with his plea, the office judgment could not 
thereafter be set aside. 
Second Assignment. 
The court erred in overruling plaintiff's motion to reject 
defendant's special plea of set-off, because: 
(a) The plea shows on its face that the contract vouched 
therein was not breached, but fully performed, and shows that 
the claim therein asserted does not entitle the defendant to 
recovery or relief against the obligation of the contract sued 
on; and it is the ref ore bad. 
( b) The plea seeks rescission of a con tract to convey real 
estate and offers to reconvey the same, and it is therefore 
bad. 
( c) The plea seeks to recover consequential damages for 
the alleged breach of a promise to pay money, and it is there-
fore bad. 
*Third Assignm,ent. 
The court erred in refusing plaintiff's instructions 2 and 3, 
because the notes described in the defendant's special plea 
of set-off were clearly barred by the statute of ·limitations, the 
plaintiff was entitled to have the jury instructed that in such 
case said notes could not be considered as the basis of defense, 
set-off or recovery, and the instructions correctly stated the 
law on the point. 
These assignments of error will be considered in their order. 
ARGUMENT. 
First Assignment of Error: Tha.t the office .fudgment 
shou,ld not have been set aside; but, on the contrary, .iudgment 
slwitld ha,ve been entered thereon as of the 24th day of Oc-
tobe.r, 1939. 
';['he plaintiff instituted her action of assu.1nvsit against the 
defendant to First September Rules, 1939. The declaration 
contained two counts : The first comprised the common counts 
of indebitatu.s assumpsit; the second was a special count" al-
legfog· a written promise, under seal, to pay (M. R., p. 1). 
The plaintiff followed the provisions of ~6133 of the Code 
of Virginia, and filed with her declaration an account and 
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affidavit; certified copies of which account and affidavit were 
served upon the defendant pursuant to the provisions of that 
Section (M. R., p. 4). The defendant did not appear or plead 
at any Rules, with the result that an office judgment was en-
tered at Second September rules, 1939 ( M. H., p. 7). The 
procedure adopted by _the plaintiff under §6133 of the· Code 
avoided a writ of inquiry. Pursuant to §6134 of the Code, 
this office judgment became final, if not previously set aside, 
at the adjournment of the next term of the Circuit .Court of 
the City of Norfolk or at the close of the fifteenth day thereof, 
whichever should happen first: concretely, at the close of the 
23rd day of October, 1939, which was the fifteenth day of the 
next term of Court. This statute, so far as. pertinent here, 
reads as follows : 
'' Every judgment entered ip. the office in a case wherein 
there is no order for an inquiry of damages, and every non-
suit or dismission entered therein, shall if not previously set 
aside, become a final judgment, if the case be in a circuit court, 
on the adjournment of the next term or at the close of the 
fifteenth day thereof (whichever shall happen first)." 
9* ·. *§6135 of the Code provides that an office judgment 
may be set aside if the defendant "shall, before it be-
comes final, appear and plead to issue, and shall, in the cases 
mentioned in §6133, in which an affidavit is required, file such 
affidavit with his plea". 
Upon the first day of the October term of the Circuit Court 
of the City of Norfolk, at the calling of the docket, defend-
ant, through counsel, appeared and filed a general demurrer 
to the plaintiff's declaration ( M. R., p. 7). No other plead-
ing was filed by this defendant prior to the close of the fif-
teenth day of the term, to-wit, the 23rd day of October, 1939. 
On the 24th day of October, 1939, the plaintiff moved the 
court to enter judgment iu her favor in the sum of Twenty-
five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) with interest thereon from 
the first day of November, 1938, until paid, and the costs 
of this action (l\L R., p. 8). The lower court overruled the 
motion and set aside the office judgment ( M. R., p. 9). Plain--
tiff contends that the only method through which the office 
judgment entered in her favor at the Second 1September Rules, 
1939, can lawfully be set aside, is by the defendant having 
plead to issue prior to the close of the fifteenth day of the· 
October term of court, supporting such plea with the affida-
vit required in §6133 of the Code. Failing such plea the of-
fice judgment became final at the close of the fifteenth day of 
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the term, to-wit, the 23rd day of October, 1939, and final judg-
ment' should have been entered thereon. 
Two points will be considered below, and in their order of 
presentation here, namely: 
First-The filing of a general demurrer without the filing 
of a plea to issue does not set aside the office judgment. 
·Second-The filing of a general demurrer to a declaration · 
in assumpsit which contains one count composed of the com-
mon counts of ind,ebitatus assumpsit is a nullity as to said 
count. 
The Demurrer Does Not Set .Aside the Office Judgment. 
§6135 of the Code of Virginia provides, as noted above, that 
in order to set aside the office judgment the defendant must, 
before it becomes final, appear and plead to iS,'NM3. 
10* * At the threshold of this discussion it may be said 
that since §6135 requires that in all cases where an ac-
count and affidavit are filed with the declaration :md served 
on the defendant, he must, in order to set aside the office judg-
ment, not only "plead to issue" but "file such (counter) af-
fidavit with his plea", it would seem obvious that the Legis-
lature did not contemplate that the filing of a demurrer would 
be equivalent to pleading to issue. In the nature of things a 
demurrer could not be supported by a counter-affidavit, and 
hence a mandatory requirement of the statute could not be 
complied with. 
Two Virginia cases construing·. this statute may properly 
be noticed here. In Price v. Marks, 103 Va. 18, there was an 
action of assmnvsit in which the declaration was supported 
by an affidavit and account. An office judgment was entered 
upon the defendant's failure to appear or plead at the Second 
Rules. On the first day of the next term the defendant filed 
two pleas, general issue and statute of limitations, and noth-
ing further was done during that term. Neither of these pleas 
was accompanied by the affidavit required by the statute. 
At a subsequent term plaintiff moved the court to strike out 
the pleas :filed by the defendant and to enter judgment on 
the office judgment; but the court overruled this motion and 
the case went to trial. On appeal this Court reversed the ac-
tion of the lower court, saying : 
''In this case, the plaintiff having complied with the pro-
vision of the statute by filing with his declaration an account 
upon which the action was broug·ht, accompanied by the req-
uisite affidavit, he stood secure in his right to a judgment 
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for the amount of the account until the defeii.dant filed a plea 
in bar to the action, verified by her affidavit, as also required 
by the statute, which plea in bar could only be filed during 
the succeeding term following the rules to which the action 
was brought; and such a plea not having been filed judgment 
should have been entered for the plaintiff' '-unless the plain-
tiff has waived the requirement for a sworn plea, etc. 
In Gring v. Lake Drwmniond Land Co., 110 Va. 754, there 
was presented again an action of assiinipsit in which the 
declaration was supported by affidavit and account. An of-
fice judg'lnent .was entered but no pleas were filed at the next 
succeeding·"term. At a subsequent term the defendant filed a 
plea of general issue with a counter-affidavit. He also filed 
a plea of the statute of limitations. Thereafter plaintiff 
moved that the pleas be stricken out and that the order, there-
tofore entered, setting aside the office judgment, be set 
11 * *aside and judgment in favor of the plaintiff be entered. 
The lower c.ourt overruled this motion and let the case 
go to trial. This action of the lower court was overruled 011 
appeal and the opinion of this Court says: 
'' All proceedings in this case after the office judgment in 
favor of plaintiff in error became final on the last day of the 
January term, 1907, of the circuit court, or 011 the fifteenth 
day thereof, whichever happened first, were a nullity, oe 
should be set aside, so as to entitle him to the benefit of this 
final judgment in his favor against the defendant in error for 
the amount of his claim." 
The opinion further says : 
"That plaintiff in error was entitled to an office judgment 
for the amount of his claim sued on at the second rules held 
in the clerk's office following the filing of his declaration ac-
companied by this affidavit, etc., required by Section 3286 
of the Code, to bec.ome final on the fifteenth day of the next 
term of court or at the expiration thereof, if that occurred 
before the fifteenth day of the term, unless the defendant filed· 
a plea in bar of the action accompanied by affidavit as re-
quired by the same statute, is the settled law in this State." 
It will be noticed that this Court in both of the cases last 
cited construed the language of the statute requiring· the de-
fendant to '' plead to issue'' to mean a plea ·in ba.r, accom-
panied by an affidavit if an affidavit accompanied the declara-
tion. Prfoe v. Marks says that plaintiff "stood secure in his 
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right to a judgment for the amount of the account until the 
defendant filed a. plea in bar to the action * * * which plea in 
bar could only be filed during the succeeding term following 
the rules to which the action was brought.'' Gring v. Lake 
Drumnwnd Land Co. says that the plaintiff was entitled to an 
office judgment '' to become final on the fifteenth day of the 
next term of court or at the expiration thereof, if that oc-
curred before the fifteenth day of the term, unless the defend-
ant filed a plea in bar of the action accompanied by affidavit'', 
etc. 
Burks' Pleading· and Practice (3rd Ed.), page 51, classines 
pleas in bar as being divided into two general classes, namely: 
First, by traverse, and Second, by confession and avoidance. 
The same classification is repeated on page 302. 
From the above it would appear that this Court had never 
considered that the filing of a demurrer was equivalent to a 
plea to issue, or, as that phrase has been construed by 
12* this Court, to a plea in bar. It is certain that *cases 
from other jurisdictions bear out such a conclusion. 
In Welsh v. Blackwell, 14 N. J. L. (2 J. S. G1=een) 344, 346, 
it was held that the term '' to plead'', when used in a limited 
and appropriate sense, excludes the idea of a de~urrer. 
In Smith v. Berryman (Mo.), 156 S. W. 40, the question was 
squarely presented whether the filing of a demurrer was 
equivalent to the filing of a plea. The Missouri ·Court re-
f erred to the 0pinion of Judge Lewis in the earlier case of 
.Alexander v. Ryan, 2 Mo. App. 303 : 
" * * * In point of fact, here the relator did not plead to 
or traverse the return but demurred to it, and, as said by 
Judge Lewis, 'no common law writer or lawmaker ever con-
f ouuded a plea or pleading with a demurrer-which implies, 
simply, a refusal to plead'." 
In Bates v. Colvin (R. I.), 41 Atl. 1004, the opinion contains 
this: 
"Defendant's counsel contends, however, that under Gen. 
Laws R. I., c. 238, ~3, he had the right to file his demurrer 
in the common pleas division. Said action is as follows: 
'Sec. 3. In any case certified to the common pleas division 
of the Supreme Court, on claim for jury trial from a district 
court, either party may file in said division such further pleas, 
legal or equitable, as he may see fit, within the period of ten 
days from the day of certification.' We do not think this 
language is broad enough to include a demurrer. A de-
murrer is not a plea, but, on the contrary, is an excuse for 
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not pleading. Perry Pl. 174; Haiton v. Jeffreys, 10 _Mod. 
280. ,, 
Havens v. Hartford.& New Haven R. R. Oo., 28 Conn. 69, 
89: 
"Gould, in his treatise on Pleading, p. 46, Sec. 43, says: 
'A demurrer to the declaration is not classed among pleas to 
the action, not only· because it may be taken as well to any 
other part of the pleadings as to the declaration, but also be-
cause it neither affirms nor denies any matter of fact, and is 
not the ref ore reg·arded as strictly a plea of any class, but 
rather as an excuse for not pleading.' '' 
Me.rrill v. Pepperdine (Ind.), 36 N. E. 921: 
·' * * * Strictly speaking, a demurrer is not a pleading. 
In the common-law practice, a plea is the defendant's an-
swer to the merits of the declaration, as opposed to a de-
murrer, arid 'to plead' is to make allegations of fact which 
follow and oppose the alleg·ations in the declaration. It is 
in this sense that 'plea' and 'to plead' are now generally un-
derstood. And. Law Diet. The word 'pleading', in its broad-
est sense, includes all proceedings from the complaint until 
issue is joined; but, in its most limited sense, it means the de-
fendant's answer to the complaint. The liberality provided 
for in the construction of pleadings by section :379, supra, 
does not, in our judgment, extend to a demurrer." 
JJ!layor of Baltimore v. Thomas (Md.), 80 Atl. 726: 
"It (the statute) says the defendant 'shall plead before 
the next succeeding return day, or judgment by default 
13* *for want of a plea shall be entered * * * unless the 
court for g·ood reason shall have granted said defend-
ant further time to plead'. As we have said, a demurrer mav 
in a sense be a pleading but it is not a plea, ·and this statute 
says that he shall vlead by the time named, and, if be does 
not, judgment for want of a plea shall be entered. (Italics a~ 
in the opinion.) 
Cornblatt v. Bloch (lVId.), 103 A.tl. 137: 
'' By these orders the defendant was granted 'leave * * * 
to file pleas within five days'. A demurrer is not mentioned 
in the order of plaintiff's counsel or the order of the court, 
but the consent of the plaintiff and the leave granted by the 
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court were expressly limited to the filing of pleas. In the 
case of Baltimore City v. Thomas, 115 Md. 212, 80 Atl. 726, 
Chief Judge Boyd, speaking for this court, said: 'A demurrer 
may in a sense be a pleading, but it is not a plea.' 
'' Giving· the terms employed their ordinary meaning, it 
would seem clear that the right granted the defendant' to file 
pleas within five days did not include the right to enter a de-
murrer to the declaration.'' · 
It seems obvious that the intention of the Legislature ·in 
enacting ~6135 was to speed the determination of cases, and, 
where plaintiff was willing to swear to the justice of his claim, 
to require a sworn denial thereof on the part of the defend-
ant, upon penalty of having judgment ente:r:ed against him. 
We have been unable to find any Virginia case in which the 
question was squarely presented as to whether a demurrer 
could properly be considered the equivalent to a plea to issue, 
or plea in bar, though we think that P.rice v. Marks, supra, and 
Gring v. Lake_ Drummond Land Go., supra, clearly show the 
disposition of the Court. We have, however, found highly 
persuasive authority upon this exact point. 
In the Second Edition of Burks' Pleading and Practice, 
page 266, the text makes the following statement: 
"The statute in Virginia makes prqvision for setting aside 
the office judgment at any time before it becomes final by 
pleading to issue, which excludes dilatory pleas. But it may 
be set aside by a general demurrer which is considered an 
issuable plea, or by any plea to the merits." 
The only authority cited for the statement in the text that 
an office judgment may be set aside by a general demurrer 
is Synie v. Griffin, 4 Hen. & M., page 277. 
In the Third Edition of Judge Burks' work, at page 
14* 111, the same *statement is made in the text with re-
g·ard to the effect of a general demurrer in setting aside 
office judg1nents. But the note appended to the text has the 
following· to say: 
''78. Sy111,e v. Griffin, 4 Hen. & M. 277. 
'' The reporter makes this statement in the syllabus, but 
the opinion of the court does not so state. The defendant 
filed pleas along· with his general demurrer. The -case was 
decided on the demurrer in favor of the defendant and on 
appeal the court sustained the ruling of the trial court· that 
the declaration was fatally defective. Nothing is said as to 
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what would have been done if the demurrer had been over-
ruled and there had been no plea filed. 
"Contra: Bank v. Burdette, 61 W. Va. 636, 57 .S. E. 53; 
Mellon & Sons v. Grafton (;;as, etc., Co., 71 W. Va. 649, Ti 
S. E. 141. In the latter case, the court said in construing 
what is now §5607 (2) of the W. Va. Code, similar in this re-
spect to Va. Code §6133, 'we have decided that a demurrer 
is not a plea to issue, setting aside an office judgment, and 
that whei:e ~o writ of inquiry is required, unless plea to issue 
be filed before the office judgment becomes final, it is then 
too late to· i'eceive such plea and there is nothing· left for the 
court to do at a subsequent term except to pronounce judg-
ment for the debt sued for'. In view of the above it would 
be very unwise for a. defendant in Virginia. to rely upon Byrne 
v. Griffin, supra. He should file his plea in issue along with 
his demurrer as he may also do under the Virginia pro-
cedure.'' 
The cases cited in the annotation just quoted fully sup-
port it. B(l;Jtk v. Burdette, supra, was an action of debt and 
the pl_aintiff filed with its declaration an affidavit, just as was 
done in this case. One of the defendants demurred to the 
declaration and the point was squarely presented as to whether 
under the West Virginia statute, essentially identical with 
Section 6135 of the Virginia Code, the demurrer had the ef-
fect of setting aside the office judgment. The opinion says: 
'' It is contended that the demurrer filed by A. C. Hall alone 
set aside the of .flee judgment as to both him and Lottie Hall, 
since the office judgment was joint ag·ainst them. vVe hold 
that under Section 46, c. 125, Code 1899 (Code 1906, §3866), a 
demurrer does not set aside an office judgment. It is true 
that the case of By1ne v. Griffin, 4 Hen. & l\L 277, in its syl-
labus states that a demurrer is an issuable plea competent to 
set aside an office judgment. The reporter so states the de-
cision: but it is not found in the decision of the court. Then 
the syllabus had no binding· force, being made by the reporter, 
not by the court. Now, our Constitution requires the court 
to make the syllabus, and it is that which is the real decision 
over the opinion. It would seem that Mr. Barton hesitated to 
incorporate it in his text as authority from the short note in 
1 Barton's Law Practice, p. 560. But, in addition, our pres-
ent statute g·overns. It says that an office judgment shall be 
final, if not set aside at the next term. On what terms can 
it be set aside f By 'plea.' with an affidavit, if the plain-
15* tiff has filed one, •that no amount, or only a certain 
amount, is due. This affidavit does not state matfer or 
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·law, but fact, and it accompanies a plea, which we take to be 
a plea of fact, not that plea of law called a 'demurrer'. What 
the use of an affidavit of fact to accompany a demurrer 1 After 
a party has let two rule days go by, and comes not in at the 
next term, he is taken to confess the fact. The statute pro-
ceeds on this theory. He bas made no defense of the debt. 
The fact, the debt as a matter of fact, stands confessed. No 
mere challenge of the law of the declaration will set aside 
this confession. If a defendant wishes to contest both law 
and fact, he can at the same time both demur and plead. • o1t * 
' .. ' A mere demurrer does not deny, but admits the debt. It 
cannot do away with that which the section speaks, the con-
fession of the debt, the finality of the office judgment. The 
design of the statute is to give speedy judgment. The sec-
tion in plain words demands that the defendant must appear 
at the first term and plead to issue. He cannot plead later. 
If the plaintiff has filed an affidavit, the defendant must file 
a counter one. How can we think that an affidavit has. to 
do with a demurrer f I repeat, what has the affidavit as to 
the amount of the demand to do with an issue of law on a 
demurrer? This means that only a plea of fact can deprive 
a plaintiff of his judgment. That is the thing that has come 
into being, and to annul it there must be matter of fact pleaded 
as to the facts alleged in the declaration, on which facts the 
judgment rests. The plea must go to those facts. A de-
murrer does not contest them, but admits them.'' 
The case of Mellon.& Sons v. Grafton Gas Company, sitpra, 
is also exactly in point. Plaintiffs filed their d~claration in 
debt supported by affidavit to December Rules, 1911. Of-
fice judgment was entered at January Rules, 1912. At the 
next term of the court defendants appeared and demurred, 
filing no other pleading. The court held that '' a demurrer 
is not a plea to issue, setting aside an office judgment, and 
that where no writ of inquiry is required, unless plea to issue 
be filed before the office judgment becomes final it is then too 
late to receive such plea, and there is nothing left for the 
court to do at a subsequent term except to pronounce judg-
ment for the debt sued for''. 
It was contended in the arguments before the trial court 
by counsel for the clef endant that these two West Virginia 
cases had been overruled by two later ,vest Virginia cases, 
µamely: Wilson v. Shrader, 79 S. E. 1083; and Snider v. 
Cochran, 92 S. E. 347. vVe deny that the effect of the later 
~ses was to overrule the doctrine of the earlier ones and 
we are prepared to demonstrate our contention in a· reply 
brief,. if a writ shall be granted to this petitioner and the 
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same contention shall be made by counsel for the defendant 
in error. We shall content our-selves here by saying that. 
16* we think it is most significant *that neither Bank v. Bur-
dette nor Mellon v. Grafton Gas Co. is noted in Shepard's 
Citations as being overruled, nor does the. learned author of 
Burks' Pleading and Practice consider that they have been 
overruled. 
Since the Virginia statute law permits a defendant to file 
as many pleas as he may be advised at the same time his de-
murrer is filed, it is certain that no hardship is worked upon 
any defendant who may be ·of opinion that a declaration filed 
against hi~ is insufficient in law. 
No Demurrer Will Lie to the Common Coimts In AssU1npsit 
and Therefore the De1nurrer Is a Nullity As to thl 
Ffrst Count of the Declaration. 
Even if a general demurrer could have the effect of setting 
aside the office judgment entered in this case, there is. in 
fact, no demurrer to the first count of the declaration. The 
first count of the declaration sets out the common counts of 
indebitatus assu11ipsit in the usual form, alleging an indebt-
edness of Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2,500:00) as of the 
first day of November, 1938 (1\L R., p. 1). The demurrer is 
a general demurrer to the declaration as a whole and says 
"that the declaration :filed ag·ainst him in this cause is not suf-
ficient in law" (M. R., p. 7). 
It is settled law in Virginia that the common counts of 
indebitatus assumpsit are not demurrable. In Norfolk v. Nor-
.folk CountJJ, 120 Va. 356~ the opinion says that the rule is es-
tablisI1ed in Virginia "that the account is no part of the 
declaration; that defects in the account eannot be taken ad-
vantage of hy demurrer; and that a demurrer will not lie to 
a common law count in a.ssumpsit ''. 
In Portsmouth Refinin_q Co. v. Oliver Refinin.a Co., 1.09 Va. 
513, there was a declaration in assumpsit containing three spe-
cial counts and a fourth count composed of the common counts 
in assillmpsit. .A demurrer was filed to the declaration and 
to each count thereof. The court said: '' The objection made 
to the common counts is without merit. They are in the usual 
form. Whether or not the agreement 11pon which the other 
countF: are based could be introduced to sustain a recoverv 
upon the common counts, was a Question to he determined_ 
upon the trial when the evidence was offered and not 
17* upon a demurrer to those *counts." 
The effect of these authorities is that the demurree 
to the declaration as a whole is, as a matter of fact, limited 
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to a demurrer to the second count. The declaration, sup-
ported, as it is, by affidavit and account, is sufficient to sus~ 
tain a judgment, even if the special count had not been made 
a part thereof, upon the first count ( the common counts of 
indebitatus asswmpsit) alone. 
The law is that no demurrer will lie to that count. There-
fore, the demurrer, althoug·h in form a general demurrer, is 
actually a demurrer to only so much of the declaration as is 
susceptible to demurrer, i. e. the second count thereof. It 
follows from this that no pleading of any character has been 
filed to the first count of the declaration. 
The necessary corollary from this 1s that even if the filing 
of a demurrer in due time would have the legal effect of 
setting aside the office judgment, still the demurrer must be 
to each count of the declaration upon which judgment might 
be predicated. If the declaration contained two special counts' 
and a demurrer should be filed to one count only, it is clear 
that plaintiff would be entitled to judgment on the count 
which was not demurred to, and her office judgment as to 
that count would become final even if the demurrer had the 
effect. of setting it aside as to the count which was demurred 
to. The legal effect of the present situation is exactly the 
situation postulated. One count of plaintiff's declaration has 
been demurred to, whereas the other count, being insusceptible 
to demurrer, has not been demurred to. 
Second Assign1nent of Error: (a) The plea sets up no claim 
to recovery or relief agai~t the obligation of the contract" 
s'lted on. 
In deciding this point it must be ascertained whether the 
claim set up in the defendant's special plea of set-off grows 
out of the contract sued on or is founded upon a contract 
other than the contract sued on by the plaintiff. In the first 
instance (so far as this point is concerned) the plea is good; 
in the second, it is bad. , 
The simplest way to answer this question is to consider 
whether an action by '\Vbite against Cape Henry Cot-
18* ta~e Corporation for alleged breach of that *contract 
would lie. If such an action would not lie, the contract 
has been fully performed. 
It seems clear that no such action for breach of this con-
tract would Ii~. The gravamen of White's claim is that cer-
tain notes have not been paid. Upon the assumption that 
they were not paid-does such failure to pay them constitute 
a breach of this contract? Obviously, it does not. 
The obligation of this contract upon the corporation was 
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'' to giye a deed of trust, subject to a mortgage of $10,000, 
to secure the principal sum of $2,500, evidenced by a note or · 
notes bearing interest at the rate ·of 6% payable, becoming 
due $100, 90 days; $100, 6 months; $100, 9 mouths; $100, 12 
months; $100, 15 months; $100, 18 months, and the balance 2 
years after <late" ( l\L R., p. 22). When the deed of trust 
was executed and delivered, and the notes thereby secured 
were executed and delivered, Cape Henry Cottage Corpora-
tion had fully performed its obligation under this contract. 
It had done all ~t promised to do. 
This is 1•ecoguized in the defendant's plea, which alleges 
that the corpor.atiou '' agTeed to and did execute and deliver 
to the defendant its negotiable· promissory notes'', etc. CM. 
R., p. 18). It is to be noted that the plea correctly states the 
obligation of the contract-to execute and deliver the notes. 
'And it also states the performance of the contract-for it says 
Cape Henry Cottage Corporation llid execitte and deliver 
theni. The plea says--correctly-that the obligation was to 
execute and deliver notes, and that this obligation was per-
formed. 
The question immediately presents itself-Can Cape Henry 
Cottage Corporation say that it has fully performed the con-
tract of January 28th, 1928, and thereby escape liability to 
pay its notes f Certainly not. It is liable to pay them ( dis-
regarding, for the moment, the defense of the statute of limi-
tations) ; but its liability does not arise out of the breach of 
any obligation of the contract of January 28th, 1928. It arises 
out of the breach of the several oblig·ations created by the 
promise to pay in the notes theniselves. Any holder of said 
notes may sue for breach of contract-but the contract 
breached is not the contract of ,January 28th, 1928. As the 
plea admits, that contract was fully performed. 
19* *By way of illustration: Suppose the City of Nor-
folk contracts with A to construct certain improvements 
in the streets and agTees, in consideration thereof, to deliver 
to A certain bonds of the City maturing five years in the fu-
ture. The work is clone, approved and accepted, and the bonds 
are delivered. Obviously, this contract has been fully per-
formed. If the bonds are not paid when they mature, A's 
right of action ag;ainst the City is based not on the original 
contract, but on the breach of the promise to pay made in the 
bonds. He must proceed by action on the bonds. 
The test is this: Could Wl.1itc recover from the corpora-
tion for a. breach of any promise by it in that contract to pay 
money 1 Decidedly he could not; and for the excellent rea-
son that no such promise was made in that contract. He must 
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sue on his note, a different contract, containing its own ob-
ligation. 
Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6 Cranch 253, 264. 
From the opinion by Chief Justice l\Iarshall: 
"That a note, without a special contract, would not, of it-
self, discharge the original cause of action is not denied. But 
it is insisted that if, by express agreement, the note is re-
ceived as payment, it satisfies the orig'inal contract, and the 
party receiving it must take his remedy on it. This principle 
appears to be well settled.'' 
Valley Mercantile Co. v. Bailey (Mont.), 216 Pac. 789: 
''In other words, if the note was accepted as payment, the 
contract was fully performed and immediately defendants be-
came entitled to a conveyance of the legal title * * * . The 
sole question which remains, therefore, is as to whether or 
not the note was given and accepted as payment.· "When such 
is the agreement, it will be held that the note is an extinguish-
ment of the precedent obligation, whether the note is after-
ward paid or not.'' 
Rosenbaum v. Paletz, 114 N. Y. Supp. 802: 
'' As we have said, the contract specifically provided that 
the notes were to be g·iven in payment of the ba]ance of tht1 
contract price, and it must be conceded that parties to an 
agreement may covenant that the giving of notes shall consti-
tute payment, and that they can be held to such agreement.'' 
Sill v. Bitrgess, 134 Ill. App. 874: 
'' Where it is specially agreed that a promissory note taken 
for a contemporaneous consideration shall be acceijted in pay-
ment of the consideration, such an agreement is binding and 
operates as a payment.'' 
20* *In the light of these authorities, let us examine the 
agreement. Does it provide that this $2,500.00 is to be 
paid in money and evidenced by notes f Not at all. "\Vhite 
agrees to sell the apartment house for $15,000.00, and "the 
purchase price of Fifteen Thousand Dollars is to be paid in 
notes assumed, land, money and notes to be given, as fol-
lows:'' * * • '' To give a deed of trust to secure the prin-
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cipal sum of $2,500 evidenced by a note or notes,'' .etc. ( M. R., 
p. 2:2). The land was duly cony eyed, the money was duly 
paid and the notes were duly given. The contract was fully 
executed. 
But the defendant's plea, to be good, must set up matters 
entitling him to relief against the obligati.on of the contract 
s~do~ · · 
Richrnond College v. Scott-Nuckols, 124 Va. 333, 342: 
From the opinion, by Prentis, J.: 
'' It is well settled in this State that the defendant cannot 
, avail himself of a set-off and counter-claim under that sec-
tion (3299, now 6145) unless such claim grows out of the 
contract sued on. Bunting v. Cockran, 99 Va. 558, 30 S. E. 
229; Am.erica,n Ma;nganese Go. v. Virgin,ia Manganese Co., 
91 Va. 281, 21 S. E. 466; Newport News Ry. Co. v. Bick! ord, 
, 105 Va. 185, 52 S. E. 1011; Leterrnan, v. Charlottesville Litm-
ber Co., 110 Va. 773, 67 8. E. 281; Burks' Pl. & Prac. 457.n 
American Manga1iese Co. v. Virginia Manganese Co., 91 
Va. 272, 279: 
''The demurrer raises the question whether under our stat-
ute (.Section 3299, now 6145 of the Code) allowing special 
pleas of set-off to be filed, a def enclant can set up a claim 
for unliquidated damages founded upon a contract other than 
the contract sued on by the plaintiff. The claim of the de-
fendant that the contract sued on and the contract set up in 
its plea, for the alleged breach of which it seeks damages, 
are parts of the same contract, cannot be sustained, as the 
pleadings show very clearly that they are separate and dis-
tinct agreements * * * . The Circuit Court ought, therefore to 
have sustained the demurrer to plea No. 2. '' 
Cox v. Hagen, 125 Va. 656, 677: 
From the opinion, by Sims, J.: 
'' The connection of the lang·uage of the statute is such that 
the words 'or any other matter' do not refer to matters of the 
same kind previously mentioned in the statute except in one 
particular, na~ely, in the particular that they must contain 
the feature of being· 'matters directly connected with and in-
juries growing out of the contract sued on'. As plainly 
set forth in the statute itself they arc 'any other matter as 
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would entitle him' (the defendant) 'to recover damages at 
law_against the plaintiff or to relief in equity, in whole or in 
part, against the obligation of the contract'. That the matters 
allowed to be pleaded under such statute must be such as 
would entitle the defendant to recovery or relief men-
21 * tioned against the obligation of the *contract sued on is, 
plainly, the only restrictive meaning which is imposed 
by "the eji1,sdem gene.ris rule, when that rule is applied to the 
words 'or any other matter'." 
Since this plea clearly sets up a claim for the alleged breach 
of a contract other than the contract upon which the plain-
tiff based her action, it is obviously bad. 
(b) The vlea seeks rescission of a contract to convey real 
estate and offers to reconvey the same. 
So far as pertinent here, the special plea of set-off reads 
as follows (M. R., p. 17): 
'''The said defendant, by his attorney, comes and says * * 19 
tlmt he has a defense to the plaintiff's claim herein based upon 
the following· grounds, to-wit: ·, 
"Rescission of the contract between the defendant and the 
said Cape Henry Cottage Corporation. Because of the fail-
ure of consideration as aforesaid, the defendant says that he 
is entitled to have the aforesaid contract rescinded between 
himself and the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, and to that 
end says that he is· ready, willing and able to reconvey to the 
said corporation the property which it conveyed to him and 
upon which there is the deed of trust securing the plaintiff's 
note from the said corporation. In the event it should be so 
ordered by the Court, or desired by the plaintiff, the def end-
ant is ready, willing and able to re-convey the said property 
directly to the plaintiff or her assigns.'' 
Clearly, therefore, his plea seeks rescission of 'the contract 
between Grover L. White and ·Cape Henry Cottage Corpora-
tion, and offers to reconvey to Cape Henry Cottage Corpora-
tion the property he acquired from it. Such a plea is bad. 
Burks' Pleading & Practice, 3rd Ed., 409: 
''·There is one class of cases, however, to which the defense 
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provided by §6145 does not apply. Where an action is brought 
to recover for the purchase price of real estate and the de-
fense involves a rescission of the contract and the reinvest-
ment of the plaintiff with the title, it has been repeatedly held 
that §6145 does not apply, because the court of law has not the 
needed machinery either to compel or supervise the making of 
a conveyance." Citing Shiflett v. Orange Hiunane Society, 
7 Gratt. 297; Mangu,s v. McClelland, 93 Va. 786. 
22,it *Ibid., 410 ~ 
"If a plaiiitift, having conveyed title to real estate to the 
defendant, s-i;ies at law to recover a part or all of the pur-
chase price, and the defendant files a plea which seeks re-
scission merely, the plea is bad, as it requires a reinvestment 
of the plaintiff with the title (Shiflett v. Orange Hiona-ne So-
ciety, supra) and the plea is not aided by a tender of recon-
veyance, as a court of law has no machinery for supervising 
such a conveyance and determining whether it is a proper 
conveyance (Mangu,9 v. McClelland, su,pra). Nor is a plea 
good which offers to rescind (Tyson, v. Willia.1nson, 96 Va. 
636, 32 S. E. 42)." 
This Court said in Tyson v. Williamison, 96 Va. 636: 
"It was not permitted at common law, in an action upon 
contracts under seal, to prove a failure in the consideration 
of the contract, or fraud in its procurement, or breach of war-
ranty of the title or soundness of the personal property, but 
the defendant had to resort to his independent action for re-
lief. JVyche v. Macklin, 2 Hanel 426; Col·ll!mbia .Accfrlent Ass'n 
v. Rockey, 93 Va. 678; 4 Minor's Inst. (8d Ed.) 792. 
"It is only by virtue of See. 3299 (now §6145) of the Code 
that such defences can be made in an action upon such a con-
tract (Colu1nbia Accident Ass'n v. Rockey, sitpm), and under 
it the defendant can claim compensation or damages for the 
injury which he has suffered by reason thereof, and th~ 
plea which sets up such defence must 'allege the amount 
to which he is entitled bv reason of the matters contained in 
the plea'. "' 
' ' If the defence is based upon equita hie grounds which re-
quire a rescission of the contract, and a reinvestment of the 
vendor with the title, the plea provided for by that statute is 
not available, because the court of law is incompetent to do 
complete justice between the parties. llf ang·us v. McClelland, 
93 Va. 786; 4 i\Iinor 's Inst. 796. 
'' There can be no rescission in this action; neither can there 
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be a plea in bar based upon the rig·ht and offer to rescind. If 
the fraud or misrepresentation relied on is such as to justify 
a rescission of the contract, as to which we express no opin-
ion, that relief can only" be had in a court of equity. 
"The pleas were bad both at common law and under the 
statute, and were properly rejected by the Circuit Court.'' 
( c) The plea seeks to recove.r conseqitential dmnages for 
the alleged breach of a promise to pc1ry ,,noney. 
The plea (l\L R., pp. 17-20) alleges that the defendant is 
not only entitled to recover the $1,000.00 hereinabove men-
tioned, evidenced by the three notes hereinabove referred to, 
together with interest thereon, but is further entitled to con-
sequential damag·es in the sum of $2,415.00 alleged to 
23·r.c have *accrued to ·white as a consequence of the alleged 
failure of Cape Henry Cottage ·Corporation to pay the 
said notes as and when they matured. There is no warranty 
in law for any such claim. It is well settled that the measure 
of damages for failure to pay money is limited to the prin-
cipal sum clue, plus interest thereon until the date of pay-
ment. 
Colon,na Dock Co. v. Colonna, 108 Va. 230: 
From the opinion by ·Cardwell, J. : 
"As was said by this court in Bethel v. Salem Imp. Co., 93 
Va. 354, etc., the 'measure of damages for a failure to pay 
money is, with few exceptions, the principal sum dµe with le-
gal interest t~1ereon from the time the payment was due'.'' 
Bethel v. Salem, 11nprovenient Co., 93 Va. 354: 
''For the breach of a eontract to pay money, no matter 
what the amount of inconvenience sustained by the plain-
tiff, the measure of damages is the interest on the money 
only * * * ." 
"It is the ordinary case of a failure to comply with a con-
tract to pay money at a stipulated time. In such cases the 
measure of damages for the breach of the contract is the 
principal sum due, and legal interest thereon.'' 
It has been held in Baker ,rf; Co. v. Hart11ian, 1.39 Va. 612, 
that speculative damag·es, such as are demanded in this plea, 
cannot properly be set up in a plea under §6145 of the Code. 
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The plea must allege the amount to which the defendant is 
entitled by reason of the matters contained in the plea. Tyson 
v. Williamson, 96 Va. 636; Richmond Ice Co. v. Crystal Ice 
_Co., g.g Va. 239. This plea states, in paragTaph 1 thereof (M. 
R., p. 18), that the defendant is entitled to $1,000.00 with in-
terest from November 2, rn2s, and in paragraph 4 thereof 
(M. R., pp. 19-20), that the defendant is entitled to said sum 
of $1,000.00 with interest as aforesaid and damages in the 
additional amount of $2,415.00. The plea is obviously bad on 
its face. 
Third Assignnient of Error: That vlaintijf's·instructions 
2 and 3 on the statute of limitations should have been granted. 
The instructions numbered 2 and 3, respectively, offered by 
the plaintiff and refused, oyer her exception, by the 
24* lower court, will be found on pages *113 and· 115, re-
spectively, of the record. Instruction number 2 was 
first offered and refused. The first paragraph thereof was 
not objected-to. The second paragraph told the jury, in effect, 
that if White's right of action on the unpaid notes of Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation held by him accrued more than 
five years prior to December 5, 1939, the date of filing of the 
special plea of set-off, then the said notes did not constitute 
any ground of offset in his favor as against the plaintiff 
Neely; nor any gTound of recovery in favor of ·white a~ 
against Cape Henry Cottage. Corporation; nor any basis for fl 
reduction in the amount which ·white might be found to owe 
to Neely; nor as a has is for a verdict in favor of ,v hite 
against Cape Henry Cottage Corporation. 
Instruction number 2 having been refused, the plaintiff of-
fered instruction number 3, which set out the same principles 
detailed above with the exception that Cape Henry Cottage 
Corporation w·as not a factor therein. 
It is respectfully submitted th.at both of these instructions 
clearly stated the law, that the plaintiff was entitled to have 
them g-ranted, and that the court's refusal to g-rant them was 
error and was directly responsible for the credit which the 
. jury applied to the plaintiff's verdict, which credit is here com-
plained of. 
Plaintiff sued at law and declared upon a promise in writ-
ing under seal. The defense is concededly a contention that 
the consideration for the promise has failed. It follows that. 
at common law such a defense could not be raised at all. Fail-
ure of c.onsideration for a promise under seal cannot be raised 
by any sort of plea at common law, for the reason that tho 
seal itself imports consideration ,,rhich is conclusively pre-
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sumed, and the defendant was not permitted to show failure 
of consideration either partial or total. Only by virtue of 
§6145 of the Code can such failure of consideration for a prom-
ise under seal be shown. Tyson v. }ViUianison, 96 Va. 636; 
Columbia .Accident .Ass' n v. Rockey, 93 Va. 67P 
Since the defendant is allowed to set up his defense purely 
by permission of the statute, it follows that he could not pos-
sibly avail himself of the def ensc of comm.on law recoupment. 
At common law, recoupment is· provable under the general 
issue; but here it is clear that under the general issue the 
defendant, White, could not set up the defense of fail-
25* ure of consideration because, •as shown above, his prom-
ise was under seal. He makes his defense under the 
statute, §6145 of the Code, or he cannot make it at all. 
The defendant, \Vhite, is concededly proceeding under the 
statute. He filed his plea entitled "Special Plea of Set-off", 
after having withdrawn a previous plea because it did not 
conform to the requirements of that statute.· Such rights as 
he has to make his defense are those permitted by the statute 
and no others; and by the same token, when h~ proceeds under 
the statute he is subject to all of the burdens which the statu-
tory law imposes upon a litigant who adopts the statutory 
method of procedure. A defenqant cannot make his defense 
( unavailable except for the statute) under statutory sanction 
nncl at the same time avoid the burdens which the statute it-
self imposes upon him. 
It may be assumed for the purpose of the ·present argu-
ment only that if it had been possible for the defendant, 
White, to have made his defense under common law recoup-
ment-that is to say, if the defense had been available to 
him without necessity for procedure under the statute-and 
he had seen fit to avail himself of common law recoupment,. 
then the bar of limitation ·would extend equally to the plain-
tiff's claim and the defendant's matter of defense. The 
claim of the plaintiff would be reduced by a showing on the 
part of the defendant-under t1le general issue-that the con-
sideration for defendant's promise had failed, in whole or 
in part, with a corresponding reduction in the plaintiff's right 
to recover. Some courts have held that this is not in fact an 
- offset at all, but is a pure matter of defense available to a 
defendant as long as the plaintiff's claim is available to him. 
But, as we have seen above, common law recoupment can-
not be availed of by the defendant in this case. He is pro-
ceeding wholly under §6145 of the Code. If he could defend 
under common law recoupment he might say, with some 
plausibility: '' I am not asserting a cross-claim; I am simply 
setting up matter of defense to defeat the plaintiff's claim. 
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Consequently, if the plaintiff's claim is not barred, neither 
is my matter of defense.'' But this defendant certainly can 
make no such statement. 
§6145 of the Code of Virginia forms a part of Chapter 255. 
§6149 is in the same Chapter and provides as follows: 
'' A defendant who files a plea or account under this chap-
ter, shall be dee-nied to ha.ve brou,ght an action, at the 
26* *ti-me of. filing such plea or accou.nt, against the plain-
. tifl, and, Jf ho be assignee or transferee, also against the 
person with wl!o'iri the contract sued on was originally made 
and under whom the plaintiff claims, according to their re-
spective interests, for the matters mentioned in such plea or 
account, and the plaintiff shall not, after the plea or account 
is filed, dismiss his case, without the defendant's consent, but 
the defendant '.s cla.ini shall be open to the smne g·rownd of 
defense to which it would have been open in any action broitght 
by him thereon." (Italics ours.) 
It follows inescapably from this that if a defendant, from 
choice or necessity, avails himself of the privileges granted 
him by §6145 he becomes, upon filing- his plea, a plaintiff, 
quoad the matter set up in his plea. The claim therein as-
serted by such defendant is subject to all the clef ens es to 
which it would have been subject had it been set up by action, 
as an original proposition, instead of by plea, as a matter 
of defense or offset. Such a defendant is in exactly the same 
position, so far as the defenses to his plea are concerned, as 
if he had instituted his action in another court and set up in 
his declaration, as grounds of recovery, the matters which 
he bas set up in his plea, as grounds of defense or offset. 
Every defense which could be made to such an action is avail-
able as a defense to the plea. This is the meaning· of the 
statute, too plain to be the subject of dispute. 
The effect of what has been said above is, clearly, that the 
rule of law applicahle as to the availability of the statute of 
limitations to a plaintiff ag·ainst matter asserted by way of 
common law recoupmcnt is impertinent as controlling· or 
even persuasive authority where there is a definite statutory 
provision which completely changes the position of the de-
fendant from that of a pure defendant to that of a plaintiff, 
instituting a new action subject to all of the defenses avail-
able thereto. Having abandoned the common law remedy, 
from choice or necessity, any special advantages it offers are 
lost to him. Having adopted the statutory remedv, he is sub- · 
ject to all the provisions of the statute-those wl1ich operate 
to his disadvantage as well as those which help him. 
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The statute needs no construction, but the case of Lete·nnan 
v. Charlottesville Lit1nber Co., 11.0 Va. 769, holds clearly that 
a defendant who files a plea under §6145 is in the position of 
a plaintiff, is deemed to have brought an action at the 
27* time of filing his plea, and is entitled to the same ""relief 
an independent plaintiff could obtain in an original ac-
tion. See also Exposition Arcade Corp. v. L-it Bros., 113 Va. 
574. 
The case of Sexton v. Aulhnan, H:2 Va. 20, is direct and 
controlling authority that a contention raised in a plea ·filed 
by a defendant under §6145 is subject to the defense, on the 
part of the plaintiff, of the statute of limitations, and that 
such defense can proporly be made by instructions offered 
at the trial. This case should be given careful consideration 
and analysis. The statements concerning the pleadings and 
evidence which we make below are in large part taken from 
the record in the case, generously lent us by the Clerk of this 
Court. 
By way of preliminary explanation it may be said that the 
plaintiff brought two actions of <lebt ag·ainst the defendant. 
The pleadings in both cases were identical, the cases were co1i-. 
solidated and tried as one case, and the verdict was a ver-
dict on the consolidated cases. The circumstances out of 
which the case arose were as follows: C. Aultman & Co., 
a corporation, was a dealer in farm' machinery ·with its prin-
cipal office in Canton, Ohio. It employed Sexton, a resident 
of Wytheville, Virginia, as its loca) agent to represent it in 
sales ·of farm machinery in Southwest Virginia, and the par-
ties entered into an elaborate contract which defined with great 
particularity the rights and obligations of each and bore elate 
of October 7, 1882. Among other things, this contract pro-
vided that under certain circumstances the agent, Sexton, 
should be responsible for any loss sustained by Aultman 
through inability to collect from purchasers to whom credit 
was extended upon the faith of Sexton's representations. 
In 1883 one Floyd offered to purchase certain farm ma-
chinery of an aggregate value of about $4,000.00, and Sexton 
sent the order on to Aultman & Co., declining, however, to 
approve Floyd as a credit risk. Thereupon Aultman made 
an independent investigation through R. G. Dunn & Co. and 
thereafter ,vrote Sexton that it had done so and as a result 
thereof was satisfied with Flovd as a credit risk and had ac-
cepted the order. Floyd clefa11lted on his payments and Ault-
man & Co. sustained a considerable loss in the transaction. 
The amount of Sexton's commissions on this sale was 
$646.44, wl1ich was set up as a credit to him. By reason of 
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the fact that Aultman had not received its money and 
28,i;, that legal proceedings were in process against Floyd fot· 
*the recovery thereof, Sexton did not insist upon imme-
diate payment of the commissions but permitted them to bo 
carried as a credit to him on his account with Aultman. 
Subsequently there was another sale of machinery to one 
Smith. In this instance Sexton did recommend the credit 
risk and when Smith defaulted, Sexton, under the terms of 
the contract, was responsible to Aultman for the loss it in-
curred thereby. A conference took place between a represen-
tative of Aultman and Sexton, and Sexton gave several notes 
payable to Aultman as evidence of the agreed amount which 
Sexton owed Aultman by reason of the Smith transaction. 
He did not pay the notes and Aultman brought an action 
of debt against Sexton to collect them. ( It is understood 
that the two actions, in which there were identical pleadings 
and which were tried together, are here spoken of as one 
action.) To the declaration Sexton filed three separate pleas, 
as follows: 
1. Nil debet. 
2. A plea of set-off setting up $217.50 alleged to be due to 
Sexton by reason of a certain transaction with Umberger; 
and an additional sum of $646.44 alleged to be due to Sexton 
as commissions on the Floyd transaction. , 
3. A plea under §6145 of the Code vouching. the contract 
under which all of the transactions occurred and setting· up 
that as a1i item of indebtedness arising under the contract 
Sexton was entitled to the sum of $646.44 as a credit due him 
under the Floyd transaction which he offered to offset ag·ainst 
the plaintiff's claim. 
The plaintiff moved to reject the third plea-i. e., the plea 
filed under §6145. The court overruled the motion to reject, 
general replication was filed, and the parties proceeded to 
trial. The similarity between this case and the one at bar 
is noticeable. In both there was a motion to reject the spe-
cial pleas under §Gl 45, and in both the court overruled the 
motion, and the case went to trial on the plea. At the trial 
there was no evidence offered for the defendant to defeat 
the plaintiff's claim to recover on the notes. The defendant's 
efforts were devoted to proving that the Floyd commissions 
were justly due him and that he was entitled to recover the 
$646.44 set up in his plea. 
The court, over the objection of Sexton, granted the fol-
lowing instr~ction for the plaintiff: 
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29• *''The court instructs the jury that if they believe 
from the evidence that the defendants, G. S. Sexton & 
Co., are entitled to commission on the Floyd sale, and if they 
further believe from the evidence that the same, according to 
the true intent and meaning of the parties by their contraet 
and dealings in regard to the same, became due more than 
five years before the filing of said accounts of set-offs and plea 
in this suit, then they must find for the plaintiffs, C. Ault-
man & Co., on said Floyd commission, and reject the same.'' 
'rhe jury gave Aultman a verdict for the full amount of its 
claim and declined to allow Sexton anything on the claim 
asserted by him in his special plea. Judgment was entered 
on this verdict. Sexton appealed, assigning as error that the 
statute of limitations could not be used as a basis of defense 
to the defendant's plea of set-off; further, that if it was avail-
able as a defense it had not been properly pleaded; and, 
lastly, that the defense of limitations could not, in any event, 
be set up for the first time by an instruction offered at the 
trial. This Court, speaking through Judge Buchanan, said: 
"The cases were heard together, by consent, as one case. 
The defendants pleaded nil debet, filed their account of set-
offs, and a special plea in writing under our statute of equi-
table set-offs (Sec. 3299, Code of 1887). The plaintiff replied 
generally to these pleas, and filed a list. of counter set-
offs. Upon the trial of the case the plaintiffs were allowed to 
relv on the statute of limitations to defeat the defendants' 
claim of set-offs, without replying the statute specially, either 
to the account of set-offs or to the plea of equitable set-
off, and this action of the court is assigned as error. 
'' Ordil)arily the statute of limitations must be pleaded spe-
cially, or it cannot be relied on; but there are some excep-
tions to the rule. In the- case of equitable set-off under our 
statute it cannot be pleaded specially. The only reply that 
can be made to such plea is a general replication. Sec. 3300 
of the Code expressly provides that every issue of fact upon 
such plea 'shall be upon a general replication that the plea 
is not true; and the plaintiff may give in evidence, on such 
issue, any matter which could be given in evidence under a 
special replication, if such replication were allowed'." 
As to the propriety of the statute of limitations as a defense 
to the set-off pleaded by the defendants, the opinion said: 
-"For the reasons given above, there was not only no ne-
cessity for replying the statute ·of limitations, but no oppor-
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tunity for it. The plaintiffs had the right to an instruction 
upon that point, as the evidence tended to show that the de-
fendants' claim of set-off for the commissions on the Floyd 
sale was barred by the statute of limitations, and a correct in-
struction upon a point which the evidence tends to prove can 
never work a surprise in law.'' 
The effect of tµis decision is the following: 
30* * First. That the statute of limitations is a defense to 
the contention set up by a defendant in a plea filed under 
§6145 of the Code. 
Second. That §6146 of the Code provides that the reply to 
a plea filed under §6145 is con.fined to a general replicatjon; 
and, therefore, the plaintiff is precluded from pleading the 
statute of limitations. 
Thi.rd. That in such a case the plaintiff is entitled to rely 
upon the defense of the statute of limitations, and, since he is 
precluded from setting up that defense by special replication 
or otherwise in his pleadings, he may raise the defense for 
the first time at the trial by appropriate iustructions. In such 
event if the claim is barred by the statute the verdict of the 
jury in disregarding it is proper and a judgment entered 
thereon will be upheld on appeal. 
No subsequent Virginia decision has affected in the least 
the doctrine of the case of Sexton v. Ai1,lt11nan. 
It seems to us that it is clear beyond reasonable arg·ument 
that the verdict and judgment of this petitioner were im-
properly reduced by the allowance against her of a claim 
which was barred by limitation; that by the refusal of the 
court to grant her instructions nunibered 2 and 3 she was 
deprived of her defense of the statute of limitations, which 
defense she was entitled to assert thereby; and that the ac-
. tion of the court in refusing said instructions was prejudicial 
error which should be corrected in this Court. 
The claini se.t up by the plea was barred on Febriw.ry H, 
19.35 (M. R., pp. 18, 64). 
CONCLUSION. 
Fo~· the reasons set forth in this petition, it is respectfully 
submitted that error has been demonstrated and that vom· 
petitioner is entitled to a ,,rrit of error and a hearing in·· this 
Court where said error may be corrected. Your petitioner 
accordingly prays this Court that a ·writ of error may be 
awarded to the aforesaid juclg1nent of the Circuit Court of 
the City of Norfolk and that this Court may reverse said 
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judgn1ent herein complained of and enter final judgment 
herein in favor of your petitioner against Grover L. ·white , 
in the sum of Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) with 
interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum from 
the 1st day of November, 1938, until paid. 
31 * *If a writ of error is awarded in this case your pe-
titioner will adopt this petition as her opening brief 
before this Court. 
Counsel for your petitioner asks leave to state orally the 
reasons for reviewing the judgment herein complained of. 
A copy of this petition has been delivered to Edward S. 
Ferebee, Esquire, Attorney at Law, Seaboard Air Line Rail-
way Building, ,Norfolk, Virginia, opposing counsel in this 
case in the trial court, on, to-,vit, the 19th day of July, 1940. · 
This petition is to be presented to the Honorable John W. 
Eggleston, one of the Justices of this Court, in vacation, at 
his office in the City of Norfolk, Virginia. 
And your petitioner will ever pray. 
CLARA J. NEELY, 
By W:M. G. MAUPIN, 
N atioual Bank of Commerce Bldg., 
Norfolk, Virginia, 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATE. 
I, Wm. G. Maupin, au Attomey practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my opinion 
the judgment complained of in the foregoing petition ought 
to be reviewed by the Supreme Court of .Appeals of Vir-
gm1a. 
\VM. G. :MAUPIN, 
National Bank of Commerce Bldg., 
Norfolk,. Virginia. 
Received July 19, 1940. 
J. W.E. 
,vrit of error granted. Bond $300. 
July 30, 1940. 
JNO. W. EGGLESTON. 
Received July 31, 1940. 
M.B.W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
at the Courthouse thereof, on the 23rd day of May, in the 
year 1940. 
Be It Remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk on the 2nd 
day of September, in the year 1939, came the plaintiff, Clara 
J. Neely and lodged her Decla1~ation together with two copies 
of her Account and Affidavit against the def enda_nt, Gro-ver 
L. White, which said Declaration. was subsequently filed at 
the Rules held for said Court on the first Monday in Septem-
ber, in the year 1939, in the following words and figures, to-
wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Clara J. Neely, Plaintiff, 
v. IN .A.SSUMPSIT. 
Grover L. White, Defendant. 
DECLARATION. 
Clara J. Neely complains of Grover L. White in a plea of 
trespass on the case in assumpsit, for this, to-,vit: 
That her~tofore, to-wit, on the first day of November, 1938, 
the said defendant was indebted to the said plaintiff in the 
sum of $2,500.00 for goods, wares and merchandise before 
that time by the said plaintiff sold and delivered to the said 
defendant, and at his special instance and request; and also 
in the said sum of $2,500 for the work and labor, care 
page 2 ~ and diligence of said plaintiff before that time done, 
performed and bestowed in and about the business 
of the said defendant, and for him, and at his special in-
stance and request; and also in the sum of $2,500.00 for me 
before that time lent and advanced to and paid, laid out and 
expended for the said defendant, and at his like special in-
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stance and request; and also in the further sum of $2,500~00 
for other money by the said defendant before that time had 
and received to and for the use of said plaintiff; and being 
so indebted, the said defendant, in consideration thereof, 
afterwards, to-wit, on the day and year aforesaid, undertook 
and faithfully promised the said plaintiff to pay her the said 
several sums of money in this count mentioned, when the said 
defendant should be thereunto afterwards requested. 
· .And for tbis also, to-wit: that heretofore, to-wit, on the 
first day of November, 1927, Cape Henry Cottage Corpora-
tion, a Virginia Corporation with its principal office in the 
City of Norfolk, executed and delivered to the said plaintiff 
a certain negotiable promissory note bearing date on the first 
day of November, 1927, pay a bl~ two years after -date to its 
own order, and by it endorsed in blank, at the Norfolk Na-
tional Bank of Commerce and Trusts, in the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia, in the principal sum of $2~500.00, with interest from 
date until paid at the rate of 6% per annum, payable semi-
annually, which said note was secured by deed of· trust from 
said Cape Henry Cottag·e Corporation to Wm. G. Maupin, 
Trustee, bearing date on the first day of November, 1927, 
and duly of record in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation 
Court of the City of Norfolk, .Virginia, in Deed 
page 3 ~ Book 302-B, page 135, which said deed of trust con-
veyed to the said trustee as security for the said 
debt of $2,500.00 and interest, evidenced by the note afore-
said, a certain lot, piece or parcel of land, situate in the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, described in said deed of trust and 
designated upon the Plat entitled "Glencove Estates'', 
duly of record in the Clerk's Office aforesaid in Map Book 
6, page 29, as Site :No. 2, the same fronting seventy-five 
( 75) feet on the North side of North Shore R.oad, and run-
ning· back between parallel lines, or nearly so, a distance 
of One Hundred and Twenty-five (125) feet. And in con-
sideration of the execution of the said note and the said deed 
of trust hereinabove mentioned and described, tbe said plain-
tiff delivered to said Cape Henry Cottage Corporation the 
sum of $2,500.00. And thereafter, to-wit, on the first day of 
February, 1928, the said Cape Henry Cottag·e Corporation 
granted and conveyed unto the said defendant the said lot, 
piece or parcel of land hereinabove described by its deed 
dated the first day of February, 1928, and duly of record in 
the Clerk's Office aforesaid in Deed Book 303-B, page 427, 
and the said deed was delivered to the said def enclant, and in 
said deed, and as a part thereof, the said defendant; under 
his sig·nature and seal, assumed and promised to pay the said 
debt of $2,500.00 and interest, secured by said deed of trust 
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from said Cape Henry Cottage Corporation to said Wm. G. 
Maupin, Trustee, bearing date on the first day of November, 
1927, and duly of record in the Clerk's Office aforesaid in 
Deed Book 302-B, page 135, according to the terms and con-
ditions of said deed of trust. And thereafter the said plaintiff 
accepted the promise of the said defendant to pay the said 
debt, and accepted from the said defendant in-
page 4 ~ terest thereon until and including the installment 
of interest thereon due and payable on the first 
day of November, 1938, which said installment of interest 
was paid to the said plaintiff by the said defendant, and 
thereafter the said defendant refused to pay to the said plain-
tiff, or to anyone for her, any further interest upon the said 
debt~ or· the principal thereo(. 
And said plaintiff says that the said defendant not regard-
ing his ·said several promises and undertakings hath not as 
yet paid to the said plaintiff the said· several sums of money, 
or any or either of them, or any part thereof, althoug·h often 
requested so to do, but to pay the same bath hitherto wholly 
neg-Iected and refused, to the damage of the said plaintiff 
of $3,500.00. 
And therefore she brings her suite. 
\V:M. G. :MAUPIN, p. q. 
The following is the Account and Affidavit above referred 
to which being filed with the Declaration was also served upon 
said defendant with process in this case: 
V ... irgnna: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Clara .J. Neely, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Grover L. White, Defendant. 
GROVER L. "WHITE, 
TO 
ACCOUNT. 
CLARA J. NEELY, DEBTOR. 
page 5 ~ To promise under the signature and seal of the 
said Grover L. "\Vllite, defendant, elated the first clay 
of February, 1928, to pav the debt evidenced by a certain 
note executed by Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, in the 
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prin~ipal sum of $2,500.00, payable two years after date to 
the holder thereof, said holder being the said Clara J. Neely, 
plaintiff herein, $2,500.00. The aggregate amount of said 
claim as to principal is, $2,500.00. Interest is claimed thereon 
from November 1, 1938, until paid. There are no credits 
to which the defendant Grover L. ·white is entitled. 
State of Virginia, 
Corporation of the City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
I, ·wm. G. Maupin, do hereby make oath that I am agent 
for Clara J. Neely, plaintiff in the above entitled cause, and 
that to the best of my belief the amomit of the claim of said 
plaintiff against Grover L. "\Vhite, defendant, is $2,500.00; that 
the said amount of $2,500.00 is justly due from the said de-
fendant to the said plaintiff; and that the said plaintiff claims 
interest on the said sum of $2,500.00 from the first day of 
November, 1938, at the rate of 6% per annum. 
Given under my hand in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, this 
2nd day of September, 1939. 
·w1v1. G. MAUPIN. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, Mary M. Moore, a 
Notary Public in and for the City of Norfolk, in the State of 
Virginia, in my City and State, by the affiant, Wm. G. :Mau-
pin, this 2nd clay of September, 1939. 
pag-e 6 ~ My commission expires April 28, 1940. 
l\IARY l\L MOORE, 
.Notary Public. 
. The following is a written request from counsel for said 
plaintiff directing that proceedings at rules be made a part 
of the record : 
Mr. Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk, 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Norfolk, Virgfoia. · 
Dear Sir: 
July 6, 1940. 
In making· up the record in the case of Clara J. Neely v. 
Grover L. White, since the finality of the office judgment at 
the close of the 15th day of the next term after its entry, pur-
suant to .Section 6134 of the Code, is one of the issues in the 
36 Supreme Court of ,Appeals of Virginia 
case, the proceedings at Rules should be made a part of the 
record. Will you please construe this letter as a special di-
rection in writing to incorporate in the record the proceed-
ings at Rules in this case as provided by Section 6340 of 
the Code. 
Very truly yours, 
Copy to: 
Edward S. Ferebee, Esq., p. d. 
,vM. G. MAUPIN, 
Wl\'I. G. MAUPIN. 
·whereupon .at the Rules held for said Court on the first 
Monday in September, 1939, the Declaration and Account and 
Affidavit having been duly filed and the process 
page 7 ~ havjng been executed upon said defendant who 
failed to appear, plead or demur, a common order 
was entered ag·ainst said defendant. 
And afterwards, to-wit: In the Clerk's Office of the Cir-
cuit -Court aforesaid, at the Rules held for said Court on the 
third Monday in September, 1939, the said defendant still 
failing to appear, the common order was confirmed and an 
office judgment entered. 
And at another day~ to-wit: In the Circuit Court aforesaid, 
on the 9th day of October, in the year 1939: 
This day came the parties, by counsel, and thereupon said 
defendant, by his attorney, filed his demurrer to said plain-
tiff's declaration, and to each count thereof, in which said 
demurr~r said plaintiff joined; and the further hearing of said 
demurrer is continued. 
The following is the demurrer referred to in the foregoing 
order: 
Now comes the defendant and says that the declaration 
filed ae:ainst him in this cause is not sufficient in law. and 
states 'the gTounds of demurrer relied upon to be as follows: 
1. That since the plaintiff's only claim ag·ainst 
page 8 ~ the defendant is based upon his assumption in the 
deed dated February 1, 1928, of the deed of trust 
' 
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indebtedness already existing in favor of the plaintiff, the 
defendant is· only secondarily liable to the plaintiff because 
of such assumption, and the land described in the said deed 
of trust is the primary fund out of which the said indebted-
ness must be paid. 
2. That unless and until there has been a foreclosure un-
der the said deed of trust, dated November 1, 1927, from 
Cape Henry Cottage ,Corporation to Wm. G. Maupin, Trus-
tee, there is no liability on the part of the defendant to the 
plaintiff under his assumption of the indebtedness secured 
thereby. 
3. That there is no allegation of any such foreclosure un-
der the said deed of trust, and no allegation of any de-
ficiency existing as the result of any such foreclosure. 
GROVER L. WHITE, 
By EDWARD S. FE.REBEE, Counsel. 
EDW AR.D S. FEREBEE, p. d. 
And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court aforesaid, 
on the 24th day of "9ctober, in the year 1939: 
This day came the parties by counsel and thereupon said 
plaintiff, by counsel, moved the Court to enter an order mak-
ing final the office judgment heretofore entered herein at 
the rules ; and the further hearing of which motion is con-
tinued. 
pag·e 9 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
aforesaid, on the 10th day of November, in the year 
1939: 
This day came as well the plaintiff by her attorney as the 
defendant by his attorney, and the Court considered the con-
ditional judgment for the plaintiff entered herein in the office 
at First September Rules 1939, the office judgment for the 
plaintiff entered at Second September R,ules 1939, the de-
murrer filed by the defendant on the first day of the October 
term 1939, to-wit, the 9th day of October, 1939, and the mo-
tion made by the plaintiff for judgmenf herei~ for $2,500.00 
with interest thereon from the first day of November, 1938, 
made herein on the 16th day of the October term, 1939, to-
wit, the 24th day of October, 1939; and the Court doth deny 
the said motion of the plaintiff for judgment as aforesaid and 
doth set aside the said office judgment, and doth overrule 
the said demurrer of the defendant with leave to the said 
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defendant to file such pleas as he may be advised. And to 
the action of the Court in denying the plaintiff's motion for 
judgment and iu setting aside · the office judgment entered 
herein the plaintiff duly excepted; and to the action of the 
.Court in overruling the defendant's demurrer the def end-
ant duly excepted. · 
-And thereupon the defendant filed three pleas in writing·, 
to-wit: a plea of non est fact,um, a plea of the statute of limi-
tations, and a plea. of failure of consideration; and the plain-
tiff moved the Coui1t to reject the said three pleas, which mo-
tion was continued; · 
page 10 ~ The following is the Plea of Non Est Fact'llm, 
filed by leave of the foregoing order: 
The said defendant, by his attorney, comes and says that 
the said supposed indenture in the declaration in this action 
mentioned, is not his deed. .And of this the said defendant 
puts himself upon the country. 
State or Virginia, 
EDWARD S. FEREBEE, p. d. 
GROVER L. ,vHITE. 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
This day Grover L. ·white personally appeared before me, 
Wilson Townsend, a notary public in and for the city and 
state aforesaid, and made oath that the matters and things 
stated in tl1e foregoing plea arc true, and that the plaintiff 
is not entitled, as the affiant verily believes, to recover any-
thing from the defendant in this cause. 
My commission expires .Apr. 6, 1941. 
Given under my hand this 9th day of November, 1939. 
·wrLSON TOvVNSEND, 
Notary Public. 
The following is the Plea of Statute of Limitations filed 
by leave of the foregoing order: 
The said defendant, by his attorney, comes and says that 
the· supposed cause of action mentioned in the 
page 11 ~ declaration in this action is founded upon the agree-
ment of the defendant, contained in the said deed 
of February 1, 1928, · set forth and described in the declara-
tion, and that the same did not accrue to the said plaintiff at 
. ' 
Clara J. Neely v. Grover L. White. 39 
any time within ten years next before the commencement of 
this action, in manner and form as the said plaintiff hath com-
plained against him. And this the said defendant is ready 
to verify. 
State of Virginia, 
EDWARD S. FEREBEE, p. d. 
GROVER L. ·wI-IITE. 
Gity of Norfolk, to-wit: 
This day Grover L. "'\iVhite personally appeared before me, 
·wnson Townsend, a notary public in and for the city and 
state aforesaid, and made oath that the matters and things 
stated in the foregoing plea are true. 
My commission expires Apr. 6, 1941. . 
Given under my hand this 9th day of November, 1939. 
"'WILSON TOWNSEND, 
Notary Public. 
The following· is the Plea of Failure of Consideration filed 
by leave of the foregoing order: 
The said defendant, by his attorney, comes and says that 
he did sign the said deed of February 1, 1928, referred to in 
the declaration filed in this action, but that- the consideration 
. for the same, which was required and intended to 
page 12 ~ be given to him for his signature thereto and for 
his assumption of the obligation therein set forth, 
was in fact not g'iven to him; the said defendant further says 
that there was and has been a total failure of consideration 
for the defendant's promises and undertakings afore said, 
through no· failure or default on the part of the said defend-
ant. 
State of Virginia, 
Enw· ARD S. FEREBEE, p. d. 
GROVER L. WHITE. 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
This day Grover L. White personally appeared before me, 
Wilson Townsend, a notary public. in and for the city and 
state aforesaid, and made oath that the matters and thing·s 
stated in the foregoing plea are true. 
l\fy commission expires Apr. 6, 1941. 
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Given under my hand this 9th day of November, 1939. 
WILSON TOWNSEND, 
Notary Public. 
And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 13th day of November, in the year 1939 : 
Upon motion of the plaintiff, the said defendant is required 
to 'file herein a statement of his grounds of defence, within 
ten days from the date hereof; and the further hearing· is con-
tinued. 
page 13 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
aforesaid, on the 15th day of November, in the 
year 1939 : , -
· This day came again the plaintiff, by counsel, and with 
leave of Court filed herein her '' Further Ground of the Mo-
tion to Reject the Special Plea of Failure of Consideration 
filed by the Defendant herein'' ; and the further hearing is 
continued. 
The following is the Motion filed by leave of the fore going 
order: 
This day came the plaintiff by her attorney and as further 
ground of the motion to reject the special plea of failure of 
consideration filed by the defendant herein, stated that the 
said plea was argumentative and that the same did not con-
form to the statute for such case made and provided. 
WM. G. MAUPIN, p. q. 
And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 5th day of December, in the year 1939: 
This day caine as wel1 the plaintiff by her attorney as the 
defendant by his attorney, and the Court considered the pleas 
heretofore filed by the defendant, to-wit: the pleas entitled 
respectively, plea of non, est factimi, plea of stat-
page 14 ~ ute of limitations, and plea of failure of considera-
tion, and the motion heretofore made hy the plain-
tiff to reject all of the said pleas ; and the Court further con-
sidered the motion of the defendant to transfer this cause to 
the equity side of the Court filed by leave l1ercby gTanted; 
and the Court doth deny the motion of the plaintiff to reject 
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the plea of non est f actum, to which action of the Court the 
plaintiff duly excepted; and the ·Court doth sustain the mo-
tion of the plaintiff to reject the defendant's plea of statute 
of limitations, which plea is accordingly rejected, to which 
action of the Court the defendant duly excepted; and there-
upon the defendant asked leave of the Court to withdraw his 
plea of failure of consideration and to file a special plea of set-
off, which motion is granted and leaye is given to the de-
fendant to file such special plea of set-off; and the Court 
doth overrule the said motion of the defendant to transfer 
this cause to the equity side of the Court, to which action 
of the ·Court the defendant duly excepted. 
And thereupon the defendant tendered his special plea of 
set-off, and the plaintiff moved the Court in writing to reject 
said plea, which motion is continued. 
The following is the '' Motion to Reject'' filed by leave of 
the foregoing order: 
This day came the plaintiff by her attorney and moved the 
Court to reject the three special pleas filed herein by the de-
fendant, the same being respectively, a plea of non 
page· 15 ~ est factum, a plea of the statute of limitations, and 
a plea of failure of consideration, and for grounds 
of his said motion, stated the following: 
FIRST: That pursuant to the statutes for such case made 
and provided no plea can -be received from the defendant 
after the 15th day of the October term of this Court, to-wit, 
after the 23rd day of October, 1939. 
SECOND: ,vithout waiving the :first ground of his said 
motion, that the affidavits :filed with the said pleas of said 
defendant are not, and none of them are such affidavits as 
are prescribed hy Section 6133 of the Code of Virginia, and 
the ref ore, even if the pro ff er of said pleas were in due time, 
they oug·ht not to be accepted because of the failure to file 
therewith affidavits as prescribed by said statute. . 
THIRD: Without waiving either the first or second 
grounds of his motion, because the plea of non est factum is 
contradicted bv the plea of failure of consideration, in which 
last plea the clefendant states on o·ath that he did sign the 
said deed of February 1, 1928, referred to in the declaration; 
and because the record in this case shows that no cause of 
action accrued to said plaintiff until the first day of N ovem-
ber, 1929, and that this action was instituted less than ten 
years thereafter; and because the promise of the defendant 
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is the basis of this action was a promise under seal and con-
sideration is conclusively imported. 
WJ\L G. MAUPIN, p. q. 
page 16 ~ The following is the "Motion to Transfer Cause 
to Equity Side of the Court'' filed by leave of the 
fore going o.rd~r: 
This day c~me the defendant by his attorney and moved the 
Court to transfer this cause to the equity side of the Court, 
and for grounds of his said motion states the following: 
FIRST: The Comt is without jurisdiction of the subject. 
matter set forth in the declaration. 
SECOND: There is no privity of contract between the 
plaintiff and the defendant, and no obligation on the part of 
the defendant to the plaintiff, under the facts and circum-
stances alleged in the declaration. 
THIRD: The defendant has a valid existing defense ag·ainst 
the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, the party through whom 
the plaintiff claims a cause of action against the defendant 
by subrogation, such as entitles him to assert the same in a 
court of equity, the plaintiff and the said Cape Henry Cot-
tage Corporation. 
FOURTH: The said Oa.pe Henry Cottage Corporation has 
forfeited its charter and is now defunct, so that in order to 
. bring it be~ore this Court as !1 necessary party revival pro-
ceedmgs will have to be instituted. 
FIFTH: The remedy at law available to the defendant in 
this action is not adequate, and entitles him to have this cause 
removed to the equity side of this Court, which procedure 
would prevent circuity of action between the parties involved 
herein. 
SIXTH : There has been a complete failure of 
page 17 ~ consideration for the defendant's assumption of 
Cape Ifonry Cottage Corporation's indebtealiess 
to the plaintiff, as a result of which the defendant is entitled 
to rescind the original agreement of assumption, as alleged 
in the declaration in this cause. 
SEVENTH: That only on the equity side of this Court can 
substantial justice be afforded to the defendant and to all 
other parties to this cause. 
GROVER L. "TRITE, 
By EffW ~RD S. FERJ~BEJi~, p. cl. 
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The following is Special Plea of Set-Off filed by leave of 
the foreg·oing order: 
The said defendant, by his attorney, comes and says that 
he did sign the said deed of :B~ebruary 1, 1928, referred to 
in the declaration filed in this action, but that he has a de-
fense to the plaintiff's claim herein based upon the following 
grounds, to-wit: 
1. Failure of consideration for the defendant's promise 
with the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, contained in the 
said deed of February 1, 1928, to assume the corporation's in-
debtedness to the plaintiff. As a part and parcel of the con-
sideration for the contract between the defendant and the 
Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, ·whereby the said parties 
effected an exchange of properties owned sepai·a tely by them 
and the defendant assumed the said corporation's indebted-
ness to the plaintiff, the Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
page 18 ~ poration agreed to and did execute and deliver to 
the defendant its negotiable promissory notes in 
the aggregate amount of $1,500.00, the said notes being dated 
February 2, 1928, numbered 1 to 8, inclusive, bearing interest 
at the rate of 6% per annum, and being due and payable as 
follows: Notes 1 to 7, inclusive, being for $100.00 each, and 
payable respectively on May 2, 1928, and every three months 
thereafter through and including ,November 2, 1929, with Note 
8 being for $800.00 and due on February 2, 1930; Notes 1 
to 5, inclusive, were duly paid, together with interest on the 
entire indebtedness through and including November 2, 192~. 
No portion of the principal balance of $1,000.00, or the in-
terest thereon, has been paid to the defendant up to the date 
of the filing· of this plea, so that the said Cape Henry Cot-
tage ·Corporation, under whom the plaintiff claims, was and 
still is justly indebted to the defendant therefor. 
2. Rescission of the contract between the defendant and 
the said Cape Henry Cottage Corporation. Because of the 
failure of consideration as aforesaid, the defendant says that 
he is entitled to have the aforesaid contract rescinded be-
tween himself and the Cape Henry ·Cottage Corporation, and 
to that end says that be is ready, willing· and able to re-
convey to the said corporation the property which it conveyed 
to him and upon which there is the deed of tmst securing the 
plaintiff's note from the said corporation. In the event it 
should be so ordered by the Court, or desired by the plain-
tiff, the defendant i8 ready, willing and able to re-convey the 
said property directly to the plaintiff 01; her as-
page 19 ~ signs. . 
3. Fulfillment of defendant's original agreement 
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with the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation to assume payment 
of its indebtedness to the plaintiff. As an alternative relief, 
the defendant says that he is ready, willing and able to pay 
to the plaintiff the amount of the indebtedness originally as-
sumed bv him Provided the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation 
shall first pay to him the suni of $1,000.00, with interest at 
the rate of 6% per annum from November 2, 1928, until paid. 
4. Damages. The defendant has continuously, from Feb-
ruarv 1, 1928, to the date of the filing· of this plea, paid all 
real "estate taxes due to the City of Norfolk, Virginia, on the 
property covered by tbe deed of trust securing plaintiff's note, 
such taxes amounting to $52.50 a year, or an aggregate amount 
of approximately $565. In addition, the defendant has paid 
interest on the plaintiff's note, at the rate of 6% per annum, 
from February 1, 1928, to November 1, 1938, amounting in 
the aggregate to approximately $1,600.00. In addition to the 
foregoing payments of taxes and interest, the defendant has 
paid the sum of $25.00 a year for approximately ten years, · 
amounting to $250.00 in the aggregate, as a bonus to prevent 
a foreclosure under the deed of trust securing the plaintiff's 
note. All of the said payments have inured to the benefit of 
the. Cape Henry Cottage Corporation and of the plaintiff, 
and have been occasioned by the said corporation's breach of 
contract with the defendant, as hcreinhefore set forth. As 
a result of these payments, the defendant is entitled to re-
cover the same as damages from the said Cape 
page 20 ~ Henry Cottage Corporation for breach of con-
tract, and to have the same applied as a set-off 
to any claim by the said Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, 
or by the plaintiff, against him. 
The defendant further savs that the actual amount which 
he is entitled to recover from the said Cape Henry Cottag·e 
Corporation, under whom the plaintiff claims and by reason 
of the matters herein contained, is the said sum of $1,000.00 
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 2, 
1928, until paid; together with damages in the amount of 
$2,415.00, as set forth above. In addition to the recovery of 
such amount, the defendant says that he is entitled to such 
other forms of legal and equitable relief as have been here-
inbefore set forth and as the nature of his case may require. 
GR.OVER L. ·wHITE, 
Eff\V ARD S. FEREBEE, p. d. 
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State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
This day Grover L. ·white personally appeared before me, 
Wilson Townsend, a Notary Public in and for the city and 
state aforesaid, and made oath that the matters and things 
stated in the fore going plea are true, and that the plaintiff is 
not entitled, as the affiant verily believes, to recover anything 
from the defendant in this cause. My commission expires 
Apr. 6, 1941. 
Given under my hand this 30th day of November, 1939. 
WILSON TOvV.NSEND, 
Notary Public. 
The f ollowiug is the Motion to Reject Plea filed by leave 
of the foregoing order: 
page 21 ~ -This day came the plaintiff by her attorney and 
craved oyer of the contract mentioned and de-
scribed in the plea entitled special plea of set-off tendered 
herein by the defendant whi~h, being read to her, is in the 
words and :figures following, to-wit: 
NORFOLK REAL ESTATE BOARD, INC. 
Standard Exchang·e Contract 
THI.S AGREEMENT of Exchange made in triplicate this 
28th day of January, 1928, between Grover L. White, party 
of the first part, and Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, party 
of the second part, 
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of the sum 
of One Dollar ($1.00) each to the other in hand paid, receipt 
of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties of the first and 
second part to this contract ag·ree to exchange properties as 
follows: 
The party of the first part agrees to sell to the party of 
the second part or assigns, for the sum of Fifteen Thousand 
and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) all that certain piece, parcel 
or lot of land, together with the improvements thereon, de-
~cribed as follows, to-wit: 
That 2 family apartment known as #751 Shirley Ave. in 
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the City of Norfolk, Va., ,vith double garage and all appurte-
nances thereon. 
The purchase price of Fifteen Thousand, and 00/100 Dol-
lars ($15,000.00) is to be paid in notes assumed, land, money 
and notes to be given as follo,vs: 
FIRST : The party of the second part agrees to assume a 
loan, or loans, now secured on the property above described, 
for:the principal sum of Dollars ($ ) 
page 22 ~ bea,:ing interest at the rate of % . 
. SECOND: To pay in cash on date of settlement 
the sum of Ten Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($10,000.00). 
THIRD: To give a deed of trust subject to a mortgag·e 
of $10,000.00 to secure the principal sum of Two Thousand 
Five Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($2,500.00) evidenced by 
a note or notes, bearing interest at the rate of 6%, payable 
Becoming due $100. 90 days, $100 6 months, $100 9 months, 
$100 12 months $100 15 months $100 18 months and the bal-
ance 2 years after date. 
FOURTH: To give a deed of bargain and sale to the party 
of the first part or its assigns, conveying all that certain piece, 
parcel or lot of land with the buildings and improvements 
thereon, described as follows, to-wit: · 
Site #2 Plat of Glencove, Norfolk, Va 
The purchase price of said property to he Five Thousand 
and 00/100 Dollars ($5,000.00) of which Two Thousand, Fiv~ 
Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($2,500.00) is evidenced by a 
note or notes secured by deed of trust on the property on 
which there is an unpaid balance of Two Thousand Five Hun-
dred and 00/100 Dollars ($2,500.00) bearing interest at 6%, 
payable semiannually, which said loan is to be assumed by 
the party of the first part or its assigns. 
It is understood that all property is to be conveyed sub-
ject to any restrictions that may have been placed on the 
land by the land company which developed it. 
It is understood that the title to all properties must be 
free and clear of all liens and indebtedness except as above 
mentioned, and shall be conveyed hy General War-
page 23 ~ ranty Deed with the usual covenants of title. 
All taxes, interest, rents and insurance, shall be 
prorated as of Settlement and settlement shall be made on 
or before Feb 3, 1928, 19 . 
It is agreed that time is the essence of. this contract. 
It is understood and agreed and with the consent of both 
parties hereto that Furr & Lindsay are the agents for both 
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parties and each of them agrees to pay to the said agents as 
compensation for making this sale the regular real estate 
commission on the purchase price of the property that each 
is selling; the said regular commission as established by the 
Norfolk Real Estate Board, Inc., being 5 per cent on the first 
Five Thousand Dollars and 3 per cent on the balance of the 
purchase price of city property and 5 per cent straight on 
farms and suburban property. 
It is further understood that the party of the :2nd part 
will secure as large a 1st loan as possible on the apartment 
which amount is to be turned over as a cash payment to the 
party of the 1st part, and that the party of the 1st part agrees 
to increase the amount of the 2nd mortgage sufficiently to 
make up any deficit between the amount of the loan secured 
and the cash payment mentioned in 2nd. -
WITNESS the following signatures and seals this 28th day 
of January, 1928. 
(signed) GROVER L. ,vHITE (Seal) 
CAPE HE~RY COTTAGE 
CORPOR&TION (Seal) 
By 




page 24 ~ And thereupon the plaintiff moves the Court to 
reject the said plea entitled special plea of set-
off and for grounds of the said motion says : 
First: That pursuant to the statutes for such case made 
and provided no plea can be received from the defendant after 
the 15th day of the October term of this Court, to-wit, after 
the 23rd day of October, 1939. · 
Second: That the said plea shows upon its face that every 
promise and covenant obligatory upon Cape Henry Cottage 
Corporation and in said contract contained was fully per-
formed by said Cape Henry Cottage Corporation and sets out 
no facts constituting a failure of the consideration to which 
the said defendant was entitled under the said contract. 
Third: That no facts set out in said plea are provable as 
a matter of defense to the cause of action alleged by the plain-
tiff in her declaration herein. 
Fourth: That the said plea shows upon its face that the 
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matter of set-off relied upon by the defendant, to-wit, three 
certain notes alleged to have been executed by Cape Henry 
Cottage Corporation and held by said defendant for the prin-
cipal sums of $100.00, $100.00, and $800.00, respectively, are 
. barred by the statute of limitations, for this, to-wit, that the 
supposed cause of action in said plea mentioned did not ac-
crue to the said defendant at any time within five years next 
before the filing of said plea in manner and form as the said 
defendant hath alleged in said plea. 
Fifth: That the said plea shows on its face that no 
grounds exist for the rescission of the contract 
page 25 ~ therein averred between the defendant and Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation. It is bad because it 
seeks rescission. 
Sixth: That the said plea shows on its face that no 
grounds exist for a claim for damages by the defendant from 
Cape Henry Cottage ·Corporation or from the plaintiff 
herein. 
vVM. G. MAUPIN, p. 0-
And on the same day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 5th day of December, in the year 1939: 
This cau$e came on this day to be heard on the petition of 
Grover L. White, by his attorney, a creditor of Cape Henry 
Cottage Corporation, to which report no exceptions have been 
filed, and was argued by counsel. · 
· On consideration whereof it appearing to tho Court that it 
is to the interest of all stockholders, creditors and other par-
ties interested in the affairs of the Corporation, that a Re-
ceiver be appointed pursuant to Section 3813 of the Code of 
. Virginia, it is aajudged, ordered and decreed that Harvey 
L. Lindsay, a former officer of the corporation, be and he 
hereby is appointed Receiver of Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration, to take charge of its affairs and to defend, in the 
name of the said corporation, such proceedings as may be 
filed against it in the case of Clara J. Neely v. Grover L. 
White, pending in this Court, and to do all other acts which 
mig·ht be done by such corporation if in being, that may be 
necessarv for the final settlement of the unfinished 
page 26 ~ business .. of said corporation. 
The following is the Petition filed by leave of the fore-
going order: 
Clara J. Neely v. Grover L. White. 49 
To the Honorable Allan R. Haneke!, Judge of said Court: . 
Your petitioner, Grover L. White, by his attorney, re-
spectfully represents to the Court the following case: 
That he is a creditor of Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, 
a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of 
Virginia with its principal office formerly in the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia, whose charter has been revoked for non-
payment of registration fees and franchise tax; that your 
petitioner deems it necessary to have the said corporation 
made a party to the pending suit in this Court entitled Clara 
J. Neely v. Grover L. White; that your petitioner believes it 
to be necessary and advisable for a receiver to be appointed 
pursuant to Section 3813 of the Code of Virginia : 
Wherefore your petitioner respectfully prays that Louis 
L. Guy, a disinterested person, be appointed Receiver of the 
said Cape Henry Cottag·e Corporation to take charge of its 
affairs and to def end, in the name of the said corporation, 
such proceedings as may be filed against it in the above-styled 
cause, and to do all other acts which might be done by the 
said corporation if in being, that may be necessary for the 
final settlement of the unfinished business of said corporation. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
GR.OVER L. WHITE, 
By EDWARD S. FEREBEE, 
Attorney. 
And on the same day, to-wit: In the Ci!cuit Court afore-
said, on the 5th clay of December, in the year 1939: 
This cause came on this day to be. heard upon the petition 
of the defendant, Grover L. White, by his attorney, for the 
joinder of Cape Henry C0ttage Corporation as n necessary 
and proper partv to this cause; and was argued by counsel. 
On consideration whereof it appearing to the Court from 
the said petition and from a copy of the defendant's special 
plea of set-off attached thereto that the Cape Henry Cottage 
Corporation is a necessary and proper party to this cause, the 
Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to issue process against 
the said Cape Henry Cottage Corporation or its legally au-
thorized representative joining the said corporation as a party 
defendant in this action. · 
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The following is Petition for Joinder of New Party filed 
by leave of _the foreg·oing order: 
To the Honorable Allan R. Hanckel, Judge of said Court: 
Your petitioner, Grover L. White, by his attorney, now 
comes and says that he is the defendant in the above-styled 
cause; that he has filed a special plea of set-off 
page 28 ~ herein, a copy of whic.h is attached hereto and asked 
- to be read as a part hereof, alleging· certain facts 
in support of a claim against the Cape Henry Cottag·e Cor-
poration, under whom the plaintiff claims; that the said Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation is deemed to be a necessary and 
proper party to this cause; and that by virtue of Section 6150 
of the Code of Virginia the defendant is entitled to have the 
said Cape Henry Cottage Corporation made a party to this 
cause. 
-wherefore the said defendant and petitioner, Grover L. 
White, respectfully petitions the Court that proper process 
may issue to have the said Cape Henry Cottage Corporation 
joined as a party to this cause. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER L. "WHITE, 
By EDWARD S. FEREBEE, 
Attorney. 
The Special Plea of Set-Off attached to the foregoing peti-
tion was on this day filed and heretofore copied into the rec-
ord hereii~above and for that reason not now repeated ex-
cept by reference. · 
And on another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court aforesaid, 
on the 11th day of December, in the year 1939: 
This day came Harvey L. Lindsay, Receiver of Cape Henry 
Cottage Corporation, and Cape Henry Cottage Corporation 
by counsel, and asked leave to file joint and several 
pag·e 29 ~ pleas of non-ass1.t1npsi.t and of limitations to the 
cause of action asserted against Cape Henry Cot-
tage Corporation herein by Grover L ... White, which leave is 
hereby granted, and said pleas are accordingly filed. 
The following is the Plea of N on-.A.ssmnpsit filed by leave 
of the foregoing order : 
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These defendants, Harvey L. Lindsay, Receiver for Cape 
Henry· Cottag·e Corporation, duly appointed as such by an 
order of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 
entered on the 5th day of December, 1939, and Cape Henry 
Cottage Corporation, a corporation, through Harvey L. Lind-
say, its Receiver, jointly and severally by their counsel come 
and say that Cape Henry Cottage Corporation did not under-
take or promise in any manner and form as Grover L. ,vhite 
hath in this action complained in his special plea of set-off, 
and of this the said defendants put themselves upon the 
country. 
WM. G. MAUPIN, Counsel. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
Personally appeared before me, .M.ary M. Ivioore, Notary 
Public in and for the City and State aforesaid, Harvey L. 
Lindsay, and made oath before me in my City aforesaid that 
he is Secretary of and Agent for Cape Henry -Cottage Cor-
poration, a Virginia corporation with its principal office in 
the City of N'orfolk, Virginia, and that he is receiver of said 
Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, duly appointed 
pag·e 30 ~ as such by order of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, entered on the 5th day of De-
cember, 1939, and that the matters and thing·s set forth in the 
foregoing plea as he verily believes are true; aml that he 
verilv believes that Grover L. ·white is not entitled to re-
covei· anything from Cape Henry Cottage Corporation on 
the claim asserted by said Grover L. White against Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation in this action. 
Given under my hand this 5th day of December, 1939. 
!Iy commission expires April 28, 1940. 
MARY l\1. :MOORE, 
Notary Public. 
The ~ollowing is the Plea of the Statute of Limitations filed 
by leave of the foregoing order: 
Harvey L. Lindsay, Receiver of Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration, appointed as such by order of the Circuit Court of 
the City of Norfolk entered on the 5th day of December, 1939, 
and said Cape Henry Cottage Corporation by Harvey L. 
Lindsay, its Receiver, by counsel, jointly and severally come 
and say that the supposed cause of action against Cape Henry 
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Cottage Corporation asserted in the special plea of set-off 
· filed herein by Grover L. White is founded upon simple con-
tracts in writing·, to-wit, three certain negotiable promissory 
notes in said plea mentioned and described, and that the same 
did not accrue to the said Grover _L. ·white at any time within 
five years next before the filing of said plea in this action by 
said Grover L. Wl1ite in manner and form as the 
page 31 ~ said Grover L. White hath complained against said 
Cape Henry Cottage Corporation; and this the 
said Harvey L. Lindsay, Receiver for said Cape Henry Cot-
tage Corporation and the said Cape Henry Cottage Corpora-
tion by the said Harvey L. Lindsay, its Receiver, are ready 
to verify. · 
WM. G. MAUPIN, Counsel. 
State of Virginia: 
Corporation of the City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
Personally appeared before me, Mary M. Moore, Notary 
Public in and for the City and State aforesaid, Harvey L. 
Lindsay and made oath before me in my City aforesaid that 
he is Secretary of and Agent for Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration, a Virginia Corporation with its principal office in 
the City of Norfolk, Virginia, and that he is receiver of said 
Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, duly appointed as such 
by order of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virg·inia, 
entered on the 5th day of December, 1939, and that' the mat-
ters and thing·s set forth in the foregoing plea as he verily 
believes are true; and that he verily believes that Grover L. 
·white is not entitled to recover anything from Cape Henry 
Cottage Corporation on the claim asserted by said Grover 
L. White against Cape Henry Cottage Corporation in this 
action. 
Given under my hand this 5th day of December, 1939. 
My commission_ expires April 28, 1940. 
MARY M. MOORE, 
Notary Public. 
page 32 } And at another clay, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
aforesaid, on the 19th day of January, in the year 
1940: 
This day can.1e the plaintiff by her attorney, the defendant 
by his attorney, and Harvey L. Lindsay, Receiver of Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation, and Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
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poration, by their attorney, and the Court considered the plea 
heretofore filed by the defendant, to-wit: the plea entitled 
Special Plea of Set-Off; and the Court further considered 
the motion heretofore made by the plaintiff to reject the' said 
Special Plea of Set-off; 
Upon consideration whereof the ·Court doth deny the motion 
of the plaintiff to reject the said Special Plea of Set-off, to 
which action of the Court the plaintiff duly excepted. 
And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court aforesaid, 
on the 15th day of Ap11il, in the year 1940: 
This day came again the parties, by counsel, and with leave 
of Court said plaintiff filed herein her general replication to 
said defendant's plea of Set-Off heretofore filed; and there-
upon came a jury, to-wit: L. M. Smith, T. S. Taylor, C. F. 
Becraft, E. A. Binns, George Mason, W.W. Walsh and R. G. 
Carroll, who were sworn to well and truly try the issue joined, 
and having· fully heard the evidence and arg·ument of counsel 
returned their verdict in the following words and figures, to-
wit: "The jury finds that Miss Neely is entitled to recover 
$2,500 and interest @ 6% per annum from Mr. 
page 33 ~ White dated from November 1, 1938. The jury 
also finds that Mr. White is entitled to a credit to 
apply against above mentioned sum amounting to $1,000 plus 
interest@ 6% from November 2, 1928, to date."_ And there-
upon said plaintiff and said defendant, by counsel, moved the 
Court to set aside the verdict of the jury and grant a new trial 
on the grounds that the same is contrary to the law and the 
evidence; and the further hearing of which motions is con-
tinued. · 
The. following is the Replication filed by leave of the fore-
going order : 
The said plaintiff, by her attorney, comes and says that the 
matters and things set out in the special plea of set-off filed 
herein by the defendant are not true, and of this she puts 
herself upon the country. 
WM. G. MAUPIN, p. q. 
And now at this day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 23rd day of May, in the year 1940, the day and 
year :first hereinabove written: 
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This day came again the parties, by counsel, and the m.o-
tions for a new trial heretofore made herein by both of said 
parties having been fully heard and maturely considered by 
the Court are overruled, to which action of the 
page 34 ~ Court in overruling_ her motion said plaintiff, by 
counsel, duly excepted, and to which action of the 
Court in overruling his motion said defendant, by counsel, . 
duly excepted. Vvhereupon it is considered by the Court that 
said plaintiff recover against said clef endant, as by the jury 
in its verdict ascertained, the sum of Twenty-five Hundred 
($2,500.00) Dollars, with legal interest thereon from the 1st 
day of November, in the year 1938, till paid, together with 
her costs about her suit in this behalf expended, subject to 
a credit of One 'rl10usand ($1,000.00) Dollars, with legal in-
terest thereon from the 2nd day of November, 1928, till the 
15th day of April, 1940, and to the foregoing judgment said 
defendant, by counsel, duly excepted. 
And thereupon each of said parties having signified the in-
tention of applying· to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia for a writ of error and su,persedeas to the foregoing 
judgment it is ordered that execution upon said judgment be 
suspended for the period of sixty ( 60) days from the end of 
this term of the Court upon said defendant, or someone for 
him, entel'ing· into and acknowledging a proper suspending 
bond before the Clerk of this Court in the penalty of Twenty-
five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars, with surety to be approved 
by said Clerk, and with condition according· to law. 
The following is the evidence and record in the case : 
NOTICE O~-, APPEAL. 
To Edward S. Ferebee, Counsel for said Defendant: 
pag-e 35 ~ Please take notice that on Saturday, July 6, 
1940, at 9 :30 o'clock A. M., the undersigned, coun. 
sel for the said plaintiff in this action, will apply to the Hon. 
Allan R. Haneke I, J uclge of the Cii-cuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia, before whom this case was tried, in' his 
chambers in the Courthouse in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 
and present then and there to the said Judge a certificate of 
exceptions embodying· the testimony, instructions and other 
incidents of the trial, and request the said J uclge to au then ti-
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cate the same for the purpose of making the same a part of 
the record in this case. 
And immediately after the authentication of said certifi-
cate of exceptions the undersigned will apply to the Clerk of 
the Circuit Court of the City of ,Norfolk for a copy of the 
record in this case for the purpose of making application to 
the Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error 
and su.pe.rsedeas therein. 
Dated at Norfolk; Virginia, this 1st day of July, 1940. 
WM. G. MAUPIN, 
WM. G. MAUPI.i~, 
Counsel for Clara J. Neely. 
Service of the above notice accepted this 2nd day of July, 
1940. 
EDW. ARD S. FEREBEE, 
EDWARD S. FER~:BEE, 
Counsel for Grover L. "'\Vhite. 
REOORD. 
page 36 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Clara J. Neely, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Grover L. White, Defendant. 
The following is the evidence and other incidents of the 
trial in this case. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the following is a complete 
and true stenographic report of all the testimony and evi-
dence and otl10r incidents of the trial, including the instruc-
tions offered, amended, granted and refused, and the objec-
tions and exceptions thereto, in the ·case of Clara J. Neely, 
Plaintiff, v. Grover L. White, Defendant, in the Circuit Court 
of the City of Norfolk, State of Virginia, before Honorable 
Allan R. Haneke!, Judge, and a jury, together with the 
motions, objections and stipulations on the part of the respec-
tive parties and the actions of the Court in respect thereto, and 
the exceptions of the respective parties, as hereinafter shown. 
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In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Clara J. Neely, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Grover L. "\Yhite, Defendant. 
Before : The Honorable Allan R. Iianckel, Judge, and 
Jury, Norfolk, Virginia, April 15, 1940. 
Present: Mr. Wm. G. Maupin, representing the plaintiff; 
Mr. Edward S. Ferebee, representing the defendant. 
page 38 r Mr. Maupin: I want to Jet the record show that 
I am renewing my motion for judgment heretofore 
made. · 
The Court: I understand. I overruled. All of those mat-
ters are in the record. 
Mr. Maupin: Yes, sir, but I wanted the motion renewed 
on the day of the trial. 
Mr. Maupin: I want to introduce in evidence two deeds; 
a. deed of trust from Cape Henry Cottage Corporation to 
Wm. G. Maupin, Trustee, dated the 1st day of November, 
1927, and recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation 
Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, in Deed Book 302-B, 
at page 135; and a deed of bargain and sale from Cape Henry 
Cottage Corporation to Grover L. ·white, dated the 1st day 
of February, 1928, and duly recorded in the same clerk's office 
in Deed Book 303-B, at page 427; and I want to read to the 
jury the trust clause in the deed from Cape He.nry Cottage 
Corporation to Wm. G. Maupin, Trustee. The deed of trust 
conveys a lot in Glen cove, Norfolk, (reading) : '' To secure 
to the holder thereof the payment of an indebtedness of 
Twenty-five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars evi-
page 39 r denced by a certain negotiable promissory note 
bearing even date with this deed, made by the said 
Cape Henry Corporation, payable to its own order two (2) 
years after elate at the Norfolk National Bank of Commerce 
and Trusts in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, for the principal 
sum of Twenty-five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars, with interest 
thereon from date until paid at the rate of six per cent per 
annum, payable semi-annually, and waiving the benefit of the 
homestead exemption. For its better identification said note 
is countersigned by the said Wm. G. Maupin, Trustee. Re-
newal and/or extension permitted.'' This is the original in-
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strument evidencing the debt. Here is the deed from the Cape 
Henry Realty Corporation to Grover L. ·white, conveying the 
identical property, and the deed contains this, (reading): 
'' As a part of the consideration of this conveyance, the said 
Grover L. White hereby assumes and promises to pay a debt 
of Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) and interest, se-
cured by a certain deed of trust from the said Cape Henry· 
Cottage Corporation to Wm. G. Maupin, Trustee, bearing date 
on the first day of November, 1927, and duly of record in the 
aforesaid Clerk's Office in Deed Book 302-B., page 135, ac-
cording to the terms and conditions of said deed of 
page 40 }- trust.'' And that is signed and sealed by Grover 
L. ·white, that promise to pay. 
Note : The said deed of trust and deed of bargain and sale 
are filed in evidence marked respectively '' Exhibit A'' and 
''Exhibit B ". 
MRS. MARY M. MOORE, 
a witness for the plaintiff, being duly sworn, on oath testified 
as follows: 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. You are Mrs. Mary M. Moore Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \'\There do you work? 
A. With ·william G. Maupin, Attorney. 
Q. How long have you been employed in that office': 
A. Since 1927. 
Q. What are your dutiesf 
A. Secretary and bookkeeper. 
Q. Have you kept the books for that period of time~ 
A. I have. 
Q. Since October, '27 ¥ 
A. October 7th, 1927. 
., 
Q. Were you employed in that office when a loan of $2,500.00 
was made to the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation Y 
page 41 }- A. I was. 
Q. With whose funds was that loan madet 
A. Clara J. Neely's. 
Q. Who is Clara J. Neely? 
A. A retired missionary. 
Q. And she loaned the money to the Cape Henry Cottage 
Corporation? 
A. She did. 
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Q. That was entered on your books when the loan was 
madef 
A. It was. 
Q. I hand you a note which is dated November 1st, 19271 
for $2,500.00~ signed by Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, 
payable to its own order, endorsed in blank, also endorsed by 
H. L. Lindsay, and ask you if this is the note secured by the 
deed of trust which has just been introduced in evidence. 
A. Yes, it is. 
Mr. Maupin: I introduce that in evidence. 
Note: The said note is filed in evidence, marked '' Exhibit 
C". 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. "\Vho owns that note? 
A. Cla.ra J. Neely. 
Q. Have you handled all the collections of interest on that 
debt? 
page 42 ~ A. I have. 
Q. vVho paid them f 
A. Mr. Grover White. 
Q. Did he pay them all? 
A. Every one of them up to November, 1928-'38 I mean. 
Q. He paid the installment of interest which came due No-
vember 1st, 19381 
A. He didn't pay that. 
Q. Let's look at the ledger sheet. 
A. I don't think he did. (Referring to the ledger sheet) : 
That's right; I was a little mixed up. 
Q. He paid the instal1ment of interest that fell due N ovem-
ber, 1938-so that the interest has been paid up to Novem-
ber-
A. Up to November 1st, 1938. 
Q. Has any interest been paid since f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. The interest, according· to the deed of trust, was due 
again in-
.A. :M:ay, 1939. 
Q. Did yon attempt to collect it from lvf r. ·white or to find 
out why he didn't pay it f 
A. I called Mr. W11ite on the telephone several times and he 
said he would come al'ound to the office, hut he didn't do it, 
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and when he didn't come I took it up with you, and 
page 43 ~ I think you wrote him one or two letters, I don't 
know which. I think you have them in the file. But 
I never did see him; he never did come to the office. 
Q. Has the principal of that note ever been paid 1 
A. No, sir, none of it~ 
The Court: I clidn 't catch the last question. 
Mr. Maupin: I asked if the principal of the note had been 
paid. She said no, none of it. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. I hand you two carbons of letters purporting to he signed 
by Wm. G. Maupin and dated respectively July 25th, 1939, 
and August 2nd, 1939. ,v ere those letters written by you? 
They are both addressed to Mr. Grover L. ,Vhite. 
A. Yes, sir, they were; they have my initial down on the 
bottom. 
Q. And signed by ,vm. G. Maupin and mailed by you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ,Vas any reply ever received from either of those letters t · 
A. I've never seen any. 
Mr. Maupin: I will read these letters with Your Honor's 
permission (reading) : "July 25th, 1939. Mr. Grover L. 
White, College Place, Norfolk, Virginia. Dear Sir: On No-
vember 1, 1927, Cape Henry Cottage Corporation was the 
owner of Site 2 on the ·Plat of" Glencove Estates, 
page 44 ~ recorded in Map Book 6, page 29, in the Clerk's 
Office of the Corporation Court of the City of Nor-
folk. On that date it borrowed the sum of $2,500.00 and exe-
cuted a deed of trust to the undersigned as trustee, conveying 
said lot as security for the debt of $2,500.00. This deed of 
trust is recorded in said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 302-B, 
page 135. The property was conveyed to you by Cape Henry 
Cottage Corporation by deed dated February 1, 1928, and re-
corded in said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 303-B, page 427, 
and as a part of the consideration for the conveyance you 
assumed and promised to pay said debt of $2,500.00. Since that 
time you have been paying interest on this debt through my 
office. Miss Clara Johnson.Neely is the holder of the note 
evidencing this indebtedness and has requested me, as her at-
torney, to ·collect the principal and interest thereof. Interest 
is clue from November 1, 1938, and in making payment please 
arrange to take ca.re of the interest accruing since that date. 
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Miss Neely has said to me that" she is not willing to extend this 
loan, particularly since you absolutely declined to pay the 
semi-annual interest which fell due on the first of last May. 
I should be glad to hear from you promptly, and I am pre-
pared to hand you the note upon payment of the 
page 45 ~ principal and accrued interest. Very truly yours, 
Wm. G. Maupin.'' 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. You say there was no answer to that at all f 
A. I never saw any. 
Q. Did you ever see Mr. White in the office after that time? 
A. Never. 
Q. Did you ever hear of any claim of set-off that he claimed f 
A. None at all. 
Mr. Maupin: The letter of August 2nd; 1939, reads this way 
(reading): "1\fr. Grover ~- "\Vhite, College Place, Norfolk, 
,Va. Dear Sir : Will you kindly reply to my letter of July 25, 
1939, regarding note of $2,500.00 secured on Site 2 on the Plat 
of Glencove Estates. Very truly yours, vVm. G. Maupin." 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Was there any answer to that? 
A. None that I know of. 
Note: The said letters of July 25th, 1939, and August 2nd, 
1939, are filed in evidence marked respectively ''Exhibit D" 
and "Exhibit E". 
page 46 ~ ByMr.'Maupin: 
Q. In answer to your telephone calls he promised 
to come to the office but never came? 
A. Never came. 
Q. Do you know whether he ever tried to beg off paying 
the note-pay any less than the full amount of the indebted-
ness? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Do you recall seeing this letter of Mr. v\Thite 's dated 
February 18, 1939, addressed to me? 
Mr. Ferebee: Before the witness makes any response I 
should like to object to the procedure of counsel· in having 
correspondence identified by the stenographer in his office. She 
may have seen the letter in the office, but spe has nothing to do 
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with this transaction. I think the wrong procedure is being 
followed by him in introducing evidence and I object. 
The Court: She can testify to what she knows. 
Mr. Ferebee: She said she didn't know anything about the 
substance of this letter. 
l\fr. Maupin: I asked it in order to be sure she understood 
my question; that's the reason. 
The Court: What was the question t 
The S'tenogTapher (reading) : Do you know whether he 
ever tried to beg off paying~ the note-pay any less 
page 47 ~ tlian the full amount of the indebtedness! . 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Did Mr. White ever make an offer to sell the lot for what 
it would bring and give an unsecured note for half irt amount 
of the balance, the whole thing not to be less than $2,500.00f 
Mr. Ferebee: I object to the question. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. All right, I'll wjthdraw it and simply ask the question 
whether or not this letter was received in my office. 
A. I don't 'i·emember seeing it. ~ 
Mr. Maupin: All right, I will examine Mr. ·white. If Your 
Honor please, I am not suing on the note,- and I don't think 
that this case comes under Section 69 of the Tax Code, which 
provides that when you sue on a note there must be the alle-
gation or proof that the note has been duly assessed for tax-
ation. But in order taht there might be no question about that 
I took it up with Mr. Ferebee and he said he had no objection 
to there being a stipulation here that this note has been duly 
assessed for taxation during each and every year," on the first 
day of ,January, of which Miss Neely l1as O":ned it. 
Mr. Ferebee: I didn't agree to stipulate it had been done. 
I agreed to have Mr. Maupin prove it. 
page 48 ~ Mr. Maupin: You most assuredly did. I asked 
you whether or not you pref erred to have the dec-
laration amended or whether I could stipulate to that effect, 
and you said you wonldn 't object. 
Mr. Ferebee: If Mr. Maupin tells me that he personally is 
aware of the fact that it has been returned for assessment 
I am perfectly willing to accept it. 
:M:r. Maupin: Of course I am-
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Mr. Ferebee: If Ivlr. J\:laupin will tell me of his own knowl-
edge-
By :Mr. :Maupin: 
Q. :M:rs. Moore, has this note been assessed for taxation? 
A. It has. 
Q. For every yearf 
A. For every year. 
Mr. Maupin: I was able to prove it by my witness. That "s 
all. 1N e rest. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ferebee: 
Q. Mrs. Moore, where is Clara J. Neely nowf 
A. In Portsmouth I think. 
page 49 ~ Q. vVhere was she in 1927 f 
A. I think she was doing missionary work. 
Q. Abroad1 
A. I wouldn't like to swear to that. 
Q. She wasn't in the City of Nqrfolk at any evenU 
A. I don't know about that. I wouldn't like to answer 
that. 
Q. Did you see her when she was in the office? You went 
there in October, 1927. 
A. After Mr. Tomlin died; October, 1927. 
Q. You were formerly ,vith M:r. Tomlin 1 
A. With Mr. Tomlin; and right after Mr. Tomlin died I went 
with :Mr. Maupin. 
Q. This loan was made by Clara J. Neely on November 
1st, 1927? That's the datef 
~ A. The money was loaned, yes. 
Q. That's what I want to get .at. Clara J. Neely didn't 
know anything about this loan personally? 
A. She gave the money to Mr. Maupin and told him to lend 
it out to a responsible party. 
Q. Do you know when she did that-of your own knowledge I 
A. I couldn't tell you the date. 
Q. After you came to this office? 
A. She gave it to him to loan for her after I came to the 
office. 
page 50 ~ Q. And Mr. Maupin is the one who made the 
loan? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. The loan wasn't made by Clara J. Neely personally! 
A. No, the money was given to Mr. Maupin. 
Q. And he used his judgment in making the loan to what 
he considered to be a responsible person f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has Miss Clara J. Neely e--ver had physical possession 
of this note T 
A. Yes, she kept it all the time. 
Q. Personally Y 
A. Yes, she kept it. She keeps all her notes. 
Q. ·where was she during the summer of 19391 
A. Listen-you've asked me something I couldn't tell you. 
Q. Was she in N orfo]k last summer? 
A. She was in Portsmouth-I think-in fact, I know she 
was. 
Mr. Maupin: May I ask the purpose of this-is Mr. Fere-
bee trying to say I don't represent the plainti:f.n Or what 
is the purpose of this question f 
Mr. Ferebee: I think it will appear in the argument to 
the jury. 
Mr. Maupin: Possibly so-but I fail to see it 
page 51 }- now. 
By Mr. Ferebee:· 
Q. Did Miss Neely ever bring in this note? 
A. She brought it in to Mr. Maupin ,vhen she wanted him 
to bring this case. 
Q. Not prior to that time f 
A. No ; when she wanted the case brought she brought 
the note in to Mr. Maupin-when she asked him to enter this 
suit. 
Q. I notice the note has no curtails on the back, for interest 
payments. 
A. I don't know how she conducts her business. She at-
tends to that. 
Q. Did you make statements to her that the interest was 
paid? . 
A. I sent her checks e--very six months, when I got it from 
Mr. White. 
Q. Mr. ·white, in addition to paying interest up to and in-
cluding November 1st, 1938, likewise paid the real estate taxes 
on that lot? 
A. He said he did. 
Q. Do you know as a matter of fact? 
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A. No, I couldn't-I took his word for it. 
Q. Didn't he show you the receipted tax bill? 
A. He never showed me the receipted tax bill. 
page 52 t Q. In addition to the payment of interest every 
six months up to November 1st, 1938, Mr. vVhite 
paid the sum of $25.00, didn't he? 
A. Yes, that was renewal fee. 
Q. That went to whom? 
A. Mr. Maupin. 
Q. I thought Miss Neely made this loan? 
A. She did, but Mr. Maupin had to get something for his 
services to Miss Neely. All lawyers do that. l\fr. Tomlin did 
that. 
Q. Did you render a statement to Miss Neely? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. Do you have copies of those statements? 
A. No. 
Q. What kind of statements were they? 
A. Just when I sent her the interest, I just sent her that 
interest. whatever it was. When Mr. Maupin was handling 
her money for her she knew in conversations with Mr. Maupin 
he was going to eharge that handling fee, and Mr. Maupin 
got that. _ 
Q. That went to Mr. Maupin? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Each year for a period of eleven. years? 
A. No; every six months. 
Q. $12.50 every six montl1S? 
page 53 ~ A. $25.00 .. 
Q. Every six months? 
A. Yes. No, I'm wrong there. He paid $25.00 a year, one 
per cent of the loan. He paid one per cent of $2,500.00. 
Q. $25.00 a year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he paid that for the first year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Beginning when, and continuing to wl1en? 
A. I think the last time he pa.id it was in November, 1938. 
Q. The same time he paid the interest f 
A. I think that's it. 
Q. And he paid it each year from the time the loan was 
made up to that time 1 
A. Each year. 
Q. Mrs. l\foore, you said something about calling Mr. ·white 
on the telephone and asking him .to take care oi that. 
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A. Numerous times on the telephone. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that on several occasions after 1938 Mr. 
White said to you in substance he wasn't going to make any 
further payments until he could find out where both parties 
stood? 
A. He told me that the last time, and that's when Mr. 
Maupin wrote Mr. White that letter and they en·-
page 54 } tered the suit. 
Q. He didn't just ignore you t 
A. When I first called him up when the interest was first 
due he said, "I'll be up to the office". Well, I waited several 
days and he didn't come, and I called him up again, and he 
still said he would be by the office. So then when I called 
him up another time he said he was throug·h with the loan 
or something to that effect. So I told Mr. Maupin about it, and 
he immediately got in touch with Miss Neely and Miss Neely 
instructed him to bring the suit or do something to collect the 
money. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Mrs. Moore, did Miss Neely have any bargain whatever 
with Mr. White about that note f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was there a bargain between Mr. White and counsel? 
A. A bargain between you and Mr. ·white. 
Q. That if he would pay the interest and-
A. And taxes that you would save him harmless if Miss 
Neely called the loan. · 
Q. Did that prevent Miss Neely from camng the loan Y 
A. No; she could have called it. 
page 55} Q. But if he paid the interest-
A. You would have taken up the loan yourself-
like Mr. Tomlin did. 
Q. Not if he paid the interest? 
A. Yon were to protect him absolutely-and that's what 
you do on all the loans in the office. 
Q. And that's the custom of other lawyers 7 
A. Absolutely; it certainly is. 
Q. And he didn't keep his part of the bargain f 
A. No ; and of course you had to break yours. 
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RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ferebee: 
Q. As I understand, it's customary, is it, for a lawyer if 
he makes a loan for a client and the loan turns bad, the lawyer 
makes the · loan good? 
A. I don't know that you can say that. Mr. Tomlin <lid. 
Mr. :Maupin: I don't think you have any right to put such 
words in Mrs. Moore's mouth. She said the lawyer would 
protect him from having to pay for one year. 
By Mr. Ferebee: 
Q. I will ask you this. Isn't it a fact, Mrs. Moore, that 
Mr. Maupin has assured Miss Neely that if this note wont 
bad that he personally will be responsible for it f 
page 56 ~ A. Mr. Maupin assure Miss Neely? 
Q. Yes. 
A. N"o, I've never heard him assure Miss Neely of any-
thing -like that. 
Mr. Maupin: I've never known tactics of that sort in a 
court. 
Mr. Ferebee: Do you objecU 
Mr. Maupin: Yes. vVe 1re learning things every minute. 
He is asking if I am the guarantor on this note. What earthly 
relevance would it have if it were true i He knows it isn't 
true. I'd hate to guarantee Mr. Grover "\\7hite 's note. 
Mr. Ferebee: You didn't know Grover White when vou 
made this loan. · 
Mr. Maupin: Oh, yes, I did; and have since. 
Mr. Ferebee: No further questions. 
Mr. Maupin: We rest. 
GROVER L. WHITE, 
the defendant, being duly sworn, on oath testified as follows:· 
By Mr. Ferebee: 
Q. Your name is Grover L. "\Vhite? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\V1iat business are you inf 
page 57 ~ A. Tiles-modern lighting :fixtures. 
Q. Where is your place of business 1 
A. 121 College Place. 
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Q. How long have you been in business in the City of Nor-
folk? 
A. Since 1915. It's about 24 years-25 years. 
Q. Mr. White, do you know Clara J. Neely, the plaintiff 
in this case? 
A. No, sir, never heard of the lady until you read that letter 
you read a few minutes ago. 
Q. I wish you would explain the circumstances to the jury 
and the court under which you had some dealings with the 
.Cape Henry Cottage Corporation regarding the exchange of 
properties in February, 1928. Tell the jury in substance 
about it a.ncl I will present the contract later. 
A. Following along the same lines tiat you told the jury. 
We made this trade and they gave us a note to complete the 
bargain. 
Q. Who is "they"? 
A. Cape Henry Cottage Corporation. 
Q. What property did they own and what property did you 
own! l 
A. They owned the lot in question now-in Glencove-Lot 
Number 2_:and they paid $500.00 on that second mortgage. 
. Q. How much was the total amount 1 
page 58 r A. $1,500.00, and they paid $500.00. Balance 
$1,000.00. 
Q. ·what else where they supposed to do f 
A. I don't know anything else they were supposed to do. 
Mr. Ferebee: I am going to introduce the exchange con-
tract. That will speak for itself. 
Mr. Maupin: I am objecting to the introduction of that, 
on the ground that it is irrelevant. 
The Court : Overruled. 
Mr. Maupin : I except. 
Mr. Ferebee: I offer the exchange contract in evidence, 
as Exhibit D-1. 
By Mr. Ferebee: 
Q. ]\fr. White, I have in my hand what purports to be a 
standard exchange contract on the printed fo,·m of the Nor-
folk Real Estate Board, dated January 28, 1928, and ask you 
if that is the original exchange contract and the terms where-
by the property was proposed to be exchange between you two? 
A. Yes, that's the original. 
Q. ,v as that subsequently- modified in any manned 
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A. Yes; we had a couple or more lots there when they made 
the final trade. - · 
Q. And I notice in this exchange contract that it calls for 
delivery to you of notes' in the amount of $2,500.00? 
A. Yes, that was changed to $1,500.00. 
page 59 ~ Q. With those exceptions was there any change 
in the exchange agreement between you and Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation 1 
A. No, sir, none that I remember. 
Mr. Ferebee: I shall read this contract to the jury, leaving 
out some of the printed portions which have no bearing. 
(Heading) : '' This Agreement of Exchange made in triplicate 
this 28th day of January, 1928, between Grover L. White, 
party of the first part, and Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, 
party of the second part, vVitnesseth: That for and in con-
sideration of the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) each to the other 
in. hand paid, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the 
parties of the first and second part to this contract agree to 
exchange properties as follows : The party of the first part 
agrees to sell to the party of the second part or assigns, for 
the sum of Fifteen Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) 
all that certain piece, parcel or fot of land, together with the 
improvements thereon, described as follows, to-wit: That 2 
family apartment known as #751 Shirley Ave., in the City 
of Norfolk, Va., with double garage and all appurtenances 
thereon. The purchase price of Fifteen Thousand and 00 /100 
Dollars ($15,000.00) is to be paid in notes assumed, land, 
money and notes to be given as follows: See-
page 60 ~ ond"-(The first provision is left blank and noth-
ing is agreed on that point.) ''Second: To pay in 
cash o·n date of settlement the sum of Ten Thousand and 
00/100 Dollars ($10,000.00). Next, "To give a deed of trust 
subject to a mortgage of $10,000.00 to secure the principal sum 
of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars, evidenced by a note 
or notes, bearing interest at the rate of 6%, becoming due 
$100. 90 days, $100. 6 months, $100 9 months, $100 12 months 
$100 15 months $100 18 months and the balance two years after 
date.'' 
By Mr. Ferebee: 
Q. Is that the portion that was changed was $2,500.00 to 
$1,500.00? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The next provision is to give a deed of bargain and 
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sale to the party of the first part or its assigns, conveying 
all that certain piece, parcel or lot of land with the buildings 
Jmd improvements thereon, described as follows, to-wit: Site. 
#2 Plat of' Glencove, Norfolk, Va., the purchase price of said 
property to be Five Thousand Dollars, of which Two Thou-
sand, Five Hundred Dollars is evidenced by a riote or _notes 
secured by deed of trust on the property on which there is 
an unpaid balance of Two Thousand, :Wive Hundred Dollars, 
bearing interest at 6% payable semi-annually, 
page 61 ~ which said loan is to be assumed by the party of the 
first part or its assigns. That's the note in ques-
tion which you under the terms of that deed assumed the pay-
ment off 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Settlement to be on February 3, 1928. The other pro-
visions are immaterial so f &r as this transaction is concerned. 
Pursuant to that did you receive from the Cape Henry Cot-
tage Corporation the sum of $10,000.00 in cash 1 
A. Well, that part of it was changed too when we changed 
that contract. I think it was about $9,000.00 they were able · 
to raise. I think they changed it to $9,000.00. 
Q. Whatever the modification was, you did receive what-
ever the modified promise was? 
A. That's right, yes. 
Q. Did you or not receive from the Cape Henry Cottage 
Corporation a deed of bargain and sale to their equity in 
this Site Number Two, Glencovef 
A. Yes. 
Q. I hand you the deed that has already been introduced 
in evidence and ask vou if this is the deed which vou received 
from Cape Henry c"'ottage Corporation? . 
A. Yes, that's it. 
Mr. Ferebee: The deed referred to is the deed dated Feb-
ruary 1st, 1928, already introduced in evidence marked '' Ex-
hibit B". 
page 62 ~ By Mr. Ferebee: . 
Q. At the time you signed this deed that I have 
just referred to did you know Clara J. Neely~ 
A:- No, sir. 
Q. Further regarding the terms of this exchange contract 
of January 28th, 1928, I will ask you what you did as to your 
part of the exchange agreement; first, as to the property on 
Shirley Avenue-751 Shirley Avenue-two family apartment. 
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A. Of course I deeded that property to the Cape Henry 
Corporation. 
Q. And I believe you have already testified that you signed 
this deed of February 1st, 19281 
A. Yes. ' 
Q. Wlrnt further were the obligations of the Cape Henry 
Corporation to you as to this $1,500.00 debt? 
A. They gave me seven notes of $100.00 each and the last 
note for $800.00, making a. total of $1,500.00. 
Q. Do you have a reeord as to the maturity dates of those 
notes 1 Do you reme~1ber when they became due? 
A. We have it on our ledger, but I haven't it right in my 
mind. I think they were due every quarter; $100.00 per quar-
ter. 
Q. Beginning with when f 
· A. From the date of that contract. 
page 63 ~ Q. Vlhich one of the series of notes was the 
$800.00 one? 
A. The last. 
Q. How many of those notes were ultimately paid 1 
A. Five. 
Q. .A.mounting to how much in all f 
A. $500.00. $100.00 each. 
Q. Vv ere they the first :five of the series of eight notes? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Interest was paid on the obligation to what time, if at 
alH 
A. Up to the time they paid the last note. Tl1at 's the last 
we received. 
Q. Do you recall that date 1 
A. No, sir. It's in my ledger. 
Q. Who made those payments to you of those notes of the 
Qape Henry Cottage Corporation Y 
A. Mr. Lindsay, of Furr an(l Lindsay. 
. Q. Harvey Lindsay f 
A. Yes. 
Q. ·what happened to the notes after they were paid-the 
ones that were paid 1 
A. I gave those to them. As he paid a note we would turn 
the note over to him. 
page 64 ~ Q. I hand you, M:r. "\\TJ1ite, three notes, one num-
bered 6, one 7 and one 8, all of them dated Feb-
ruary 2, 1928; number 6 being for $100.00 payable August 
2, 1929, signed by Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, payable 
to the order of Bearer, bearing on its back the notation, "Nov~ 
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7, 1928, Received interest to Nov. 2, 1928, $4.50". Also Num-
ber 7, in the amount of $100.00, payable November 2, 1929, 
to the order of Bearer, signed by Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration, and bearing on its back the notation, ''Nov. 7, 1928, 
Received interest to Nov. 2, 1928, $4.50' '. Number 8, being 
in the amount of $800.00, payable February 2, 1930, to Bearer 
and signed by Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, bearing on 
its back, "Nov. 7, 1928, R,eceived interest to Nov. 2, 1928, 
$36.00". I ask you if they a.re the la.st three of the series of 
eight notes you just testified to as receiving from the Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does the notation on the back refresh your recollection 
as to the point to which interest was paid on the entire obli-
gation? · 
A. Not my memory, but this is supposed to be correct. I 
am sure it is correct. 
Mr. Ferebee: I offer these notes in evidence, to be marked 
respectively ''Exhibit D-2", "Exhibit D-3", and ''Exhibit 
D-4". 
Mr. M-aupin: I object, for reasons that are ap-
page 65 ~ p~rent in the pleadings in this case, which the court 
overruled, and I except. 
By Mr. Ferebee : 
Q. Mr. White, has any portion of those three notes that I 
have just handed to you been paid f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Has any interest been paid on them from November 
2nd, 1928, to the present time 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. They bear interest at the rate of what per cent¥ 
A. Six. 
Q. Do you know anything about the financial condition or 
the legal status so far as a layman can know of the Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation? 
A. I only know what I heard. 
Q. From whom did you hear anything about it? 
A. From Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Epstein. 
Q. Harvey L. Lindsayf 
A. Yes. 
Q. ,vas he connected with the Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration? 
A. I think so. 
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Q:What did he tell you about iU 
A. He told me when I asked him about the pay-
page 66 ~ ment of those notes that the company was defunct 
and they couldn't do anything. 
Q. Do you remember when that was that he made that state-
ment? 
A. No, sir, not exactly, but some time after these notes 
were due. 
Q, And prior to what time, if you can recall? 
A. I should say a short time after this, February 2nd, 
August 2nd, 1929. I gave them a few weeks. Must have been 
about September '29. 
Q. Has any demand ever been made tlie Cape Henry Cot-
tage Corporation for the payment of those notes-by you T 
A. Just when I asked for it. That's the only demand. No 
suit' or anything of the kind. 
Q. Now, Mr. White, after this exchange agreement was en-
tered into in February, 1928, what payments, if any, did you 
make on this obligation that is now being held by Clara J. 
Neely-the $2,500.00 note in question in this case? 
A. What's that? 
Q. After you entered into this agreement back in 1928 what 
payments of any kind have you made covering the $2,500.00 
that you assumed? 
A. I paid the interest every six months. 
Q. At the rate of how ·much? 
A. Six per cent. $75.00 semi-annually, maldng $150.00 a 
year. 
page 67 ~ Q. You paid $150.00 a year? 
A. $175.00 a year. 
Q. What was the additional $25.00 for? 
A. That was, as I understood, a bonus for making the loan. 
Q. To whom? 
A. Mr. Maupin. 
Q. Did you know who held that note of $2,500.00 that you 
had assumed the payment of? 
A. No, sir; -and I always thought it was Mr. Maupin per-
sonally. No, I didn't know. 
Q. Did he ever advise you it was a clienH 
A. I think he said a lady. He never mentioned the name-
when I asked him to do something about compromising. I 
wanted to get rid of it. 
Q. ·what was that? 
A. I've been after him five years-"Let's get rid of that 
note.'' The thing worried me. 
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Q. Had yon made any other payments regarding the prop-
erty ont at Glencove Y 
A. None other than paying the taxes. 
Q. Who paid the taxes? 
A. I did. 
Q. How much a year. 
page 68 } A. $52.50 a year. 
Q. From what time to what time? 
A. From the time the deed was made in '28, and they are 
paid to date now. ,· 
Q. How much a year? 
A. $52.50. 
Mr. Ferebee: Answer Mr. Maupin. 
CROSS EXA:M:INATION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. You told Mr. Ferebee, Mr. White, that you didn't know 
who held that note? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You knew somebody held it? 
A. I always thought it was your note. 
Q. You knew somebody held iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I never told you it was my note, did I? 
A. No. 
~- You knew that I loaned money for clients? 
A. I imagine you did, yes. 
Q. And you knew you paid through my office? · 
A. I thought you were wealthy-had a good deal of money 
-and loaned your own money. · 
Q. The point is, you knew when you signed that deed agree-
ing to pay that, you had to pay it to somebody? 
page 69 } A. Yes. 
Q. And it didn't make any particular difference 
to whom you paid it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You felt it was up to you to pay the sum of $2,500.00 
evidenced by a note described in your deed? 
A. You. · · 
Q. And you signed this deed? That's your signature? 
A. That is, yes. 
Mr. Maupin: I want. that in the record because there's a 
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sworn pleading signed by you saying you didn't sign that. 
Mr. Ferebee: I object to that statement. The form of 
the pleading is the plea of the general issue. It is in no 
sense a claim that it wasn't his signature. 
Mr. Maupin: I don't know of any law that you can make 
a statement and then file a pleading saying it isn't so. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. So, irrespective of your pleading, you did sign that deed 
under your seal 1 
A. Yes; I've never disputed signing that. 
Q. I don't know whether you disputed it or not. 
i>age 70· ~ There's a pleading in the papers in this case, sworn 
to by you, in which you. say you clidn 't sign it. 
Mr. Ferebee: I would like to have the statement appear in 
the record, that the pleading was drawn by his attomey ancl 
that any responsibility for the form of the pleading rests on 
the attorney's shoulders. 
Mr. Maupin: That's a matter for-
The Court : For the jury to determine. 
Mr.· Maupin: If Mr. "\Vhite says he affixed his signature 
to something that doesn't state a fac.t the jury is entitled to 
know it. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Now, Mr. "\Vhite, you made that contract with the Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation-and I am cross examining you 
without waiver of my objection on these points-in 1928, 
whereby you traded an apartment on Shirley Avenue to the 
Cape Henry Cottage Corporation f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were to get a certain amount in cash and the 
assumption of certain second mortgage notes, and take this 
lot in at an agreed valuation of $5,000.00? Is that right 1 
A. Yes, I think-
Q. So you agreed the lot at the time to be worth $5,000.001 
A. No; I based my judgment on yonr loan on 
page 71 ~ that lot. 
Q. Let's see if you did. (Reading· from the con-
tract marked" Exhibit D-1"): ''To give a deed of bargain 
and sale to the party of the first part or its assig11s conveying· 
all that certain piece, parcel or lot of land * * * described as 
fo1lows, to-wit: * * * The purchase price of said property 
to be $5,000.00, of which $2,500.00 is evidenced by a note or 
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no~·cs Hecurec.1 by deed of trust on the property 011 which there 
is an unpaid balanee of $2,500.00. '' So you did evaluate that 
lot at $5,000.00 '? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But yon took it in at only $:2,500.00. In other words, 
you were to get n 8:\000.00 lot hut the amonnt that you paid 
for the lot in this trade was only $2,500.00, and the other 
$2,500.00 you ug']'(~od o pay to the holder of that note? 
.A.. Yes. 
Q. So you g·ot the lot $2,500.00 cheaper1 
A. Provided the Jot w~s worth it. 
Q. It di<ln 't make nny difference. You made your own 
valuation. That's yom signature to this contracU 
A. But I told you f based my judgn1ent in the deal on 
yours. 
Q. X o mat for what you hm;ed it on, the contract 
pag·e 72 ~ say~ yonr valuation ".,.as $5,000.00. That's righU 
A. Asi-:mming· that you made y01i own-
Q. Answer my q1w~tion. 
A.. (continuing) :--vnlnation 011 the lot yourself and that 
you ha<l---
Q. Ann,ler my question. 
Mr. Ferebee: Let him answer it the way he wants to. 
B:y Mr. Maupin: 
Q. No, I won't. My question is if you didn't put the valua-
tion of $5,000.00- , 
A. That's right, but I understood it was going to sell for 
$5,000.00. 
Q. Let mo finish my question. TJ1at you wonldn 't have to 
pay in but $2,500.00, and you agreed to pay the $2,500.00 that 
was on the lot at that time f 
.A. Well, in this way-if the lot wasn't worth $2,500.00 I 
always th,;mg-l1t I could let you have the lot. 
Q. Have you ever made any real estate sales before? 
A. No; that's my first experience. 
0. Ever made any bank loans? 
A. I've borrowecl°rnonev from the bank. 
Q. Kver put up collateral? 
A. '1 ... es, I've done that. 
Q. Do you think you cnn go to a bank and say, 
page 73 ~ '' Here, take the collateral and let me off from my 
loan"? Is that vom· idea of business-von a busi-
nc8s man in Norfolk? · · 
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A. ·\Vhen you agree to do anything. 
Q. So you think if you had given the ·Bank of Commerce 
some Yellow Cab stock worth twenty, as a collateral loan, and 
that Yellow CalJ stock went down to one, you could go down 
to the bank and tell Mr. Alfriend to take the Y1ellow Gab 
stock and he'd let. you off at thaU 
l\.fr. Ferehee: That bas no bearing on this case, and I 
object. The issue is whether or not the notes of the Cape 
Henry ·CottagP. Corporation had been paid. 
The Con rt: I suppose it's just a question of the credi-
bility of the witness. · 
-Mr. Maupin: . Exactly. 
The Court: I suppose you could call it credibility-or the 
weight to attach to it. . 
Mr. F'erehee: I should like to have this witness say whether 
or not the witness understood he had anv defense to this 
matter., or if he ·has been advised by counsel. 
Th-3 Court: I don't understand that. · I just thought the 
question was as to the value of this property. 
Mr. Ferebee: As I understood my ·friend's 
pagt~ 7 4 ~ preeent line he is seeking to show that this wit-
ness vohmtarily made payments on this obligation 
for a pm'iod of ten years and then for some inexplicable rea-
son he ~topped. I Rhou]d to have the record show he stopped 
on advice of counsel. 
By Mr. }f anpin : 
Q. I didn't ask lJ.im any such thing. · ( Addressing the wit-
ness) : You Haicl to me you thought at any time you could 
convev that lot to the holder of the note and that would be 
the encl of it 1 ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. I asked you if you thought when you made a loan se-
cured by collateral and that collateral depreciated in ':alue, 
you could turn that over to the holder of the note and forget 
the debt. 
A. I don't say flmt in regard to banks. 
Q. But any other orclinary lender isn't as powerful as a 
hank'~ 
A. I mean it isn't yom~ habit to lend over fifty pe.r cent 
of what you eom-ider tlH} property worth when you take it 
over. 
0. You dicbl 't ]mv<> to take that lot, did you? 
A ... What do you uwan? It was in the contract .. 
• 
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Q. You could hnve refused to take it or consented to take 
iU 
page 75 } A. I've been trying to get you to take it. 
Q. I'm talking about before--when you made 
your contract with the Cape Henry Cottag·e Corporation. 
'11hey offered you the lot at a value of $5,000.00. You didn't 
have to take it unless yon wanted to, did you t 
A. No. 
Q. You did take it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you ngru(·cl to pay whoever had that loan for 
$2,500.00, you agreed to pay that $2,500.00 and interest? 
A. Provided tJ1ey canied their contract out. 
Q. You promh.:ed in 1.JJi~ deed, without any reserYations 
whatever, that you woufrl pay off that debt of $2,500.00 with 
interest, didn't you 7 
A. I think this reads that way. 
Q. You dou 't think it does¥ 
A. 1 sav I think it does·. 
Q. Without any reservation? 
A. I don't know of anv in there. 
Q. So you have per~on::.Hy promised to pay to the holder 
of" that debt thflt $2,500.00"! . 
A. You know how I felt about the whole thing. 
Q. Don't n rgue with me. 
'J~he Court: Answer the question and then let him make 
exnlana tion. 
11ag-e 76 } Tl1e ·witness: What's the question 1 
B)~ J\f.r. Maupin: 
Q. You prqmised to pay thei holder of that debt $2,500.00? 
A. I think that's what that reads there. 
Q. And now you say that you thought, notwithstanding· 
that promise, that if the lot depreciated you could turn it 
OVP,rf 
A. Yes, and I offered to pay you a certain amount of money 
and compromise the balance. 
Q. I'm getting rig·ht down to that now. You sent me this 
letter. didn't you? 
A. Yc~s, that's one of them. . . 
Q. And that letter reads this way: "February 18, 1939. 
1\1:1·. ,vminm G. Maupin, Bank of Commerce Bldg., Norfolk, 
Va. Re-Loan on lot #2, Glencove. Dear Sir: As per our 
phone conversation in regard to loan of $2,500.00 made by 
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you to the Cape Henry Cottage Corp. on above mentioned 
lot. I am enclosing· herewith copy of offer of $1,000.00 which 
was received sometime a?;o, but have delayed taking this 
matter with you, trying to get a bette1~ offer, but have failed 
in this effort. I see nothing else to do but let this go for 
$1,000.00, and I will give you my personal note for one-half 
of the balanec, which will be $750.00 and pay same either 
$2b.OO monthly or $150.00 semi-annually. Trust. 
page 77 ~ iug the above proposition will meet with your ap-
proval, l am, Very truly yours, Grover L. \Vhite.' > 
~rliat was not accepted, ,vas iU • 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you say anything about that to the Cape Henry 
Cottage Corporation f 
A. No, but I got Mr. Lindsay to come to see you about the 
thing. He said he thought you would make a reasonab1e 
offce on that Jine so that we could settle it. 
Q. What's Mr. Lindsay got to do with what Mr. Maupin 
can doT · 
A. He's th~ one borrowed the money from you for the Cape 
Henry Corporation. 
Q. Do you know wl1etber he ever did see me¥ 
A. He eaid he did. 
Q. '\Vhcn? 
A. A fe-w dnvs after I saw him about it. 
Q. You don't know of your own knowledge whether he 
ever did or not 7 
A. I think l\fr. Lindsav 's a truthful man. 
Q. You clicln ~t f:.ay unything to me about the Cape Henry 
Cottag·c Corporation? 
A.. I mf•ntfoncd that to you two or three times, when you 
were in the Law Building. · 
Q. About the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation? 
page 78 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the contrary didn't you say this lot wa8 
g·oing down in value and you wanted the party that loaned yoli 
the money to pay half? 
A. I asked yon to compromise the thing. 
(). Yon said because the value of that lot had gone down 
and you were lmdng money on the deal you thought the per-
son that loaned that money ought to make some settlement? 
A. And I told yon I based my judgment on your judgment 
:md I thought you ought to stand half the lo~s. 
Q. Did von ever consult me about making this deal with 
the Cape Henry Corporation 1 
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A. No, I didn't know you had the loan on it. (J. How could you take my valuation if you didn't know I 
had the loan on it f 
A. I knew you had the loan when I made the deal. 
Q. But you never consulted me about it, did you f 
A. No. . 
Q. So when the property went clown in value your whole 
idea was to cut down your loss by making the holder of that 
note be easy on you and aceopt less than $2,500.0(H 
A. That's what I tried to get you to do-told you I thought 
you ought to do it. 
Q. Did you ever make any effort to collect that $1,000.00 
the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation owes you? 
page 79 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. From whom¥ 
A. Mr. Li11dsay up to the time it wns turned over to Mr.· 
Larsen. Mr. Larsen finally took the property back. 
(~. AH n matter of fact, the Cape Henry Corporation sold 
that property to a man named Louis Larsen 7 
A. 'l,hat 's ri,ght. 
Q. On November 1st, 1928¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Larsen paid you part of the notes 1 
A. I don't tllink be did; they were all paid through Mr~ 
Lindsav. 
Q. n·ou 't you know it to be a fact that Mr. Larsen assumed 
$.1,300.00 of the $1~500.00 clue 0,n that second mortgage? 
A. I nevBr ngreecl to accept Mr. Larsen. 
Q. The deed conveyed it to Larsen, by which he assumed 
$1,HOO.OOf If that be true it must be a fact that $300.00 of 
the money that you got came from Larsen? 
A. It all came through Lindsay. 
Q. · You bad no trouble collecting that $500.00 from Lind-
sav? 
~\. No. 
Q. Have you ~Yer tried to collect this $800.00 ¥. 
A.. $1,000.00 you mean. Yes. I spoke to him 
page 80 ~ nhout it several times. He's here. Ask him. 
(). 13ut I'm asking vou about it now. 
A. I 1wohnbly Rpoke to him twcntv-five or thirty time~. 
Q. You knew the Cape Hemry Cottage Corporation wa~ 
dN1 lirn.~· in real estate-owned thousands and thousands of 
dollars '\'Orth? 
A. I dicln 't know bow much they owned. 
Q. You never got a judgment on those notes? -
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A. No. 
Q. You never attempted to get a judgment on them-Y 
A. No. 
Q. Although the Cape Henry .Cottage Corporation had any 
amount of real estate! 
A. No, they had already gone bankrupt when these notes 
came due. 
Q. 'l'hese notes came due· in !9.29-=---February, 1930. You 
don't mean to tell us that the Cape Henry Cottage Corpora-
tion had· busted then? · 
A. I lmov 1\fr. Lindsay told me they were. Just what 
time it wa.., I couldn't tell vou. 
Q. Mr. liindsay told yo11 in February 1930 that the Capc.> 
Henry Cottag·e Corporation was busted? 
A. I couldn't tell you the date, but it must have been afte1~ 
thi~ date. 
page 81 ~ Q. rm assuming that as soon as these notes fell 
due _and weren't collected that you tried to collect. 
them? 
A.. Yes. 
Q. The last one came due February, 19301 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when it wasn't paid you immediately tried to col-
lect it? · 
A. I wouldn ~t Ray immediately. I was a friend of Mr. 
Lindbay's ancl didn ;t ·want to· pus]1 him. I did ask him about 
it several times. My bookkeeper got after him, and I did 
personally too. 
Q . .Sl10rtly after the note came due 1 
A. I gues~ r-:o. 
Q. And h(' told you then that the Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration was busted? 
A. I don't ~ay he told me that rigl1t away, but. he finally 
did tell me. 
Q. And you made no effort to reduce it to judgment? 
A. No, J didn ·t tl1ink I needed to. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Ji'erebee: 
· Q. Thi~ 1ctter t11at Jias heen introduced in evidence that 
you wrote to Mr. Maupin February 18, 1939, offering a basis 
of possible snttleme.nt of this claim. Was tl1at be-
page 82 ~ fore 01 .. after you consulted an attorney about yom· 
leg·al rights in the matter? 
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A. That was written before. I didn't consult you about it 
until lie brought this suit. . 
Q. Up until tbat time did you know whether or not you 
did have any legal defense? 
A. Yes ; Mr. Maupin knows I told him I had a legal defense ; 
I didn't want to go to court-never been in court in my life. 
Q. \'Vas tlmt before or after November 1st, 1938, when the 
last payment wus madef 
A. Aftflr that. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. :Maupin: . 
Q. You say you told me that vou had a legal defense. What 
legal defense clid you tell me you had? 
.A. I didn't teU you what. 
Q. You never answ·ered my letters, did you t 
A. Yon never nnswered mine. I wrote three or four or 
.five. 
Q. You testified just now that tpat letter was turned down 
--that I told vou-
A. y OU never answered me anything by letter. y Otl 
wouldn't write me a letter. 
Q. Yon got these letters all rigl1t Y 
page 83 ~ A. T think I did. 
. Q. You didn't answer them, did you Y 
A. No, sir. Of course I told you over t!1e phone I was go-
inp: to let you bring suit. . . 
Q. Diel yon m1s-wer them verbally or otherwise 1 
.A. Yes, ~ir. 
Q. To me! 
A. No. sir ; Mrs. Moore. 
<;:. ,Vhat d1d you tell her? 
A. That I wasn't going to pay any more until we.got thiE~ 
thing· settled. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. •Ferebee: 
· Q. Mr. Maupin in hjs cross _examination referred to your 
promise in this c,xcliange contract of January 28, 1928, to 
assume the payment of this $2,500.00 mortgage on the Glen-
cove lot ancl asked you if that waR a distinct promise on your 
part. In making that promise were you influenced by thP. 
promise on behalf of the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation T -,,, 
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A . .Certainly I expected them to carry out their contract. 
Q . .Aud they didn't carry out their part of the agreement'/ 
.A. That's what I told Mr. Maupin; they didn't 
page 84 1· keep their contract. 
By Mr. l\Iaupin: 
Q. You testified you never mentioned the Cape Henry Cot-
tag·c Corporation to me. 
A. Ko, 1 told you I <lid mentioned it in the Law Building. 
Q. You mentioned the fact that the Cape Henry Cottag~ 
Corporation owed your money, to me in the Law Building l 
A. Yes. 
Q. When? 
A. I spoke to you about it several times, and you know 
all about this. 
(~. Didn ·t you tell me you got this lot from the Cape Henry 
Cotta~e Corporation and the value of the lot had gone down 
and you didn't think you ought to have to pay this whole 
$2,500.00f 
A .. I might have mentio11ed that one time too. 
Mr. Maupin: T'hat's all. 
By .Mr. ]i1erebec: 
Q. I hand you what appear to be ledger sheets and ask 
you if you ean idoutify them a.s being your personal ledger 
sheets of your personal and company transactions. · 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is there nny 1 efc~rence on tl1esc sheets to the $1,000.00 
debt as represented by these three notes introduced 
page 85 ~ in evidence, a~ to what disposition you made of 
1 h<.'m on vou 1-- record 0? 
A. Yes; we elm rg~cl that off to profit and loss. 
Q. As of what Hme<t What are the dates on these sheets? 
A. December HJ st, 1931. 
Mr. Ferebee·: I offer these ledger sheets in evidence as 
Exhibit D-5. No fur1-11er questions. 
HARVEY L. LINDSAY, 
being called aH nn ackerse witness for the defendnnt and b~-
ing duly Rworu, on oath testified as follows: 
Rv Mr. Ferebee: 
·Q. Your m~me h; Harvey L. Linclsay1 
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A. Yes. 
Q. You are mg-aged in the real estate business in the City 
of Norfolk? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And have been fol' bow long? 
4-. For about twenty years. 
<J. ~Vere you an oflieer of the Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration? 
A. Yes, E-ir. 
Q. 1-· on were an officer back in the period ·from 
page 86 ~ ]928 1o J93l, the only time we are interested inf 
mise. 
A. I wa..; an officer from its beginning to its de-
Q. ·what was the nature of the business canied on by that 
company? 
A. Real estate trading. Buying and selling, real estate. 
Q. Do you remernbe1; w]1en it began approximately? 
A. '14. 
Q. The bulk of its tramsad.ions took plac~ during the pe-
riod 1928, '29 nnd thr. early part of '30-or prior to '301 
A. I don't know, l\fr. Ferebe~. It's been so long ~go since 
that company was in existence I don't know when the bulk 
of its frnding took placo. I haven't heard anything of the 
company for su long--
Q. It's been almoRt ten yenrs since it did any business that 
you recall 1 rrirn t would be 1980 T 
A. Yes, I E-:uppose ~o ; I don't rerall. 
Q. 'J,he company foldr:c1 its tent and silently stole away-
eeased to do bu~nessl 
A. Ceased to do hmdnres, yes. 
Q. Do yon remember when its last franchise tax was paid? 
A. No, sir, I clon 't remem her. 
Q. S0mewl1ere around ten years f 
page 87 ~ A. I don't remember. There's no wav for me to 
answer tlrnse qu0stions. It's been so many years 
and the question uever has been brought up about it. There's 
no wav for me to nn:3wer with any degree of accuracy. 
Q. The corporation was es8entially a trading company! 
A. Ye8. 
Q. It had no nR~ets ()Xcept such property as it took in and 
immediately tried to dispose of? 
A. At times it l1ad assets; ot11er times it did not. · 
Q. At the encl, so for as you know, it ha.cl no asset~ or it 
wouldn't have gone defunct? 
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.lL I presum,~ that's the case, yes. 
Q. There have been introduced in evidence three notes of 
the ·Cape Henry Cottag·e Corporation, numbers, 6, 7 and 8, 
which are defendant's exhibits 2, 3 and 4, each of those notes 
signed by Cape Henry Cottage Corporation by J. B. Nor-
:fleet, Jr., President. Who was president of the company in 
1928? 
A. I think he wa.s the only president the companr had. 
Q. ·\"v hat officer were you f 
A. I think I was eecretary. 
Q. These noteR have boen introduced in evidence on behalf 
of the defendant. uncl I believe Mr. White testified as to them . 
before vou came in the courtroom. He testified 
page 88 ~ that no portion of these, three notes as to principal 
has been paid and that interest on them is unpaid 
from November 2nd, 1938. Do you have any recollection to 
the contrary that might sho,\t that :Mr. White is in error? 
A. I have not. It's been over eleven vears. I haven't 
heard an·:vthing of tl1e notes. No demand ims been made on 
me for payment of the notes. I have no way of telling you 
anything· els~. The records were · destroyed in the flood of 
1933 when our oliice was on Plume .Street, and I have noth-
ing. 
Q. You know Mr. ·white p~rsoually? 
A. Yes. 
. Q. How long havn you known llim Y 
A. I suppose iwm1ty- yfiar~. 
Q. vVliat wonld you say his reputation is for truth and 
veracity? 
A. I lrnve no reason to say it's anything but perfectl? ali 
rig;ht. 
Q. \Vould you hclieYe him under oath in a matter in which 
he was personally inte l"<?sted? . 
A. Y cs, I think I probnhly would. 
DIRECT JDXAl\HNATION. 
Bv l\Ir. :\faupin: 
·· c~. Mr. I,inclsay, isn't it a fact that this S1frrloy 
page 89 ~ A,1enue properiy which is spoken of in thi.s eon-
tract ]1e1·e was conveyecl by Cape Henry OoifagH 
Corporation to T..oui:=; Larsen on November 1st, 19~8? 
A. Ye~. 1he. rerorclR show. . 
Q. And lw assnnwd and promised to pay that debt? 
j 
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A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Mr. ·white testified a moment ago that he had no dif-
ficulty whatever in collecting $1,000.00 of those notes from 
you. 
Mr. Ferebee: $500.00. 
By l\fr. lVIa upin : 
Q. $500.00 I should say. Did he make any demand on you 
to pay the other $1,000.00? · 
A. I didn't hear anything of the notes on this property. 
The last I heard of it was when it was transferred to Mr. 
Larsen. Until I got the record I haven't heard anything 
more of the notes. 
Q. You didn't even know those notes were in default T 
A. No, sir, I didn't know they hadn't been paid. Nobody 
said uuything· to me about the notes. 
Q. Now the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation had a whole 
block of property do"rn at Virginia Beach? 
A. Oh, it hacl tremendous holdings of property about that 
time--0ne time. 
<J. About the time it took over this property? 
· page BO ~ A. It was an active trading corporation, pad a 
great deal of property at the time. 
0. It was worth ~M.,000.00? 
A. I would sav it was worth manv thousand. 
Q. No reason . why it couldn't have paid off these notes 
if demand lmd been made1 
A. No, sh, I don't think so. I didn't hear any more of 
th,-, note& aftm· the property was sold. 
Q. No clcmnncl was made 7 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. "\Vl1itc RayB he got you to intercede with me to let 
him off from pnyiug- this $2:500.00, to see if you couldn't 
persuad,~ me to let J1im off. Did you ever m~ke any such de-
mand ni:; that on me? 
A. I don't r<~member seeing you about it. Whether Mr. 
"'\Vhifo nsked me i:, n question I couldn't possibly answer. I 
knew enough n hout real estate to know you just can't take 
n piece of nrcmorty in lien of a deht. I dicln 't come to see 
v011 nbont it. Wl1ether he asked me I don't know. 
· 0. Yon m·e nerf e~tly' sure you never came to me in be-
half of l\fr. ,\1hitc to have my client take less than the deed 
of trust? 
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A. I don't remember doing it. 
CJ. You 're pretty sure of that f 
A. Pretty sure of that. 
RE.JCROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ferebee: 
Q. I under:-;tood you to say that you had forgotten about 
these notes. You knew about them when they were originally 
given, didn't yo\1 'J 
A. I indistinctly remembered, and I went up, knowning 1 
was going to testjfy, I got the facts of the transaction from the 
records. Of course I was se<.1retary of the company; I would 
· have known whc11 the notl's were given. 
Q. You bavc no independent recollection except what you 
got from tho H:!cordation cf the deed of trusU 
A. No; nobody has ever broached the subject of the notes 
to me. 
<~. You hem·d l\fr. Grover ·wnite testify he had talked with 
YOU on numerous 1irne~-- -one time he said orobablv as manv 
as twenty times- -about tlw payment of these notes. Are 
you prcpare'd to deny under oath that he asked you f 
A . .I ,vould answer that 1-hat I never remember of him ask-
ing· me, or sayin;2: anything of those notes to me. 
Q. If he says. tlmt he did under oath would you deny it, 
of your own 1 ecQJlnet.ion 1 
A. I would clistinctlv dc•nY it. Q.' And you say you·· forgoU 
A. No reas<m for me r0mcmbering. 
Q. And no reason for )1ou to remember him 
page 92 ~ speaking to you about it 1 
A. He sees me at intervals on the street, and 
he's sold me numerous materials to build houses that I build, 
and I think Mr. White would Irnve mentioned the notes to me 
if any reason would have come up to mention them. I don't 
see whv he didn't. I don't think l\f r. White has ever men-
tioned those notes to me or asked that they be paid. 
Q. rrhen you don't belieYc him under oath! 
Mr. }\faupin: I object. 
The Cond: That's a ·matt0r of anrnment to tlrn jury. 
M1·. Ferehee: I asked l1im first and l1e told me that. he~ 
would. · 
The Court: And now you foll him he wou1dn 't. 
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Mr. Ferebee: Yes, sir. . 
The Court: That's a matter of argument for the jury. 
By Mr. 11~,crcbce: 
Q. Mr. Liudsay, in response to },fr. :Maupin's question you 
said one time thh; companv was vwrth thousands of dollars. 
All it was worth was pape"r dollars 1 In other words, it hacl 
noteH and property on which there ·was mortgage indebted-
ness'! It never had any property free and clear¥ 
A. Yes it did. 
Q. Which piece! Name one. 
page H3 ~ A. I can't nnme any particular piece. I might 
answer the question the Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration was a very active trading· corporation. It had as-
sets from time to time, which were equities in properties, and 
it had clear proporties. 
Q. N mne one piece of property it had clear. 
A. I ean 't go back possibly to name them for you. You 
aslrncl me a general question and I answered it. 
Q. And now I'm asking· a specific question. 
A. I can't give you a specific answer. I can't tell you 
the various pieces they owned, because they owned a great 
many pieces. Rut as for the pieces they owned or the pieces 
clear or encnmherecl, I couldn't answer that. But the Cape 
Henry Cotfoge Corporation had tangible assets from time to 
timP-. 
Q. Whether it did on January 1st, 1930 you are not pre-
pared to tell us 1 
- A. No, sir, I clon ~t remember. 
C~- Do you know when l\fr. Larsen bought this loU 
A. This two--family apartment~/ 
Q. Yes. 
A. Only from the record that I have. 
Q. ,vhat dO(IS the record show? 
A. The record 8hows the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation 
c·onveyocl it to Louis Larsen November 1st, 1928. 
page 94 ~- (). And yon don't recall who made the payments 
of $500.00 that Mr. White admits has been paid 1 
A. No, sir, I dm1 't. Tf I fried to answer those qneRtions 
it would be entirely without-I don't remember whether I 
piticl them or whctl;er the p<?rson who bought it paid them. 
No way for me to answer that. 
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RE-DIRECT EXAl\UNATION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Let me see if I can't refresh your recollection from 
the records. Isn't it a fact that Mr. Larsen assumed $1,300.00 
of the debt originally $1,500.00T 
A. Oh, yes. I didn't notice that. 
Q. So that you had paid apparently $200.00, and Larsen 
assumed the balance of $1,300.00 f 
A. Evidently. That's what it says. 
Q. Aud after that time yon never heard anything about 
those notes and no request was made of you to pay them "i 
A. No, sir. I'm as near positive as a person can be of 
that. 
Mr.· Maupin: That's all. 
page 95 ~ GROVE·R L. WffiTE, 
the defendant, being thereupon recalled, on oath 
testified as follows: 
Bv Mr. J.i-,erebee: 
~Q. Mr. ·white, I hand you a letter dated A ngust 9, 1928, 
addreRi.:ied to Mr. I-I. L. Li.ndRay, c/o Furr & Lindsay, Nor-
folk. Virginia, regarding the notes that have been t~stified 
to by yon being given by the Cape Henry Cottage Corpora-
tion, and nsk if you sent the original of that letter to Mr. 
Lindsav. · · ·-~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
l\fr. Ferebee: I introduce this letter in evidence as Ex-
hibit D-7. Remo this to the jury. 
Note: The said letter, which is filed in evidence marked 
''Exhibit l>:-7," was thereupon read to the jnry by the wit-
ness. · 
By Mr. Ferebee: 
Q. Let me ask you to read further the pencil notations 
that appear 011 the copy of this letter, when they were made 
and who made them. 
A. This was made by the bookkeeper-they paid interest 
on this date-after that letter was written. 
0. ·w~re these notations made within a short Rpacc of time 
of the date of that letted 
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A. These notations were made on the dates that the interest 
was paid. No. 3 dated Feb. 2, 1928 for $100.00, 
page 96 ~ due Nov. 2, 1928, and the notation "Pd." and in-~ 
terest paid to November 2, 1928, $4.50. No. 4 dated 
]fob. 2, 1928 for $100.00, due Feb. 2; 1929, and the notation 
"Pd." and interest paid to November 2, 1928. No., 5 dated 
~,eb. 2, 1928 for $100.00, due May 2, 1929, and the notation 
"Pd." and interest of $4.50 paid to Novem~er 2, 19·28. No. 
6 dated Feb. 2, 1928 for $100.00, payable Aug. 2, 1929. No 
notation of paid, but interest paid, $4.50, to November 2, 1.928. 
No. 7 dated IB''eb. 2, 1928 for $100.00, due Nov. 2, 1929. No 
notation as to payment of principal but $4.50 credited to in-
terest under date of November 2, 1928. No. 8 dated Feb. 2, 
1928 for $800.00 due Feb. 2, 1930. No notation as to the 
payment of principal but a credit. for $36.00 interest to No-
vember 2, 1928. 
Q. I hand you also a carbon copy of a letter dated January 
24, 1930, from you to Mr. Louis Larsen, care of Brick Sales 
Corporation. Is Mr. Larsen the person who purchased the 
property on Shirley Avenue from Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration? 
A. Yes, $ir. 
Q. The date of this is January 24, 1930. You sent the origi-
nal of that to Mr. Larsen f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Ferebee: I offer this in evidence as Exhibit D-8. 
page 97 ~ Note: The sa.id letter marked Exhibit D-8 was 
thereupon read to the jury. 
By .Mr. FC?rebce: 
Q. I hand you carbon copy of a letter elated E,ebruary 19, 
1930, from you to !fr. Louis Larsen~ and ask you if you sent 
the orig;inal of that letter to Mr. Larsen. 
A. Y°es. sir. 
Mr. Ferebee: I offer this letter in evidence as Exhibit D-9. 
Note: The ~aid letter marked ~xhibit D-9 was thereupon 
rPad to the jury. 
Bv Mr. Ferebee: 
· •'Q. Was l\Ir. H. L. Lindsay the Lindsay of the firm of Furr, 
Lindsay & Gray? 
90 
. A .• Yes. 
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:Mr. Ferebee: No further questions. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. :Maupin: 
Q. Mr. White, this Jetter which you wrote to Lindsay was· 
dated Aug11st 9, ,1928, and the records show that that property 
waB conveyed" to Larsen the following- November, '28 t 
A. Yer:1. 
Q. Have you got any letter that you wrote to Lindsay after 
N ovemhcr, 1928, in wliich you asked Lindsay to 
page 98 ~ pay those notes? 
A. I wouldn't sav. I know that 1\fr. Larsen or 
Mr. Lindsay came out and sai~l he thought he had a deal and 
wanted to Iinow what I would take in cash. 
q. Have you any letter which you wrote to Mr. Lindsay 
after November 1st., 1928? 
A. I wouldn't say. I don't know whet.her I confirmed it 
by letter or not. 
Q. You have no letter that you can produce Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So tlmt you took it up with Larsen and asked him to 
pay tliese uotes 1 You made a rig·ht stiff demand on him-
Larscn. You didn't hold any notes of Larsen's, did you f 
.A. No, I didn't. 
Q. So you were attempting to collect out of Larsen claim-
ing he liacl n~sumecl the payment of another man's note, just 
::is yon a!:,:::nmied the payment of this 11.ote 1 
A. I never agreed to release the Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poratio11. 
Q. Wl:o ~mid you did? I said you assumed the payment 
of th~ Capo Henry Cottage Corporation's note, didn't you-
t}1is very $2,500.00 we are talking nbout f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now Lar~f'n assumed the payment of those other notes·! 
That's right? 
pag·c 99 ~ A. Y eR. 
Q. So you are trying to collect out of Larsen 
on those notes the same way Miss Neely is trying to collect 
out of you? 
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A. Well the money was being paid through 1Furr, Lind-
say and Gray. They said Larsen hadn't authorized them io 
do it. 
· Q. Th~ only reason Larsen paid you anything was because 
he assumed the payment of somebody else's loan ·t 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you were attempting to collect from him for that 
reason 1 
A. That\; right. 
Q. In other words, he bad exactly the same interest in his 
debt that you had in your debt? 
A. I imagine he did. 
Q. You know, as a matter of fact, that J\fr. Lindsay had 
gotten out fTom ·Furr, Lindsay and Gray t 
A. They were collecting rents on property for Mr. Larsen, 
and he asked me to ,vrite Lars011. 
Q. You say this man, Lindsay, was connected with that 
firm t Don't you know he was not connected with it Y 
A. Well bis name wouldn't be in there if he wasn't con-
nected with it, I didn't think. I always thought he was. 
page 100 ~ Mr. Ferebee: That's the defendant's case with 
the exception of a matter I would like to take up 
with the judge in the ahscnce of the jury. 
H. L. LINDSAY, 
being· thereupon recalled in rebuttal by the plaintiff, on oatb 
t<:stified as follows : 
Hy Mr. 1\:Iaupjn: 
Q. Have you even been an officer of or connected with the 
business of 1~,urr, Lindsay and Gray in any way 1 
A. I don't ]mow whether I was-I don't think I was an 
officer "\Ve sold our rental business to that firm and Mr. 
Furr and I retained a very small amount of the stock. I took 
no active part. 
Q. You had nothing whatever to do with the business? 
A. No. r,;ir. 
Q. They just kept. tllat name, Furr, Lindsay and Gray, be-
can se vou had been in the business t 
A. Ye!;, for advertising- purposes. 
Q. And you had nothing to do with it-took no part in the 
bmdneRs--clidn 't know what was going- on 1 
A. No, sir. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By :Mr. Ferebee: 
Q. That firm name was originally }-,m-r and Lindsay? 
A. Yes. 
page 101 ~ Q. It wa~ a partnership? 
A. Yes. 
Q. vV. as it ever incorporated 1 
A. I 1hink it was, yes; I think Furr and Lindsay incorpo-
ru tecl. I am answering from memory. 
(~. But you started off as a full partner of the firm of :B1urr 
and Lindsay? 
A. That'b the wav. 
Q. And the outside world knew of the firm as you being 
ono of the partners of it f 
Mr. Maupin: How does l1e know what the outside world 
knew? 
Bv 1\1.r. Ferebee: 
.. Q. The outside world in having dealings with Furr and 
Lindsay was correct in assuming that you were a member of 
the partnership? 
Tlrn Court: If he held himself out-
Bv l\ifr. Ferebee: 
· Q~ I'll ask him that way- Did you hold yourself out as 
a rnfmher of the firm of Furr and Lindsav? 
A. I wa~ a nartner in t]1e firm of Furr., a.ncl Lindsav. 
Q. Theu it iater became the firm of Furr, Lindsay and 
Grav? A: Not that firm. No, sir. Furr and Lindsay continued 
on for years after }1urr, Lindsay and Gray was 
page 102 ~ incorporated. 
Q. Did you ever issue any notice to the public 
that the Lindsay in Fnrr, Lindsay and Gray wasn't you or 
that von had no connection with it? 
A. "1 think we notified the public when we sold out our 
rental and insurance business to the two l\fr. Gravs. I am 
confident they announced they had bought it. I ~can't an-
swer your question any more than that. I don't know what 
the offiein] anuouncement was. 
Clara J. Neely v. Grover L. White. 93 
H. L. Lindsay. 
Q. Are you prepared to deny that you received the original 
of that letter, D-7 Y 
A. No, ] 'm not prepared to deny it. . I don't know. 
Q. ~I.1he letter I notice is addressed to Mr. H. L. Lindsay, 
care of Furr and Lindsay, dated August 9, 1928. Is there 
any reason why that wo-qld not have been delivered to you 
in the ordinary course of mail f 
A. No. sir. 
RFJ-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By l\.fr. :Maupin: 
Q. Let'~ get this thing straight. You and Herman Furr 
we1·e in the real. estate business for many years T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that was real estate transactions and rentals 7 
A. And insurance. 
Q. Then in 1928 or thereabouts you sold your 
page lOR ~ rental business to t]1e Messrs. Gray, and a cor-
poration was formed-Furr, Lindsay and Gray-
that handled the rental end of iU 
A. Autl immrance. 
Q. And you, with ::.Mr. Furr, continued for years as 1F.urr 
and Lind~1ay, and the rental firm continued as Furr, Lindsay 
nm] Gray, and wore entirely distinct and separate f 
A. Ye8. 
Q. And you had nothing; to -do with that business t 
A. No more than you have except for owning a few shares 
of $tock. 
(~. Rut you had nothing· to clo with the conduct of the busi-
ness! 
A. I cli<l not; no, sfr. 
· Q. Aud this Iettor was a cl dressed to you before the prop-
nrh- wa8 sold to I Jfl rsen? 
A. Yes, sir . 
. RE-CROSS E~AMINATION. 
By Mr. Ferebee: 
· Q. .A.re you prepared to deny that you were an officer in 
the firm of :B,nrr~ Linclsav and Gray as weU as a stockholder? 
A. No. sir, I'm not prepared to deny that. 
Q. Wlwu you amnvered Mr. Maupin 's question that you had 
no interest in it except as a stockholder, that's subject to 
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qualification! You were also an officer? 
pag<~ 104 ~ A. More than likely Mr. Gray had us in there 
ns vice president or something- of that sort, but 
as a practical matter I never knew what was going on in 
li,m·t·, Lindsay and Gray. 
Note:· _Thereupon the jury vv-ere excluded. 
:i\'f r. F\•rcbcc: If Your Honor please, I should like at this 
time fo review the court's rooollection with what has taken 
phwc in our pleadings up to the present time, because there 
is ono matter in connection with the pleadings that may have 
to go iu the evidence. Your Honor will recall that one or 
the point~ involved was as to the fi.nality of the judgment, 
wLether the oflice jndgment became final. Part of the circum-
stances unclel' Virginia decisions in determining whether or 
not office judgments become final is the action of counsel as 
to setting the case voluntarily after the l 5th day of the term 
and matters of that nature. In the proofs that have been 
filed in support of the pleadings and in support of the propo-
Ri1ion on behalf of the defendant that the office 
page 105 ~ judgment did not become final reference was 
made to the circumstances surrounding the set-
ting- of this case. Whether these circumstances will have 
to b~ proved in the evidence or whetller they can go in the 
evid,mce by stipulation of counsel for tl1e plaintiff t am not 
prepared to say. The circumstances I am quite certain are 
uncontradicted, and I want to prove them if the stipulation 
is not forthcoming. Those facts are as follows: 
The Court: They are not set up in the order enterecl 1 
Mr. Ferebee: Those facts were not set out. As a matt.e1· 
of fact I don't think they could properly be set out in the 
order~. But in order to have the record complete before the 
ap1:;cllate court if it goes there I think these facts should 
he in tbf:' record. The first fact is, when the bill was filed 
with the accompanying· affidavits it was filed to the first Sep-
tember R.ule8. 
Mr. ~Iannin: That's already in the record. 
Mr. F·erebee: That's in the rec01·d. The. next. is, the Sec-
ornl Rules had elansed hcfo1·e the docket call whicli followed 
tl1e filing of the biI1. 
The Court: Yon mean the notice of motion? 
1\fr. Ferebee: It was a declaration. I should 
page -106 ~ have said dechiration mtl1er tlrnn bill. Tlie decla-
ration ,vas filed the first September Rules and 
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tho second September Rules had passed prior to the conven-
ing of the court for the October term. The court convened 
Octobe1· Hth, 19ml, which was a :Monday, and the docket call 
was held on U1at dny. The second fact is, when the case was 
called by the Clerk at the docket. calJ a general demurrer was 
filed by counsel for the defendant. 
Mr. ·Maupin: Tl,at's in the record. , 
Mr. :B,cn1bee: ':l1hat at the time the general demurrer was 
filed at the docket call, counsel for the defendant requested 
tho cas(~ to be 8et down for hearing on the demurrer only, and 
tho Clerk set the matter for hearing on the general demurrer 
only for Novmber 4th, 19'H9. 
Tlw next fact, which is not in the record and which is, I 
think, uncontrndicted, is that counsel for the plaintiff was 
not at the docket call wl1en the matter was set. 
The next fact, which is not in the record, is that on th(1 
same clay, Oc.•toher 9th, 19:39, counsel for the defendant wrote 
a le:tter to counsel for the plaintiff advising counsel for the 
plaintiff of t.he action taken at. the docket call re-
page 107 ~ garding the date set for the hearing on the gen-
eral demurrer and calling- attention to the fact 
that if no ndverse statement was received from him as to the 
agrceability of that date it would he as~nuned that tho date 
wm; sntisfactory. I sl10uld like to offer that letter in evidence,. 
-I i,ssume Mr. l\faupin will admit having received it-so 
as to sl1ow wl1at 8teps were taken by counsel in this niatter-
if l\fr. lVJ aupin dnesn 't object. 
Mr. l\foupin: None in the world. I don't think it ought 
to go to the jury. 
I\fr. Ferebee: No, the jury has nothing· to do with this 
n1atter. · 
Mr. Maupin: I 1iave no objection to admitting that I re-
ceivNl that letter and to lmving tl1e letter put in the record 
hy stipulation. I ,vould like to mnke my position clear. I 
do11 't nnderstand that it's incumbent on counsel for the plain-
tiff to instruct achrerse counsel. The Clerk notified me of 
it and I clidn 't see wbv that letter called for anv answer .. 
The Court: I don '(see why it ought to go to"' the jury. 
Mr. Ji"e-?·ehet•: No, and I am not offering it for that, hut 
merely on this point of law which has already been decided 
by the court. 
page 108 r Note: The said copy of letter dated October 9. 
1939, was thereupon filed marked "Exhibit D-10. 
Note for the jury". 
Mr. Ferebee: Tl1e next fact I should lilrn to appear in the 
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record is that no reply was re~eived from counsel for the plain-
tiff to the letter of October 9, 1939. 
Mr. Maupin: I will admit that. Let the record show it. 
Mr. Ferebee: The next fact is that Mr. Maupin, as coun-
sel for the plaintiff, appeared before this court on the 16th 
day of the October term~ which was October 24th, 1939, and 
asked that the office judgment already entered in this case 
be· decreed final. 
Mr. Maupin: My motion is already in the record. I don't 
want it paraphrased by Mr. Ferebee. It's already there. 
Mr. Ferebee: I should like to have the further fact appear 
in the record, by stipulation if agreeable; if not, by proof; 
that counsel for the plaintiff did not give any notice to coun-
sel for the defendant of his intention to ask on that date or 
any subsequent date for entry of an order de-
page 109 ~. claring the office judgment to be final. 
Mr. Maupin: And also let it show that when 
-counsel asked for the entry of judgment counsel for the de-
fendant was present in the court, and that the motion was not 
made in the absence of counsel for the defendant. 
Mr. Ferebee: By mere coincidence. 
Mr. Maupin: He was present in court. 
Mr. Ferebee: Do I understand, l\Ir. Maupin, that with the 
qualifications my statement of these facts can go in the record 
'by stipulation? 
Mr. Maupin: This can be stipulated. That counsel for the 
plaintiff was not present at the calling of the docket. That the 
letter referred to by Mr. Ferebee was received by counsel for 
the plaintiff. That counsel for the plaintiff made no reply 
thereto. Tl1at counsel for the plaintiff on the 16th day of 
the October te11m made a motion for judgment and that Mr. 
Ferebee was present ii~ the court. 
Mr. Ferebee: Will you further stipulate that Mr. Ferebee 
was not notified that the motion was to be made f 
Mr. Maupin: I will not, because you were present in the 
court. The motion would not have been made if 
page 110 ~ I hadn't know you were going to be present-if 
I hadn't known you were going to be in court-
but I knew you were going to be here. 
The Court: Was that the day set for the general demurrer? 
Mr. Ferebee: No, sir. . 
Mr. Maupin: That was the 16th day of the term. 
Mr. Ferebee: Counsel for the defendant wishes to have 
this stipulation reserved in the record if agreeable to counsel 
for the plaintiff, for the reason that defendant's counsel was 
present in court on the morning of October 24th, but that he 
was at that time engaged in the trial of another case and had 
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received no notice of the fact tha.t the motion of Mr. Maupin's 
was to be presented at the court. Is that accepted Y 
Mr. Maupin: With this addition. That counsel for the 
plaintiff had lea.med at the office of counsel for the defendant 
upon calling there that he was going to be in court and for 
that reason did not see any necessity of giving additional 
notice; and I don't ,,Tant the record to show even by impli-
cation that I was lacking in what is necessary in 
page 111 ~ courtesy or proper practice with regard to oppos-
ing counsel. 
Mr. Ferebee: With that exceptions those stipulations can 
go in. 
The Court: All right, now we'll take up the instructions. 
THEREUPON the plaintiff offered her Instruction Num-
ber 1, as follows: 
''Instruction No. 1. The court instructs the jury that the 
defendant, Grover L. White, has admitted that he signed and 
sealed the deed from Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, as 
g-rantor, to him, as grantee, dated February 1, 1928~ mentioned 
in the declaration and introduced in evidence in this case, and 
the effect of the signing and sealing of said deed by said de-
fendant, Grover L. White, was to impose liability upon him to 
pay to the plaintiff the sum of $2,500.00, with 6% interest 
thereon, which liability is enforcible by the plaintiff against 
said Grover L. ·white in this case. If the jury shall believe 
from the evidence that no part of the principal of said 
$2,500.00 has been paid and that interest on said $2,500.00 is 
due from the 1st day of November, 1938, and that thern are 
no off-sets or defense enforcible by said defend-
page 112 } a.nt, Grover L. White, against the said plaintiff 
or Cape Henry Cottage Corporation as defined in 
other instructions of the Court, then the plaintiff, Clara J. 
Neely, is entitled to recover from said Grover L. White the 
sum of $2,500.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 6% 
per annum from the 1st day of November, 1938, until paid." 
vVbich said Instruction No. 1 was granted by the Court, a.nd' 
the defendant excepts, as follows: 
"Counsel for the defendant objects to the granting of In-
struction Number 1, on the ground that it does not take "into 
consideration the fact that the plaintiff's rights in this action 
are entirely dependent upon such rights as may exist on be-
half of the Cape Henry Cottage Corpora.tio~1 against the de-
fendant, Grover L. White. More specifically, objection is made 
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to the fact that the instructio11 does not take into consideration 
the failure of consideration on the part of the Cape Henry 
Cottage Corporation, namely, the payment of the notes 
amounting to $1,000.00 which accrued prior to the matm·ity 
date of tlie $2,500.00 obligation to the plaintiff, namely, Ko-
vember 1, 1929. In view of said prior failnre of consideration, 
the defendant, Grover L. ·white, was thereupon 
page 113 ~ excused from further performance of his said con-
tract with Cape Henry Cottage Corporation." 
THEREUPON the plaintiff offered her Instruction Num-
ber 2, as follows : 
"Instruction No. 2. The Court instructs the jury that if 
they believe from the evidence that the defendant, GroY<.H" L. 
White, signed the clec~l of February 2, 1928, in evidence in 
this case; that the plaintiff Clara J. Neely is the holder of the 
· debt which in said deed the said Grover L. v\Thite assumed and 
promised to pay; that the principal of said debt is $2,50!).00; 
that the said Grover L. White paid interest thereon unt-il the 
2nd day of November, 1938, and has paid no interest Hinre 
that elate; and that no part of the principal of said dP-ht has 
been paid: then the jury must :find that the defendant Grover 
L. White is indebted to the plaintiff Clara J. Neely in the 
sum of $2,500.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 6% 1wr 
annum from the 2nd day of Novemller, 1938, until paid, and 
that the said plaintiff, Neely, do recover from the said defend-
ant, White, accordingly, upon the declaration in this ('.H:rn. 
And the Court further instructs the jury that if they be-
lieve from the evidence that the notes of Cape 
page 114 ~ Henry Cottage Corporation which the def(~mlant, 
·white, claims to hold and which he seeks in his 
plea, entitled 'Special Plea of Set-off', to set off against any 
indebtedness due from him to the plaintiff and to assert as the 
basis of a recovery in his favor against Cape Henry Cottago 
Corporation, matured more than five years prior to tlw date 
, of the filing of his said plea in this case, to-wit, the 5th day of 
December, 1939, then the said defendant ·white is not entitled 
to recover anything by virtue of said notes; they do not con-
stitute any ground of offset in favor of said White as against 
said Neely nor any ground of recovery in favor of said ·white 
as against Cape Henry Cottage Corporation; and they cannot 
be considered by the jury as the basis for reduction of the 
amount, if any, which the jury may find from the eviclen~e 
that said White owes said Neely, nor can they he considered 
as the basis for a verdict in favor of said White against Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation." 
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Which said Instruction No. 2 was refused by the Court, 
and the plaintiff excepts, as follows: 
'' The plaintiff by counsel excepts to the refusal of the court 
to grant his Instruction Number 2 on the ground that the in-
struction is a correct exposition of the law, is sup-
page 115 ~ ported by Section 6149 of the Code of Virginia 
and by the case of 8 ext on v. A·uUman, 92 Va., page 
30; that the notes offered in evidence by the defendant, \Vhite, 
are barred by the statute of limitations; that the plea filed 
by the defendant pursuant to Section 6145 of the Code of 
Virginia sets up certain matters therein contained as to which 
said matters the said defendant occupies the position of a 
plaintiff, is deemed to have broug·ht an action thereo11, and 
the matters and things set up in said plea are open to the 
same gTounds of defense to which they would have been open 
if an action had. been brought by the defendant thereon, in-
cluding the defense of the statute of limitations; and that the 
defense of limitation can properly be raised in this case by an 
instruction.'' 
THEREUPON the plaintiff offered her Instruction N um-
ber 3, as follows : 
''Instruction No. 3. The Court instructs the jury that if 
they believe from the evidence that the three notes of Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation for $100.00, $100.00, and $800.00, 
respectively, introduced by the defendant Grover 
page 116 ~ L. ·white in evidence in this case, all matured 
more than five years prior to the date of the filing 
of said White's special plea. of set-off herein, to-wit: prior 
to the 5th day-of December, 1939, then the said .notes are not 
legally a matter of defense to the said· White against the 
claim of the plaintiff in this case and cannot be used as a bash, 
of any reduction in the amount, if any, which the plaintiff 
Neely may be entitled to recover against said defendant 
White.'' 
,vhich said Instruction No. 3 was refused by tlw <·ourt, 
and the plaintiff excepts, as follows : 
"The plaintiff by counsel excepts to the refusal of the court 
to grant his Instruction Number 3 on the ground that the in-· 
structiou is a correct exposition of the law, is supported by 
Section 6149 of the Code of Virginia and by the case of SP-xton 
v. Aultman, 92 Va., page 30; that the notes offered in evidence 
by the defendant, vVhite, are barred by the statute of limi-
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t.ations; that the plea filed by the defendant pursuant to Sec-
tion 6145 of the Code of Virginia sets up certain matters 
therein contained as to which said matters the said defendant 
occupies the position of a plaintiff, is deemed to have brought 
an action thereon, and the matters and thi11gs se1· 
page 117 ~ up in said plea are open to the same grounds of 
defense to which they would have been open if an 
action had been brought by the defendant thereon, including 
the defense of the statute of limitations; and that the defense 
of limitation can properly be raised in this case by an instruc-
tion.'' 
THEREUPON th(I plaintiff offered her Instruction Number 
4, as follows : 
'' The Court instructs the jury that, so far as concerns the 
offsets claimed by Grover L. White in this case, whether the 
same be claimed against Clara J. Neely or against Cape Henl'y 
Cottage Corporation, the said Grover L. White occupie~ the 
position of a plaintiff ans has the burden of proving the exist-
ence and· validity of said offsets by a preponderance of the 
evidence, which burden rests upon him during the entire case; 
and if the jury shall believe from all the evidence in th is ca~w 
that the said Grover L. ,Vhite has failed to prove the existence 
and validity of said offsets, or any of them, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, they should find against the said Grover 
L. White upQn any offset as to which they believe from the 
evidence he has failed to sustain the burden rest-
page 118 ~ ing upon him as aforesaid.'' 
But the court amended said instruction by striking out the 
word "offsets" wherever the same appeared in said iirntnlC-
tion and substituting therefor the word ''defenses'', and as 
amended granted said Instruction No. 4. 
To which action of the court in amending said Instruction 
No. 4 the plaintiff by counsel excepts, on the ground tlrnt. tlw 
notes introduced in evidence by said Grover L. White, the 
defendant herein, made by Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, 
in the principal sums of $100.00, $100.00 and $800.00 re:::pec-
tively, were claimed in the special plea of set-off filed by <:;aid 
defendant to be offsets and are properly described as off-
sets to the claim of the plaintiff according to the contP-nlion 
of the defendant.'' 
And the defendant excepts as follows : 
"Counsel for the defendant objects to the grant i11~ of Iu-
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struction No. 4, on the ground that in this case the fili11g of 
the plea of failure of consideration under Section 6145 does 
not place the defendant in the position of a plaintiff for the 
purposes of establishing such failure of consideration. The 
most that is imposed upon him is the duty td ...sup-
page 119 } port the burden of proof as to such failure of con-
sideration. The instruction as granted is there-
fore erroneous, since it defines the duty of the defendant 
as that of a plaintiff in this proceeding, rath~r than defining 
the burden of proof which rests upon him in establishing hi-s 
defense of failure of consideration.'' 
THEREUPON the defendant offered his instruction, D-1, 
as follows: 
'' The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from 
the evidence that the defendant, Grover L. White, has never 
received payment of the three notes of the Cape Henry Cot-
tage Corporation, dated February ·2, 1928, and in the aggre-
gate amount of $1,000.00,. then such non-payment constitutes a 
failure of consideration for the defendant's promise to a&-
sume payment of the note being sued upon in this case, and 
you should return yom verdict for the defendant.'' 
,vhich said Instruction D-1 was refused by the court, and 
the def eudant excepts, as follows : 
'' Counsel for the defendant objects to the refusal of the 
court to grant his Instruction D-::1 on the grouiicl 
page 120 } that, as set forth in the foregoing objections in-
corporated herein, the prior failure of the Cape 
Henry . Cottag·e Corporation to pay the three notes aggre-
g-ating $1,000.00 excuses the defendant from further per-
formance on his part, and that after such prior failure of 
consideration he was excused from fulfilling his assumption 
of the $2,500.00 indebtedness on the note held by Clara J. 
Neely, t11e plaintiff." • 
THEREUPON the defendant offered his Instruction num-
bered D-2, as follows: 
·'D-2. The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from 
the evidence that the failure of the Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration to pay the principal and interest of the 3 notes (Nos. 
6, 7 & 8) aggregating· the principal sum of $1,000.00 amounted 
to a substantial or material breach of its contract with the 
defendant, Grover L. White, and that such breach occurred 
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prior to the defendant's failure to pay the note sued upo;:i in 
this case at maturity, then you should find for the defendant.'' 
·which said Instruction D-2 was refused by the court, and 
the defendant excepts, as follows: 
"Counsel for the defendant excepts to tlrn refusal of the 
court to grant instruction D-2, on the ground that 
page 121 ~ the sole issue in this case is as to whether or not 
the prior failure of the Cape Henry Cottage Cor-
poration to pay the three notes aggregating $1,000.00 
amounted to a substantial or material failure of consideration 
for the defendant's promise to pay the mortgage indebted-
ness of $2,500.00 held l)y Clara J. Neely.'' 
THEREUPON the defendant offered his Instruction D-3, 
as follows: 
"D-3. The Court instructs the jury that if yon believe from 
the. evidence that the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation has 
failed to pay or to have paid to the defendant the three notes 
(Nos. 6, 7 & 8) in the aggregate principal amount of $1,000.00, 
then the defendant is entitled to a credit for that amount, to-
gether '"ith interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum 
from November 2, 1928, to date, together with a further credit 
for such additional damages as you may believe from the 
evidence have been occasioned to tlie defendant by virtue of 
such failure to pay the said sum of $1,000.00 when and as 
due.'' 
. And the court amended said instruction by deleting there-
. from the words: ''-together with a further credit 
page 122 ~ for such additional damages as you may believe 
from the evidence have l)een occasioned to the de-
fendant by virtue of such failure to pay the said sum of 
$1,000.00 when and as clue,' '-and as so amended granted said 
Instruction D-3. · 
To which action of the court in granting the said Instruction 
D-3 as amended the said plaintiff by counsel duly excepted 011 
the grounds that the three notes mentioned in said instruction 
show on their face that they are subject to the defense of the 
statute of limitations; that the said notes wei·e raised in the 
pleadings, in the special plea of set-off filed by the defendant, 
"White, herein pursuant to Section 6145 of the Code of Vir-
ginia; that the said plaintiff, pursuant to Section 6146 of 
the Code of Virginia, must reply only by general replication 
Clara J. Neely v. Grover L. White:18 103 
to the said plea and is not permitteg to file any special repli-
cation thereto; that the defense of the statute of lirni~ations 
can, therefore, be raised only at the trial and cnn prop~rly be 
r~ised by an appropriate instruction at the trial; and that the 
evidence shows on its face that the said notes are' barred 
by limitation and no longer enforcible, either in 
page 123 ~ an independent action brought thereon or as a 
matter of defense or offset when raised by a plea 
:fileci by the defendant pursuant to Section 6l•J5 of the Code · 
of Virginia. '' 
THEREUPON the defendant, by counsel, interposed the 
following objection: 
''In addition to the specific objections already pointed out 
to the foregoing instructions, counsel for the defendant fur-
ther directs the attention of the court to the fact that the plain-
tiff in this case, Clara J. Neely, stands in the shoes of the 
Cape Henry Cottage Corporation, and under Section 6145 of 
the Code is subject in this action to all def ens es which exist 
on behalf of the defendant against the Cape Henry Cottage 
Corporation; that in standing in the shoes of the Cape Henry 
Cottage Corporation, sl1e, the plaintiff, cannot recover against 
Grover L. White unless and until the amount of $1,000.00 
represented by the three notes in question has been paid to 
him. · 
A further objection to the instructions is that they do not 
take into consideration the fact that the defendant, Grnver L. 
White, is, under Section 6145, entitled to all equitable defenses 
which exist between him and the Cape Henry Cot-
pa.ge 124 ~ tage Corporation, and that the instructions as· 
given preclude him from taking advantage of the 
fact that title to the Glencove lot is still subject to the out-
standing mortgage securing the $2,500.00 note. Further, that 
if the defendant is required in this action to pay the difference 
between $2,500.00 with interest and $1,000.00 with interest 
(due from the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation to him) he 
will be required to pay for something which neither the plain-
tiff nor the Cape Henry Cottage Corporation is in a position 
to grant him, 11:amely, a credit on the obligation secured· by 
the deed of trust on this Glen cove lot. '' 
T~EREUPON the jury returned to the courtroom and after 
they were instructed as heretofore shown and after the argu-
ments of counsel for the plaintiff. and the defendant the jury 
retired to their room and later returned a verdict in the fol-
lowing words and figures : 
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"The jury finds that Miss Neely is entitled to recover $2,500 
and interest @ 6% per annum from M:r. White dated from 
November 1, 1938. The jury also finds that Mr. 
page 125 ~ White is entitled to a credit to apply against above 
mentioned sum amounting to $1,000 plus interest 
@ 6% from November 2, 1928, to date. R. G. Carroll, Fore-
man.'' 
page 126 ~ I, Allan R. Haneke!, Judge of the Circuit Court 
of the City of Norfolk, in the State of Virginia, 
who presided ove~ the fore going trial in said court, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy and report 
of all of the evidence, all of the instructions offered, amended, 
granted and refused by the court, and all of the other incidents 
of the said trial, with the exceptions and objections of the 
respective parties as therein set forth. 
And I do further certify that the defendant, Grover L. 
White, had reasonable notice in writing-, given by the defend-
ant, of the time and place when said copy and report of all 
of the eviden,!e, instructions, exceptions and other incidents 
of the trial would be tendered and presented to the under-
signed for signature and authentication. 
Given under my hand this 6th day of J ul~r, 1940, within 
sixty ( 60) clays after the entry of the final judgment in said 
cause. 
ALLAN R. HANCKEL, 
Judge of tl1e Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
pag·e 127 ~ The follow'ing- Stipulation of Counsel was filed 
on the 6th day of July, in the year 1940: 
It is stipulated and agreed between "\Vm. G. Maupin, counsel 
for plaintiff, and Edward S. Ferebee, counsel for defendant, 
in this case, as follows : 
FIRST. That the written opinion of the Judg·e of the Cir-
cuit Court of the City of Norfolk filed amongst the papers in 
this cause shall be incorporated in and made a part of the tran-
script of the record. 
SECOND. That the exhibits in this case and introduced 
at the trial shall be certified bv the Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of the Citv of Norfolk and forwarded to the Clerk of thr 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia and may be used at 
the hearing; on appeal with the same effect as in the Court 
below. The said exhibits shall be signed or initialed by the 
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Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk and con-
sist of exhibits marked "A", "B", "C", "D", and "E" 
introduced in evidence at the trial by the plaintiff, and ex-
hibits marked "D-1 ", "D-2 ", "D-3 ", "D-4", "D-5 ", "D-6", 
"D-7", "D-8", "D-9", and "D-10" introduced in evidence 
at the trial by the defendant. 
In ,vitness Whereof, the said Wm. G. Maupin and Edward 
S. Ferebee have hereunto set their hands and seals this 6th day 
of July, 1940. 
"\VM. G. MAUPIN 
EDWARD S. FEREBEE 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
page 128 r The following is the Written Opinion of the. 
Judge of this Court made a part of the record by 
the foregoing stipulation: 
On this motion to set aside the verdict I am of opinion to 
adhere to my former ruling on the question of setting· aside 
the office judgment. 
And as to defendant's objection that verdict is erroneous 
for not allowing to defendant a verdict in his favor as to 
plaintiff's entire claim, seems to be unsound for the reason 
that both plaintiff and defendant's claims arise out of one and 
the same transaction, under the terms of which one of the 
parties was obligated to pay $1,500-the other $2,500-and 
inasmuch as the plaintiff standing in the shoes of one of the 
parties sues the other obligated party their respective rights 
are determined by the terms of the original contract. 
And a reference to that contract and the evidence on the 
trial seems to me to show that the jury's verdict allowing 
one claim as a credit on the other is correct. 
I do not see the applicability of the cases of Osborne v. 
Cabell, or Willia,ms v. W orshami to the facts here, and am of 
opinion that it is a clear case of subtracting one claim from 
tl1e other and giving judgment for the difference. 
The motions to set aside the verdict are overruled. 
A. R.H. 
page 129 ~ I, Cecil J\L Robertson, Clerk of the Circuit 
Court of tho City of Norfolk, State of Virginia, 
do certify that the foregoing report of the testimony and 
other incidents of the trial in the case of Clara J. Neely, 
· Plaintiff, v. Grover L. White, Defendant, herein referred to, 
all of which have been duly authenticated by the Judge of said 
106 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Court, were filed and lodged with me as the Clerk of said 
Court on the 6th clay of July, 1940. 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
By vV. R. H.A.NCKEL, D. C. 
page 130 ~ In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of 
the City of Norfolk, State of Virginia. 
On the 6th day of July, 1940. 
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, State of Virginia, do certify that the fore-
going is a true transcript of the Record in the suit of Clara J. 
Neely, Plaintiff, v. Grover L. White, Defendant, lately pend-
ing in said court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the defendant had received due 
notice thereof and of the intention of the plaintiff, Clara J. 
Neely, to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
for a writ of error and supersedeas to the judgment therein. 
Teste: 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, :Virginia. 
By W. R. HANCKEL, D. C. 
Fee for this transcript, $37.75. 
A Copy-Teste ~ 
M. B. Vl ATTS, C. C. 
INDEX TO RE<;ORD 
Page 
- Petition fo1· ·writ of Error .............. : . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Record ............................................ H2 
Declaratio11 . . . . .................................... a2 
Account of .Affidavit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H4 
Demurrer to Declaration ............................. 36 
Order, November 10, H>39, Denying Motion for Judg-
me11t, &c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :37 
Plea of Non Est Factumi ......................... · ... 38 
Plea of Statute of Limitations ....................... a8 
Ple~ of Failure of Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
Order, December 5, rn:39 ............................. 40 
Motion to Reject Pleas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
Motion to Transfer Cause to Equity Side ............... 4~ 
Special Plea of Set-Off . . ..................... ; . . . . . . 4:J 
Contract for Exchange of Real Estate, ,January 28, 1928, 
between Grover L. ,vhite and Cape Henry Cottage 
Corporation ..................................... 45 
Motion to Hcject Plea of Set-Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
Order, December 5, 1939, Appointing Receiver for Cape 
Henry Cottage Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
Petition of Grover L. White for Appointment of Receiver 49 
Petition for Joinder of Cape Henry Cottag·e Corporation 50 
Plea of Statute of Limitations by Harvey L. Lindsay, Re-
ceiver, &c ....................................... 51 
Verdict of .Jury and Motion to Set Aside ........... 53, 104 
Judgment, l\fay 23, 1940,-Complained of . . . . . . . . . . . . 5a 
Notice of A ppea I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
Stenographic Report of Ter.;timony, &c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;;5 
Mary l\L l\Ioore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
Grover L. W11itc ................................ fi6, 88 
Harvey L. Lindsay ............................. 82 
Arg·ument of Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $)4 
I11structio11s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 
·v erclict . . . . ........................................ 104 
,Judg·e 's Certificate .................................. 104 
Stipulation of Counsel ............................... 104 
Opinion of ,Judge . . . . ............................... 105 
Clerk's Certificates .............................. 105, 106 

